321 U.S. 158 (1944)
Sarah Prince lived in Brockton, Massachusetts, where she served as the mother of two young sons and the legal custodian of her nine-year-old niece, Betty M. Simmons.1 Both Prince and Simmons identified as Jehovah's Witnesses and ordained ministers.2 Prince customarily went each week to the streets of Brockton to distribute Watchtower and Consolation magazines.3 She had allowed the children to participate in this activity before but had been warned by school attendance officer Mr. Perkins against taking them out at night.4
On December 18, 1941, as Prince prepared to leave home, the children asked to go with her.5 After initially refusing, she yielded when they began to cry.6 Upon arriving downtown, Prince permitted Betty to engage in the preaching work on the sidewalks.7 Betty stood about twenty feet from her aunt near a street intersection, holding up copies of the magazines for passersby while carrying the standard canvas bag marked "Watchtower and Consolation 50 per copy."8 No one accepted a copy from Betty that evening and she received no money.9 Nor did her aunt receive any money that evening.10 But on other occasions, Betty had received funds and given out copies.11 They remained until 8:45 p.m.12
A few minutes before this, Mr. Perkins approached Mrs. Prince.13 A discussion ensued.14 He inquired and she refused to give Betty's name.15 However, she stated the child attended the Shaw School.16 Mrs. Prince admitted she supplied Betty with the magazines and said, "[N]either you nor anybody else can stop me . . . This child is exercising her God-given right and her constitutional right to preach the gospel, and no creature has a right to interfere with God's commands." Mr. Perkins referred to his previous warnings and said he would allow five minutes for them to get off the street.17 However, Mrs. Prince and Betty departed.18
Three separate complaints were brought against Prince pursuant to sections 79, 80, and 81 of Chapter 149 of the Massachusetts General Laws.19 Appellant received moderate fines on each complaint, first in the District Court of Brockton, then on pleas of not guilty by trial de novo without a jury in the Superior Court for Plymouth County.20 The Supreme Judicial Court reversed the conviction under the first complaint on state grounds but sustained the judgments founded on the other two.21
Whether the Massachusetts child labor statutes, as applied to a nine-year-old Jehovah's Witness distributing religious literature on public streets accompanied by her guardian, violate the First Amendment's guarantee of free exercise of religion?22
Acting to guard the general interest in youth's well being, the state as parens patriae may restrict the parent's control by requiring school attendance, regulating or prohibiting the child's labor and in many other ways. Its authority is not nullified merely because the parent grounds his claim to control the child's course of conduct on religion or conscience.23
No. The statutes do not violate the First Amendment.24 The state's authority over children's activities is broader than over like actions of adults. This is peculiarly true of public activities and in matters of employment.25 The court applied the rule by recognizing that the state possesses broader authority over children's public activities than over adults to protect against the harms of street work and diverse street influences, even when the conduct is religious and occurs in the guardian's presence.26
The prohibition advances the legitimate objective of safeguarding minors' welfare. The parent's religious motivation does not nullify that authority.27
The Massachusetts child labor statutes, as applied to the facts, do not violate the First Amendment free exercise guarantee.28
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Murphy dissented on the ground that the state completely failed to sustain its burden of proving the existence of any grave or immediate danger to any interest which it may lawfully protect.29 The record showed an orderly religious activity carried on at a public street corner in groups subject to adult control.30 The bare possibility of harm from distribution of religious literature is not sufficient justification for restricting freedom of conscience and religion.31
Religious training and activity performed by a child are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment against state interference except when they violate reasonable regulations adopted for the protection of public health, morals and welfare.32 The state cannot lawfully prohibit girls under eighteen from practicing their religious faith through distribution of religious tracts on public streets without convincing proof that the practice constitutes a grave and immediate danger.33
Joined by Justice Roberts And Justice Frankfurter
Justice Jackson dissented on the ground that the decision is inconsistent with Murdock v. Pennsylvania.34 That case held that this form of religious activity occupies the same high estate under the First Amendment as worship in churches and preaching from pulpits.35 Drawing a line based on age that cuts across both true exercise of religion and auxiliary secular activities lays a foundation for state intervention in the indoctrination and participation of children in religion provided it is done in the name of their health or welfare.36
Jackson viewed the limits on religious freedom as beginning whenever activities affect or collide with liberties of others or of the public.37 He would have affirmed on the grounds that money-raising activities on a public scale are subject to state regulation.38
Whether those statutes infringe the due process rights of a parent under the Fourteenth Amendment to direct the religious upbringing of her child?39
It is cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.40 But the family itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest, as against a claim of religious liberty.41
No. The statutes do not infringe the parent's Fourteenth Amendment due process rights.42 Although parents possess primary authority over the religious training of their children, the state may limit that authority when the child's welfare is at stake.43 The court applied the rule by holding that neither rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation when the state acts as parens patriae to guard youth's well-being through reasonable child labor regulations.44
The statutes do not infringe the parent's due process right to direct the child's religious upbringing.45
Whether application of the statutes denies equal protection to Jehovah's Witnesses and their children?46
The contention that the street, for Jehovah's Witnesses and their children, is their church falls with the claim based on denial of religious freedom, since in this instance the one is but another phrasing of the other.47
No. Application of the statutes does not deny equal protection.48 The facts show that the statutes prohibit all girls under eighteen from selling or offering magazines on public streets regardless of religious motivation.49 The court applied the rule by concluding that there is no denial of equal protection in excluding Jehovah's Witness children from doing on the streets what no other children may do, as the public highways have not become their religious property merely by their assertion.50
The application of the statutes does not deny equal protection of the laws.51