345 U.S. 395 (1953)
Poulos, a member of Jehovah's Witnesses, applied with another Witness for permission to conduct religious services in Goodwin Park in Portsmouth, New Hampshire, on June 25 and July 2, 1950.1 They complied with all procedural requirements of the city ordinance and offered to pay the necessary fees and charges.2 The City Council refused the license on May 4, 1950.3
Despite the refusal, Poulos held the planned religious services in the park until he was arrested.4 He was charged with violating section 22 of the Portsmouth city ordinance, which prohibits open air public meetings without a license from the City Council.5 After conviction in Municipal Court and imposition of a twenty-dollar fine, Poulos appealed to the Superior Court, where he moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the ordinance as applied was unconstitutional.6
The constitutional question was transferred to the New Hampshire Supreme Court.7 Upon remand for trial, the Superior Court found that the City Council's refusal of the licenses was arbitrary and unreasonable.8 It nevertheless declined to dismiss the prosecution, ruling that the proper remedy for the denial was through civil proceedings rather than as a defense in the criminal case.9
The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the conviction.10 It held that the ordinance was valid on its face and that the remedy for the wrongful refusal lay in certiorari or other civil proceedings against the licensing authority.11 Poulos appealed to the United States Supreme Court.12
Whether a municipal ordinance may constitutionally require a license for conducting religious services in a public park?13
A municipal ordinance requiring a license for open air public meetings in a park is constitutional if it is administered in a uniform, nondiscriminatory manner without granting officials uncontrolled discretion over speech content, as such regulation preserves public order while allowing reasonable use of public spaces.14
Yes. The Portsmouth ordinance requires a license for open air public meetings.15 The New Hampshire Supreme Court interpreted it to limit discretion to reasonable, uniform treatment free from discrimination.16 Poulos and his companion complied with procedural requirements for Goodwin Park services but were denied.17 The ordinance itself was upheld as valid on its face under precedents like Cox v. New Hampshire.18
The ordinance constitutionally requires a license for religious services in the park.19
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Frankfurter protested against the Court's discussion of the facial validity of the ordinance because that issue was not before the Court.20 He noted that Poulos had conceded throughout the proceedings that the ordinance was valid on its face.21 The only constitutional attack presented was the claim that Poulos was denied the opportunity to set up the arbitrary denial of the license as a defense in the criminal prosecution.22
Frankfurter stressed that when there is no duty to speak on an issue, there is a duty not to speak, especially in cases involving the reconciliation of liberty and order.23 He concluded that the discussion under the first heading would have been appropriate only if Poulos had claimed the licensing scheme as such was void, which he did not.24
Whether an arbitrary and unreasonable refusal of a required license by city officials provides a complete defense to criminal prosecution for holding the services without the license?25
An arbitrary refusal of a license under a valid ordinance does not provide a complete defense to prosecution for conducting the activity without the license; the applicant must pursue judicial remedies such as certiorari to compel issuance.26
No. Although the Superior Court found that the City Council's refusal of the licenses was arbitrary and unreasonable, Poulos nevertheless held the religious services in Goodwin Park without obtaining the license and was arrested and convicted under the ordinance.27 The New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because the ordinance was valid on its face, the remedy for the wrongful refusal was to seek certiorari or other civil proceedings against the licensing authority rather than defending the criminal prosecution on the ground that the license had been arbitrarily denied.28
The arbitrary refusal does not provide a complete defense.29
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Black dissented on the ground that the First Amendment affords freedom of speech special protection.30 He argued that the Amendment prohibits a state from convicting a man of crime whose only offense is that he makes an orderly religious appeal after he has been illegally and arbitrarily denied a license to talk.31 Black emphasized that the Court now holds Poulos can be branded a criminal for making a talk at the very time and place which the State Supreme Court has held its licensing officials could not legally forbid.32
He viewed this holding as a subtle use of creeping censorship loose in the land.33
Joined by Justice Black
Justice Douglas dissented on the ground that the licensing power as construed by the New Hampshire court was discretionary rather than ministerial.34 He maintained that a discretionary power to license free speech is unconstitutional.35 Douglas explained that the citizen may flout an administrative order denying the right just as he may flout an unconstitutional statute.36
He rejected the view that the statute imposed merely a ministerial duty on the city council and warned that the doctrine allowing reasonable regulation of free speech is dangerous to liberty.37
Whether a state may constitutionally require that an applicant for a license seek judicial review of an arbitrary denial through civil proceedings such as certiorari rather than raising the denial as a defense in a subsequent criminal prosecution?38
Yes. New Hampshire determined that the proper remedy for the arbitrary refusal was certiorari against the City Council.41 Poulos was required to follow that procedure rather than hold the meeting without a license.42 The Court held that this requirement does not abridge First Amendment rights or due process.43
The state may constitutionally impose such a procedural requirement.44
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Frankfurter agreed that New Hampshire was not barred by the Due Process Clause from requiring Poulos to mandamus the City Council after it had unlawfully refused him a permit.45 He observed that there was no showing that the remedy frustrated Poulos's right of utterance.46 Frankfurter concluded that the requirement that legal issues be determined in an appropriately designed procedure does not trivialize the Due Process Clause.47
He noted that Poulos had available a prompt judicial remedy to secure his right and that New Hampshire could properly confine adjudication to civil proceedings rather than police court defenses.48