413 U.S. 376 (1973)
The Human Relations Ordinance of the City of Pittsburgh (the Ordinance) has been construed below by the courts of Pennsylvania as forbidding newspapers to carry "help-wanted" advertisements in sex-designated columns except where the employer or advertiser is free to make hiring or employment referral decisions on the basis of sex.1 On October 9, 1969, the National Organization for Women, Inc. filed a complaint with the Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations alleging that the Pittsburgh Press Co. was violating the Ordinance by permitting employers to place help-wanted advertisements in sex-designated columns.2
The Commission held a hearing at which it received evidence, including clippings from the January 4, 1970 edition of the Sunday Pittsburgh Press arranged by column.3 The Commission found that during 1969 the Pittsburgh Press had carried a total of 248,000 help-wanted advertisements and that its practice was to use columns captioned "Jobs—Male Interest," "Jobs—Female Interest," and "Male-Female," with placement determined according to the advertiser's wishes.4
On July 23, 1970, the Commission issued a Decision and Order finding that the Pittsburgh Press had aided advertisers in violation of the Ordinance by maintaining a sex-designated classification system and directing it to cease and desist from such violations and to utilize a classification system with no reference to sex.5 The order was affirmed in relevant respects by the Court of Common Pleas.6
On appeal, the Commonwealth Court narrowed the order to permit sex-designated columns for jobs exempt from the Ordinance, such as those with employers of fewer than five persons, employers outside Pittsburgh, religious organizations, domestic service, or positions with certified bona fide occupational exceptions.7 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied review.8
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the First Amendment challenge to the modified order.9
Whether the Human Relations Ordinance of the City of Pittsburgh as construed by the Pennsylvania courts violates the freedoms of speech and of the press guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments?10
Commercial speech that does no more than propose a commercial transaction receives no First Amendment protection when the underlying activity is illegal.11 A newspaper's placement decisions regarding such advertisements remain commercial in character and subject to regulation when they aid unlawful discrimination.12
No. The proceedings began when the National Organization for Women, Inc. filed a complaint with the Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations on October 9, 1969, alleging that the Pittsburgh Press Co. was violating the Ordinance by allowing employers to place help-wanted advertisements in sex-designated columns.13 The Commission found probable cause and held a hearing where it received evidence including clippings from the January 4, 1970 edition of the Sunday Pittsburgh Press arranged by column.14
The Commission found that during 1969 the Pittsburgh Press carried 248,000 help-wanted advertisements and used captions such as Jobs—Male Interest and Jobs—Female Interest, with placement determined by the advertiser's wishes.15 On July 23, 1970, the Commission issued a Decision and Order finding a violation of the Ordinance and directing the Pittsburgh Press to cease using a sex-designated classification system.
The order was affirmed by the Court of Common Pleas, but the Commonwealth Court narrowed it to allow sex-designated columns for jobs exempt from the Ordinance, such as those with employers of fewer than five persons or with certified bona fide occupational exceptions.16 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied review, and the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The rule that commercial speech proposing illegal activity receives no First Amendment protection applies to these facts.17 The sex-designated placement aids employers in indicating illegal sex preferences under the Ordinance.18 This makes the newspaper's actions an integrated commercial statement that can be regulated.19
The Human Relations Ordinance as construed does not violate the freedoms of speech and of the press guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments.20
Related opinions on this issue
Chief Justice Burger dissented on the ground that the decision enlarges the commercial speech doctrine and encroaches on press freedom by subjecting newspapers' layout and organizational decisions to government regulation.21 He emphasized that the Pittsburgh Press used sex-designated columns for reader convenience and included a notice disclaiming any discriminatory intent, placing the arrangement within protected journalistic discretion.22 Burger also concluded that the cease-and-desist order functions as an impermissible prior restraint because it operates like an injunction that could expose the newspaper to contempt for mistaken judgments about exemptions.23
Justice Douglas joined Justice Stewart's dissent but added that commercial speech deserves First Amendment protection and that the press may publish what it pleases about any law without censorship.24 He noted that while the press can be regulated on business and economic matters such as antitrust or labor laws, it cannot be punished for printing views or want ads expressing employer preferences.25 Douglas stressed that speech and action must be closely brigaded before government intrusion is permissible, and no such unusual circumstances existed here.26
Joined by Justice Douglas
Justice Stewart dissented on the ground that no government agency may tell a newspaper in advance what it can print and what it cannot.27 He argued that the order dictates the layout of the newspaper's classified advertising pages, marking the first time a court permitted a government agency to enter a composing room and control editorial judgment.28 Stewart warned that subordinating the First Amendment to other interests endangers the guarantee of a free press and opens the door to further governmental control over newspaper content.29
Justice Blackmun dissented substantially for the reasons stated by Justice Stewart in his opinion.30 He declined to join the paragraph of Stewart's opinion that begins on page 402 and ends on page 403.31 By withholding his endorsement from that specific passage, Blackmun signaled agreement with the core prior-restraint and editorial-judgment objections while reserving his position on one discrete aspect of the reasoning.32
This selective joinder allowed him to support the primary arguments against the order without fully endorsing every element of the Stewart dissent, thereby preserving his independent view on the precise contours of the First Amendment protection at issue.33
Whether the Commission's modified cease-and-desist order constitutes an impermissible prior restraint on expression?34
An order based on a continuing course of repetitive conduct that is clear, sweeps no more broadly than necessary, and takes effect only after final judicial determination does not constitute an impermissible prior restraint.35
No. The modified order addresses the Pittsburgh Press's established policy of permitting placement in sex-designated columns without regard to exemptions, rather than any single publication.36 Because the order followed full proceedings and no interim relief was granted, it does not suppress speech before an adequate determination of unprotected status.37 The order is narrowly drawn to cover only nonexempt employment advertisements and therefore lacks the vice of prior restraint.38
The Commission's modified cease-and-desist order does not constitute an impermissible prior restraint on expression.39