483 U.S. 219, 107 S.Ct. 2802, 97 L.Ed.2d 187
On January 25, 1981, respondent Ronald Calder, then a civilian air traffic controller employed by the Federal Aviation Administration in San Juan, Puerto Rico, struck two people with his automobile in the parking lot of a grocery store in Aguadilla, Puerto Rico.1 One of the victims, Antonio de Jesus Gonzalez, was injured; his wife, Army Villalba, was killed, and her unborn child did not survive.2 On the basis of sworn statements taken by police from De Jesus Gonzalez and a witness to the incident, Calder was arrested, charged with homicide, arraigned before a municipal judge, and released on $5,000 bail.3
Subsequently, Calder was arraigned before a District Court of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, charged with first-degree murder and attempted murder.4 Calder failed to appear at a preliminary hearing on March 4, 1981, and bail was increased to $50,000; he also failed to appear at a hearing on April 13, 1981, leading to his being declared a fugitive from justice and bail increased to $300,000.5 The Puerto Rican police notified local authorities in Iowa that Calder was a fugitive wanted on murder charges, and on April 24, 1981, Calder surrendered to local authorities in Polk County, Iowa, posted the $20,000 bond set by an Iowa Magistrate, and was released.6
On May 15, 1981, the Governor of Puerto Rico submitted to the Governor of Iowa a request for Calder's extradition, including the arrest warrant, the fugitive resolution, the charging documents, and three sworn statements of witnesses.7 After an extradition hearing conducted by the Governor's counsel on June 17, 1981, at which Calder's counsel and Calder himself testified regarding concerns about a fair trial in Puerto Rico, discussions aimed at negotiating a reduction of the charges were unavailing.8
On December 28, 1981, Iowa's Governor, Robert Ray, formally notified the Governor of Puerto Rico that the request for extradition was denied in the absence of a change to a more realistic charge, and a subsequent request to Governor Terry Branstad was also denied. On February 15, 1984, petitioner Commonwealth of Puerto Rico filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Iowa against respondents Governor Branstad and the State of Iowa, seeking a declaration that failure to deliver Calder violated the Extradition Clause and the Extradition Act and requesting the issuance of a writ of mandamus.9 Respondents stipulated before the District Court that the extradition papers fully complied with the requirements of the Act.10 The District Court dismissed the complaint, the Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the propositions concerning the limitation of federal judicial power stated in Kentucky v. Dennison in 1861 retain their validity today.
Whether the holding of Kentucky v. Dennison that federal courts have no power to order the Governor of a State to fulfill the State's obligation under the Extradition Clause remains valid today?11
The holding in Kentucky v. Dennison rests on an outdated premise. The premise is that the federal government cannot impose duties on state officers. This premise is incompatible with subsequent constitutional development. Federal courts may enforce constitutional obligations against state officials through mandamus or injunction.12
No. Kentucky v. Dennison concluded that the words it shall be the duty were declaratory of moral duty only. No constitutional clause arms the federal government with power to compel a state officer to perform it.13
Applying that rule to the established facts shows the District Court dismissed Puerto Rico's complaint seeking mandamus against Governor Branstad solely on the authority of Dennison.14 The Court of Appeals affirmed reluctantly.15
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and then reversed.16 It determined that basic constitutional principles now point the other way.17 The duty to deliver fugitives is enforceable in federal court like other constitutional duties.18
The holding of Kentucky v. Dennison does not remain valid today.19
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Powell
Justice O’Connor joined Parts I, II-A, II-C, and III of the Court’s opinion.20 Because the Court ultimately resolves this case under the Extradition Act, 18 U. S.
C. § 3182, she did not find Part II-B, and its statements concerning the Extradition Clause of the Constitution, necessary to the decision of this case.21 Accordingly, she did not subscribe to that part of the Court’s opinion.22
This approach follows the Court's practice of avoiding constitutional questions when a case can be resolved on statutory grounds.23
Justice Scalia concurred in the result, and in the portions of the Court’s opinion applying 18 U. S. C.
§ 3182 and overruling Kentucky v. Dennison, 24 How. 66 (1861), insofar as it interpreted the predecessor of that statute.24 He noted that no party before us has asserted the lack of power of Congress to require extradition from a State to a Territory.25
Thus, he limited his concurrence to the statutory application and the overruling on that basis without addressing broader constitutional issues regarding territories.26
Whether the Extradition Clause creates a mandatory duty to deliver up fugitives upon proper demand?27
The Extradition Clause creates a mandatory duty to deliver up fugitives upon proper demand.28 This duty affords no discretion to the executive officers or courts of the asylum State. Its clear and explicit language furthers the purposes of enabling swift trial in the demanding state and precluding any state from becoming a sanctuary for fugitives.
Yes. The Clause uses mandatory language. The Court interpreted it as conferring an absolute right to demand and a correlative obligation to deliver. This is without reference to the character of the crime or the policy of the asylum state.29
Applying the rule to the established facts shows that Iowa Governor Ray denied Puerto Rico's extradition request absent a change to a more realistic charge.30 Governor Branstad likewise denied a subsequent request.31 Respondents stipulated that the extradition papers fully complied with statutory requirements.32
The Extradition Clause creates a mandatory duty to deliver up fugitives upon proper demand.
Whether the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico may invoke the Extradition Act to demand rendition of fugitives from a state?33
The Extradition Act applies to Territories and therefore permits the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico to invoke federal court authority to enforce the statutory duty of extradition against state officers. Puerto Rico possessed that power as a Territory. The legislation granting Commonwealth status preserved it by according Puerto Rico the autonomy normally associated with States.34
Yes. Although the Extradition Clause refers only to States the Act expressly requires rendition at the request of a demanding Territory. Long-settled precedent confirms that Puerto Rico as a Territory could invoke the Act.35
Applying the rule to the established facts shows that Puerto Rico filed its complaint in federal district court seeking declaratory and mandamus relief under the Act after both Iowa governors denied extradition. Respondents stipulated full compliance of the papers with the Act's requirements.36
The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico may invoke the Extradition Act to demand rendition of fugitives from a state.37