102 S.Ct. 445, 454 U.S. 312, 70 L.Ed.2d 509
Russell Richard Dodson filed a pro se complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 Dodson alleged that Martha Shepard, a full-time employee of the Polk County Offender Advocate's Office, had failed to represent him adequately in an appeal to the Iowa Supreme Court of his robbery conviction.2 Shepard had been assigned to represent Dodson after his conviction.3 After inquiring into the case, she moved for permission to withdraw as counsel on the ground that Dodson's claims were wholly frivolous, accompanying the motion with an affidavit and a memorandum summarizing his claims and supporting legal arguments.4
On November 9, 1979, the Iowa Supreme Court granted the motion to withdraw and dismissed Dodson's appeal.5 In his complaint, Dodson alleged that Shepard's actions deprived him of his right to counsel, subjected him to cruel and unusual punishment, and denied him due process of law.6 He sought injunctive relief as well as damages in the amount of $175,000.7 Dodson also sued Polk County, the Polk County Offender Advocate, and the Polk County Board of Supervisors, alleging that they had established the rules and procedures that Shepard was bound to follow in handling criminal appeals.8
The District Court dismissed Dodson's claims against all defendants in 483 F. Supp. 347 (1979).9 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed that decision in 628 F. 2d 1104 (1980).10 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the division among the Courts of Appeals over whether a public defender acts under color of state law when providing representation to an indigent client.11
Whether a public defender acts under color of state law when representing an indigent defendant in a state criminal proceeding?12
A person acts under color of state law only when exercising power possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.13
No. The Offender Advocate for Polk County assigned Martha Shepard to represent Russell Dodson in the appeal of his criminal conviction.14 This assignment entailed functions and obligations in no way dependent on state authority.15
From the moment of her appointment, Shepard became Dodson's lawyer, and Dodson became Shepard's client.16 Except for the source of payment their relationship became identical to that existing between any other lawyer and client.17 The duties of a defense lawyer are those of a personal counselor and advocate opposing the designated representatives of the State.18
This is essentially a private function, traditionally filled by retained counsel, for which state office and authority are not needed.19 A public defender is not amenable to administrative direction in the same sense as other employees of the State because ethical standards require independent professional judgment on behalf of the client.20
No. A public defender does not act under color of state law when performing a lawyer's traditional functions as counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding.21
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The concurrence emphasizes that under Gideon v. Wainwright and Argersinger v. Hamlin the government's role is limited to providing a professionally qualified advocate wholly independent of governmental control.22 The advocate owes obligations to the client as defined by professional codes rather than by the governmental entity supplying compensation.23 Disciplinary Rule 5-107(B) of the ABA Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits any person who recommends, employs, or pays the lawyer from directing professional judgment.24
Counsel reached a considered judgment on the merits and acted consistently with the highest traditions of the bar in withdrawing from a frivolous appeal.25
The dissent maintains that a full-time state employee acting to fulfill a state obligation violates constitutional rights under color of state law.26 The majority's functional test departs from prior rulings such as Parratt v. Taylor that treated state employment as dispositive.27 The public defender's power to represent and to withdraw is possessed by virtue of the State's selection and official employment rather than client choice.28
The case is indistinguishable from Estelle v. Gamble where a prison doctor was held to act under color of state law despite independent professional obligations to patients.29 Pervasive county control over funding, caseload, and office policies further confirms that the defender acts under color of state law.30
Whether Dodson's complaint stated actionable § 1983 claims against the Offender Advocate, Polk County, and the Polk County Board of Supervisors?31
No. Dodson's complaint alleged that the Offender Advocate and the Board of Supervisors had established the rules and procedures that Shepard was bound to follow.34 He failed to allege any policy that arguably violated his rights under the Sixth, Eighth, or Fourteenth Amendments.35
A policy of withdrawal from frivolous cases does not violate the Constitution under Anders v. California.36 Dodson further asserted deprivation of effective counsel but failed to allege that this was caused by any constitutionally forbidden rule or procedure.37 Section 1983 claims against the supervisory defendants therefore must be dismissed.38
No. Dodson's claims against the Offender Advocate, Polk County, and the Polk County Board of Supervisors must be dismissed because the complaint failed to allege unconstitutional action by those defendants.39
Related opinions on this issue
The dissent would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals with respect to the claims against the supervisory defendants.40 Respondent's general allegations of an official policy are sufficient under the standards for pro se complaints to call for the opportunity to offer supporting evidence.41 Respondent also alleged that other public defenders in the Offender Advocate's Office had acted in the same manner as Shepard and challenged the process by which the office represented indigents.42
These allegations, if true, could establish that the defendants had established rules authorizing the challenged conduct, satisfying the requirements for stating a claim under Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services.43