499 U.S. 400 (1991)
Larry Joe Powers, a white man, was indicted in Franklin County, Ohio, on two counts of aggravated murder and one count of attempted aggravated murder, each with a firearm specification.1 Powers pleaded not guilty and invoked his right to a jury trial.2
In the jury selection process, Powers objected when the prosecutor exercised his first peremptory challenge to remove a black venireperson and requested that the trial court compel the prosecutor to explain the reasons on the record.3 The trial court denied the request and excused the juror. The State proceeded to use nine more peremptory challenges, six of which removed black venirepersons from the jury.4 Each time the prosecution challenged a black prospective juror, Powers renewed his objections, citing Batson v. Kentucky, but the trial court overruled them.5 The record does not indicate that race was implicated in the crime or the trial.6
The empaneled jury convicted Powers on counts of murder, aggravated murder, and attempted aggravated murder, each with the firearm specifications, and the trial court sentenced him to a term of imprisonment of 53 years to life.7 Powers appealed his conviction to the Ohio Court of Appeals, contending that the prosecutor's discriminatory use of peremptories violated the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a fair cross section in his petit jury, the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, and Article I, §§ 10 and 16, of the Ohio Constitution.8 The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, and the Supreme Court of Ohio dismissed Powers' appeal on the ground that it presented no substantial constitutional question.9
Petitioner sought review before the Supreme Court, renewing his Sixth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment claims.10 While the petition for certiorari was pending, the Court decided Holland v. Illinois.11 After that decision, the Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the question whether, based on the Equal Protection Clause, a white defendant may object to the prosecution's peremptory challenges of black venirepersons.12
Whether a white defendant may object on equal protection grounds to the prosecution's peremptory challenges of black venirepersons?13
The Equal Protection Clause prohibits a prosecutor from using peremptory challenges to exclude otherwise qualified and unbiased persons from the petit jury solely on account of their race.14 A criminal defendant has standing to raise the equal protection rights of jurors excluded because of race even if the defendant and the excluded jurors do not share the same race, provided the defendant has suffered an injury in fact, has a close relation to the third party, and the third party faces some hindrance to protecting his or her own interests.15
Yes. Powers, a white defendant, objected to the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to remove black venirepersons from the jury in his trial on charges of aggravated murder.16
The prosecutor exercised six peremptory challenges against black prospective jurors.17
This occurred in a case where race was not implicated in the crime or the trial.18
The practice violated the command of racial neutrality in jury selection under the Equal Protection Clause.19
The discriminatory practice cast doubt on the integrity of the judicial process in his own trial.20
It placed the fairness of the proceeding in doubt.21
This gave him a concrete interest in the outcome.22
The relation between Powers and the excluded jurors was close.23
Voir dire permitted the establishment of a relation that continued throughout the trial.24
The excluded jurors faced significant barriers to asserting their own rights.25
These included the lack of opportunity to be heard at the time of exclusion and practical economic burdens of litigation.26
Therefore, Powers has standing to object to the race-based exclusions.27
A white defendant may object on equal protection grounds to the prosecution's peremptory challenges of black venirepersons.28
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by The Chief Justice
Justice Scalia dissented, contending that the majority's holding contradicts well-established precedent requiring that the defendant and the excluded jurors share the same race for an equal protection challenge to the composition of the jury.29
He argued that peremptory challenges based on race do not violate equal protection when all groups are subject to the same treatment.30
He further contended that the defendant lacks an injury in fact for third-party standing because the exclusion of jurors of another race does not produce an unfair jury or tangible harm to the defendant.31
Scalia maintained that the decision represents an unwarranted extension of Batson that threatens to undermine the peremptory challenge system without advancing the fairness of trials.32