410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981)
This case arises out of a plan by the Detroit Economic Development Corporation to acquire, by condemnation if necessary, a large tract of land to be conveyed to General Motors Corporation as a site for construction of an assembly plant.1 The plaintiffs, a neighborhood association and several individual residents of the affected area, brought suit in Wayne Circuit Court to challenge the project on several grounds.2
In the spring of 1980, General Motors informed the City of Detroit that it would close its Cadillac and Fisher Body plants located within the city in 1983.3 General Motors offered to build an assembly complex in the city if a suitable site could be found meeting four criteria: an area of between 450 and 500 acres, a rectangular shape, access to a long-haul railroad line, and access to the freeway system.4 The city evaluated nine potential sites and selected a parcel of approximately 465 acres straddling the Detroit-Hamtramck border known as Central Industrial Park.5
In July 1980 the Detroit Common Council approved the boundaries of the project.6 On September 30, 1980, the completed project plan was approved by the Detroit Economic Development Corporation.7 On October 31, 1980, the Common Council passed a resolution approving the project plan with minor modifications and declaring that the project constituted a public purpose.8 General Motors required that title to the entire site and the rail marshalling yard must be vested in the City of Detroit by May 1, 1981.9 The projected public cost of preparing a site agreeable to the board of directors of General Motors is over $200 million.10 The site was to be sold to General Motors for little more than $8 million.11
The trial court conducted a ten-day trial on defendants’ motion to dismiss from November 17 to December 2, 1980, limited to the question whether the city abused its discretion in determining that condemnation of plaintiffs’ property was necessary under 1980 PA 87.12 On December 9, 1980, the court entered judgment for defendants and dismissed the complaint.13 Plaintiffs filed a claim of appeal with the Court of Appeals on December 12, 1980, and an application for bypass with the Michigan Supreme Court on December 15, 1980, which the Court granted along with a motion for immediate consideration.14
Does the use of eminent domain in this case constitute a taking of private property for private use and, therefore, contravene Const 1963, art 10, §2?15
The Michigan Constitution, Const 1963, art 10, §2, prohibits taking private property for private use without just compensation.16 The power of eminent domain may be exercised only for a public use or purpose.17 The determination of what constitutes a public use is ultimately a judicial question.18 Legislative declarations of public purpose are entitled to deference and will not be overturned unless palpably arbitrary.19 Condemnation for transfer to a private corporation is generally forbidden unless the public benefit is primary.20 The project must fall within recognized exceptions such as slum clearance, where the controlling purpose is elimination of blight independent of the private recipient.21
No. The Legislature has determined through the Economic Development Corporations Act that programs to alleviate unemployment and revitalize the economy constitute essential public purposes.2223 The city followed all statutory procedures and presented substantial evidence of severe economic conditions facing Detroit residents, the need for new industrial development, the economic boost the project would provide through retention of thousands of jobs, and the lack of alternative sites.24 The benefit to General Motors is incidental to the predominant public purpose of job retention and economic revitalization.25 Applying the rule to the established facts, General Motors informed the city in spring 1980 that it would close its plants unless a suitable site was found, the city evaluated nine sites and selected the 465-acre Central Industrial Park to retain 6,150 jobs that would otherwise be lost if General Motors moved to a green field location outside the region, and the Common Council declared the project a public purpose on October 31, 1980, after which the trial court found no abuse of discretion in the necessity determination.26
The use of eminent domain does not constitute a taking for private use and does not contravene Const 1963, art 10, §2.27
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Ryan dissented on the ground that the condemnation transfers property to General Motors for its exclusive private use and profit with no continuing public accountability after the transfer.28 He identified three elements from prior instrumentality-of-commerce cases that justify exceptions for private corporations.29 He found all three absent because the site was chosen solely to satisfy General Motors' specifications, the plant will be operated by private managers accountable only to stockholders, and employment levels will be determined by profit rather than public need.30
Ryan concluded that the decision subordinates constitutional property rights to private corporate interests and would hold the authorizing statute unconstitutional as applied.31
Joined by Justice Ryan
Justice Fitzgerald dissented on the ground that the transfer of property to General Motors is not incidental but essential to achieving the claimed public benefits.32 This distinguishes the case from slum-clearance precedents where blight removal itself constitutes the public use independent of the private recipient.33 He noted that the economic benefits of employment and tax revenue flow only through General Motors' private operation of the plant.34
The burden of condemnation falls on a few property owners rather than being distributed through taxation.35 Fitzgerald concluded that the proposed taking exceeds the government's eminent-domain authority because it takes private property for private use.36
Did the trial court err in ruling that cultural, social and historical institutions were not protected by the Michigan Environmental Protection Act?37
The Michigan Environmental Protection Act, MCL 691.1201 et seq., authorizes actions for declaratory and equitable relief to protect air, water, and other natural resources and the public trust therein from pollution, impairment, or destruction.38 Under the plain meaning of the statutory language and the principle of ejusdem generis, the term natural resources does not encompass social and cultural environments.39
No. The act's operative provisions repeatedly reference air, water, and other natural resources, and social and cultural institutions are not of like kind with those enumerated terms.4041 Applying the rule to the established facts, plaintiffs alleged that the project would have a major adverse impact on the social and cultural environment of Poletown, but the trial court correctly dismissed the claim because such environments fall outside the act's legislative intent and the statutory text.42
The trial court did not err in ruling that cultural, social and historical institutions were not protected by the Michigan Environmental Protection Act.43