923 A.2d 971 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2007)
Where a component part “causes damage to the assembled product and other consequential damages, such liability as is imposed on the immediate or remote seller to the purchaser has ordinarily been based on warranty theories.”
Prosser & Keeton on Torts § 101(4) at 709. That is because “[t]he risk that a component part of the product is not suitable for use in the ... assembly of another product is a risk that sophisticated parties ... should be free to allocate by contract.”
Id.
As we indicated in Parts III and IV of our Discussion, the trial court properly granted Parex’s motion to dismiss the breach of express warranties count against it and properly granted summary judgment in Parex’s favor as to the breach of implied warranties count. Significantly, Pulte pursued claims for breach of express and implied warranties against all of the defendants. Although the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of all defendants on the breach of implied warranties count, Pulte did not appeal the ruling as to any of the defendants except Parex. Rather, it reached a settlement agreement with the other defendants. Moreover, the breach of express warranty count against the other defendants remained alive when the settlement agreement between those defendants and Pulte was reached.
Pulte presents no convincing argument that would persuade this Court that the trial court erred when it apparently determined that the Barrier EIFS was part of an “integrated whole” — a completed home — when the damage occurred, and the damage was, thus, a “harm to the product itself.” Restatement (Third) of the Law of Torts, Products Liability § 21 cmt. e, at 296. As we have explained, the barrier cladding system in question consisted of fiberglass mesh affixed to the exterior covering of the homes, with insulation board affixed to the fiberglass mesh. A cement-like mixture was applied to the insulation board, and finally fiberglass fabric was embedded into the cement-like mixture. Flashing was applied in places where the cladding adjoined other materials, such as window frames and cornices, and special tapes, caulks, sealants, and insulations were used along those places.
Each system was integrated temporally and physically with the construction of a home. A system was installed as part of the construction of each home. Once installed, the system could not readily be separated from the underlying structure.
Gunkel v. Renovations, Inc., 822 N.E.2d 150 (Ind. 2005), is instructive, but not for the reasons urged by Pulte. In that case, the plaintiff homeowners contracted with a builder, Renovations, Inc. (Renovations), for the construction of a home. Six months later, the plaintiffs entered into a separate contract with J & N Stone, Inc. (J & N) to install a stone and masonry exterior on the home. Ultimately, water leaked into the home through gaps in the exterior. The plaintiffs filed suit against both Renovations and J & N, and the complaint included a count against J & N for negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of J & N on the negligence count on the ground that the economic loss rule applied, but the Supreme Court of Indiana reversed.
The Gunkel Court’s decision was based on the undisputed fact that the plaintiffs contracted separately with J & N to install the exterior, such that the exterior was not part of the finished product sold to the plaintiffs by Renovations. The court explained that, “[b]ecause the ‘economic loss’ doctrine permits tort recovery only for personal injury or damage to ‘other property,’ if property is damaged it is necessary to identify the product at issue which defines ‘other property.’ ”
Id. at 154. The court reasoned:
If a component is sold to the first user as a part of the finished product, the consequences of its failure are fully within the rationale of the economic loss doctrine. It therefore is not “other property.” But property acquired separately from the defective good or service is “other property,” whether or not it is, or is intended to be, incorporated into the same physical object.... [W]e align ourselves with the courts that have concluded that the “product” is the product purchased by the plaintiff, not the product furnished by the defendant. The cases that have used this formulation have typically involved claims by a first user of a finished product that includes a component supplied by the defendant where the purchaser had no dealings with the defendant.
Here we have the obverse situation. The Gunkels did deal directly with J & N. The same formulation of the demarcation between contract and tort remedies is controlling — property acquired by the plaintiff separately from the defective goods or services is “other property” whose damage is recoverable in tort. That formulation excludes from “other property” other parts of a finished product damaged by components supplied to the seller by other manufacturers and imported into the seller’s product. But it does make property acquired separately “other property” for purposes of the economic loss rule even if the defective product is to be incorporated into a completed product for use or resale.
Id. at 155-56 (citations omitted).
Applying the rationale of Gunkel to the facts of the instant case, it is clear that the economic loss rule bars Pulte from recovering in tort from Parex. Parex sold containers of a synthetic stucco product. Unlike the plaintiffs in Gunkel, neither Pulte nor the homeowners contracted with Parex for the product. Rather, Parex contracted with a supplier, which in turn contracted with an applicator, which in turn contracted with Pulte, which in turn contracted with the homeowners. Regardless of who is deemed to have been the “first user”— Pulte or the homeowners — the product reached the first user “as a part of the finished product” — the entire home — and was not separate or “other” property.
Id. at 155.
See, e.g., Linden v. Cascade Stone Co., Inc., 283 Wis. 2d 606, 699 N.W.2d 189, 197-99 (2005) (where the Supreme Court of Wisconsin held that the economic loss rule barred plaintiff homeowners from recovering in tort from a defendant subcontractor, with whom the plaintiffs were not in privity, for the installation of a stucco exterior that leaked). Under the circumstances, the trial court properly applied the economic loss rule to bar Pulte’s recovery in tort.
In Count Sixteen of its Third Amended Complaint, Pulte purported to set forth a cause of action for “legal subrogation” against all of the defendants, including Parex. Pulte alleged that, because it had warranted to the homeowners that “the homes were constructed with quality building materials,” it had been compelled to replace the leaky Barrier EIFS and repair the damages it caused. Pulte posited that in doing so it had “discharge[d] the obligations owed by Defendants to the Homeowners,” and that it “became, by operation of law, subrogated to the rights and claims of such owners and ... entitled to recover from Defendants for its discharge of their duties.” The trial court granted Parex’s Motion for Summary Judgment as to Count Sixteen, although it is clear that the court’s decision was more in the nature of a dismissal. Pulte now argues that the court erred.
Contrary to Pulte’s apparent understanding, subrogation is not a cause of action in and of itself. Rather, the doctrine of subrogation allows a party to step into the shoes of another in order to pursue a cause of action.
See Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 308 Md. 315, 319, 519 A.2d 202 (1987). Subrogation is “ ‘[t]he substitution of one person in the place of another with reference to a lawful claim, demand or right, so that he who is substituted succeeds to the rights of the other in relation to the debt or claim, and its rights, remedies, or securities.’ ”
Riemer v. Columbia Med. Plan, Inc., 358 Md. 222, 231, 747 A.2d 677 (2000) (quoting Black’s Law Dictionary 1427 (6th ed. 1990)), superseded by statute, 2000 Laws of Md., Ch. 569.
See also G.E. Capital Mortgage Servs., Inc. v. Levenson, 338 Md. 227, 231, 657 A.2d 1170 (1995). As the Court of Appeals has explained:
Subrogation is founded upon the equitable powers of the court. It is intended to provide relief against loss and damage to a meritorious creditor who has paid the debt of another. The doctrine is a legal fiction whereby an obligation extinguished by a payment made by a third person is treated as still subsisting for the benefit of this third person. This third person succeeds to the rights of the creditor in relation to the debt. The rationale underlying the doctrine of subrogation is to prevent the party primarily liable on the debt from being unjustly enriched when someone pays his debt.
Riemer, 358 Md. at 231-32, 747 A.2d 677 (internal citations omitted).
This Court has summarized: In Maryland, there are three kinds of subrogation: 1) legal subrogation, arising by operation of law; 2) conventional subrogation, arising by an express or implied agreement; 3) statutory subrogation, created by an act of the Legislature.
Poteet v. Sauter, 136 Md. App. 383, 401, 766 A.2d 150 (2001). The elements of legal subrogation are: (1) the existence of a debt or obligation for which a party, other than the subrogee, is primarily liable, which (2) the subrogee, who is neither a volunteer nor an intermeddler, pays or discharges in order to protect his own rights or interests.
Bachmann v. Glazer & Glazer, Inc., 316 Md. 405, 411, 559 A.2d 365 (1989).
Here, Pulte asks in Count Sixteen to be subrogated to the rights of the homeowners but does not, in relation to the subrogation, seek to pursue any particular cause of action against Parex. It contends that it extinguished a debt that Parex owed to the homeowners, but does not, in Count Sixteen, set forth the legal basis of the debt. Assuming, without deciding, that Pulte was neither a volunteer nor an intermeddler when it replaced and repaired the property in question, Pulte alleged nothing within Count Sixteen that would have established the first element of legal subrogation — the existence of a debt or obligation for which Parex was primarily liable.
In any event, the trial court’s decision as to Count Sixteen was of little consequence to Pulte. Although it was not done in the guise of subrogation, Pulte alleged a variety of counts against Parex as assignee of the homeowners. Those counts included: breach of implied warranties; negligence and/or strict liability as to design of the Barrier EIFS; negligence and/or strict liability in failing to warn of the defects and deficiencies in the Barrier EIFS; negligent misrepresentation regarding quality of the Barrier EIFS; constructive fraud; and false advertising under Virginia law. Pulte does not suggest on appeal that it was precluded from pursuing these claims on the ground that it was not a proper assignee of the homeowners.
As we have explained, the only claims that went to the jury were claims for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability and breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, both of which were originally brought by Coronado and CSS against Parex in a cross-complaint and were assigned to Pulte pursuant to the settlement agreement.17
Judgment on those claims was entered in Pulte’s favor and, in its cross-appeal, Parex now challenges that judgment on a multitude of grounds.
Parex first argues that the implied warranty claims assigned by Coronado and CSS to Pulte should not have been submitted to the jury because Pulte failed to present sufficient evidence to establish: that either Coronado and CSS suffered any damages; the specific amount of the damages suffered by Coronado as opposed to CSS; or whether the Barrier EIFS was sold by American EIFS or American Stucco, and whether it was sold to Coronado or CSS.
Preliminarily, we are not persuaded by Parex’s argument that Pulte failed to establish that Coronado and CSS suffered damages. It is true that “[d]amages must be proven with reasonable certainty, or some degree of specificity, and may not be based on mere speculation or conjecture.”
Zachair, Ltd. v. Driggs, 135 Md. App. 403, 427, 762 A.2d 991 (2000) (quoting 8 Maryland Law Encyclopedia, Damages § 193 at 159 (1985) (footnotes omitted)). In this case, however, it appears that Pulte refrained from presenting evidence as to the amount of the settlement agreement because the trial court specifically determined that that information should be withheld from the jury. As we shall discuss further in addressing issue IV of Parex’s cross-appeal, throughout trial, the court reserved judgment on whether Pulte would be permitted to recover from Parex the amount of the consent judgment entered against Coronado and CSS, or would be limited to the amount of the settlement agreement. The court opined that the issue of limiting any award to Pulte to the amount of the settlement “is a post-trial issue, because it requires the interplay of legal circumstances which are not a matter of evidence to the jury, and it is a matter to be adjudicated by this Court, I think, if it becomes necessary, as a post-trial consideration.”18
Pulte presented evidence that it entered into subcontracts that required Coronado and, as shall be explained, CSS, as Coronado’s successor, to install Barrier EIFS in the homes. Pulte further presented evidence that the Barrier EIFS installed by Coronado and CSS was defective and leaked and that Pulte spent $3,800,000 to replace the systems and to repair the resulting damages. The jury was informed that Pulte filed suit against Coronado and CSS, among others, to recover its costs, and that Coronado and CSS in turn filed suit against Parex. Although the settlement agreement itself was not entered into evidence, the jury was informed that Coronado and CSS assigned their claims against Parex to Pulte.
In Hooton v. Kenneth B. Mumaw Plumbing & Heating Co., Inc., 271 Md. 565, 573, 318 A.2d 514 (1974), a case involving the breach of an express warranty in installing a heating and air conditioning system, the Court of Appeals explained that “ ‘[t]he measure of damages in a case such as this ... is that amount of money which will render that which is guaranteed to be as warranted.’ ” (Citation omitted.) In Hall v. Lovell Regency Homes Ltd. P’ship, 121 Md. App. 1, 12-13, 708 A.2d 344 (1998), which involved breach of implied warranty claims against builders, this Court elaborated, “[i]n a breach of contract action for defective performance of a real estate construction contract, the primary measure of damages is the cost of repairing or remedying the defect.”
On the evidence before it, the jury properly determined that Coronado and CSS could be held liable to Pulte, on a breach of implied warranty theory, for the $3,800,000 Pulte spent to repair the defective systems and the damages they caused.19 The fact that Coronado and CSS had settled with Pulte and never paid that amount is inconsequential in light of the trial court’s decision to withhold that information from the jury.
We are not persuaded that Pulte was required to distinguish between the damages suffered by CSS and the damages suffered by Coronado. Pulte introduced into evidence its subcontract agreement with Coronado, showing that Pulte hired Coronado to apply “stucco” to the exteriors of the homes. Michael Walker, the Northeast Area Vice President for Product Development for Pulte, testified to the effect that, although Coronado was named in the agreement as the subcontractor, Coronado and CSS were the same company. Rob Fisher, who was Pulte’s Vice President of Customer Relations, clarified that at some point while the subcontract was in effect Coronado “became known as CSS,” and that Bernard Franks remained owner. Walker indicated that Coronado and CSS were certified or otherwise trained by Parex. He added that they supplied the Barrier EIFS, made by Parex, for the project. On this testimony, the jury readily could have concluded that Coronado and CSS were one and the same.
Cf. Acad. of IRM v. LVI Envtl. Servs., Inc., 344 Md. 434, 451, 687 A.2d 669 (1997) (explaining that successor liability will exist where the “successor entity is a mere continuation or reincarnation of the predecessor entity .... ” (citations and internal quotations omitted)).
Parex’s argument that the evidence regarding damages was insufficient because Pulte failed to establish, as to each home, whether Coronado or CSS purchased the Barrier EIFS from American EIFS or American Stucco is utterly without merit. Pulte presented evidence that Coronado was the successor entity to CSS, and that American EIFS and American Stucco were the exclusive regional distributors of the Parex product. The president of Parex, Fransua Bouan acknowledged that Coronado and CSS applied “the Parex Barrier EIFS on the homes that are at issue in this litigation.” There was simply no dispute that the product in question was a Parex product and was purchased by Coronado or CSS from one of the two suppliers. For purposes of this issue, the identity of the particular supplier was of no consequence.
On this record, we are satisfied that there was sufficient evidence to support the $3,800,000 award, which we are constrained to reduce as a matter of law in light of the settlement. We reiterate that the trial court expressly sanctioned withholding evidence as to the amount of the settlement, as the court had not yet decided whether Pulte was limited to recovering that amount.
Parex next contends that the trial court erred by failing to determine that Coronado and CSS could not have recovered on their cross-claim against Parex for breach of the implied warranty of fitness because there was no privity of contract or its equivalent between the applicators and Parex. Parex asserts that, absent such an intimate nexus between the applicators and Parex, Pulte could not, as a matter of law, recover on the assigned claim. Parex insists that, in reviewing the matter, this Court should apply Virginia law.
Preliminarily, the argument that Virginia law is the applicable law in resolving this issue has been waived. As Pulte points out, Parex never provided notice of an intention to rely on Virginia law. A party to a proceeding in a Maryland court who intends to rely on the law of another jurisdiction is required to provide “reasonable notice ... to the adverse parties either in the pleadings or by other written notice.” Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 10-504.20
Our courts have interpreted [§ 10-504] to mean that, if a party wishes to rely on a foreign law, notice should be given in the trial court so that the adverse party has an adequate opportunity to prepare his arguments on the foreign law.... Although we may, in our discretion, take judicial notice of foreign law where the statutory notification was not given and proof of the foreign law was not presented, ... we [will] decline to do so [when] the case proceeded in the trial court on the assumption that Maryland law was applicable....
Beale v. Am. Nat. Lawyers Ins. Reciprocal, 379 Md. 643, 652 n. 5, 843 A.2d 78 (2004) (citations omitted).
Contrary to Parex’s assertion, it is not sufficient that CSS filed notice of an intention to rely on Virginia law in connection with the claims brought by Pulte against CSS. Those claims were resolved pursuant to the settlement agreement and simply had no bearing on the applicability of Virginia law to the cross-claims brought by Coronado and CSS against Parex. In any event, Parex acknowledges on appeal that Maryland law and Virginia law on the matter in issue are substantially similar.
As we explained in Part IV of our discussion as to Pulte’s appeal, the Court of Appeals commented in Ford Motor Co., 365 Md. at 345, 779 A.2d 362, that, in order to establish a breach of the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, “the plaintiff only needs to prove that the buyer had a particular purpose known to the seller, and that privity itself is not a required element that must be shown independently.” The Court observed that, in a case such as this, where there is “an intermediate chain of owners,” a plaintiff may encounter difficulty in proving that the original seller knew of the ultimate purpose for which the product in question would be used.
See id.
Parex baldly asserts that the evidence was insufficient to establish that it was aware, at the times of the relevant sales, of the ultimate, intended use by Coronado and CSS. Pulte employee Rob Fisher testified, however, that prior to executing the subcontract for application of the Barrier EIFS, he met with Bernie Franks and a Parex representative, who assured him that the planned construction projects would “work with the Parex product.” On this testimony, the jury could have properly concluded that, despite the “intermediate chain of owners,” Parex was well aware of the “particular purpose” to which the Barrier EIFS would be put.
Id.
Even assuming arguendo that Parex is correct in asserting that Pulte was required to establish contractual privity and, in any event, failed to establish an equivalent intimate nexus, Parex’s victory would be a hollow one. The jury also determined by special interrogatory that the Parex product “used in the Pulte home construction was defective.” Although the jury responded “No” when asked if the “product was unfit for the ordinarily purposes for which such goods are used” (see id.), we are satisfied that the determination that the product was defective was equivalent to a determination that Parex breached the implied warranty of merchantability, for which the legislature of this State has expressly waived the privity requirement.
To reiterate, any previous requirement of privity is abolished as between the buyer and the seller in any action brought by the buyer. See Md. Code Ann., Com. Law I § 2-314(b) (emphasis added).
The Court of Appeals “long has held that a plaintiff asserting a breach of the implied warranty of merchantability must prove that the product was defective.”
Ford Motor Co., 365 Md. at 333, 779 A.2d 362. That is, “a plaintiff must prove the existence of a defect at the time the product leaves the manufacturer to recover on an implied warranty claim, as well as with regard to strict liability and negligence claims.”
Id. at 334, 779 A.2d 362. As the Court of Appeals noted in Ford Motor Co., 365 Md. at 334 n. 13, 779 A.2d 362:
One treatise explains the evidentiary requirements for proving an implied warranty of merchantability claim as including proof of a defect:
For a product to flunk the merchantability test, it must contain an inherent defect.... The cases indicate that the courts find goods to be unfit for their ordinary purposes when they can identify one of three general types of defects: manufacturing defects, design defects, and failure to give the buyer proper instructions with respect to the goods. This tripartite test for defect is essentially the same as that required when the theory is strict tort liability under Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, except that goods may violate Section 2-314 without being ‘unreasonably dangerous’ as is generally required under strict tort. In other words, a defect that leads to primary or consequential economic loss is actionable under Section 2-314, although it probably would not trigger strict tort recovery.
(citing Barkley Clark & Christopher Smith, The Law of Product Warranties paragraph 5.01[2][a] at 5-9 (1984)).
Parex does not contend that Pulte failed to present sufficient evidence to establish a breach by Pulte of an implied warranty of merchantability to Coronado and CSS. Although the jury determined that Pulte did not prove that the Barrier EIFS was unfit for the ordinary purposes for which such goods are used, there is no indication that its additional determination that the product was defective rendered the verdict irreconcilably inconsistent.
See generally Patras v. Syphax, 166 Md. App. 67, 75-76, 887 A.2d 84 (2005). The jury’s determination that the goods were defective may well have reflected a belief that the goods did not “[p]ass without objection in the trade under the contract description,” or were not “of fair or average quality within the description.” Md. Code Ann., Com. Law I § 2-314(2)(a) and (b).
See Bond v. NIBCO, Inc., 96 Md. App. 127, 139, 623 A.2d 731 (1993) (“a plaintiff who alleges breach of warranty of merchantability is not obligated to identify which factors under § 2-314(2) are breached”).
In Part I of our Discussion as to Pulte’s appeal, we observed that the trial court ruled that the event that triggered the running of the statute of limitations in this case was the delivery of the Barrier EIFS product to the construction site. The court concluded that because Pulte filed the complaint that triggered the instant case on June 14, 2001, it could not recover from Parex on any breach of implied warranty claim assigned to Pulte by Coronado or CSS if the Barrier EIFS for the houses to which the claims related was delivered prior to June 14, 1997. Subsequently, the jury determined that Pulte could not recover as to forty-four of the homes because the closings on the sales of those homes occurred prior to June 14, 1997. The jury, thus, inferred that for the twenty-three homes for which closings occurred after June 14, 1997, deliveries of Barrier EIFS occurred after that date as well.
Parex now contends that the jury’s decision was clearly erroneous as to four of the twenty-three homes. It asserts that the four homes were model homes and points out that it offered into evidence, as Defendant’s Exhibit 24A, certificates of occupancy issued prior to June 14, 1997 for each of the homes. Parex reasons, “Since it has been established that the certificate[s] of occupancy [were] issued prior to June 14, 1997, it is evident that the Parex product ... [was] delivered prior to that date.... ”
As we have indicated, “it is not the province of an appellate court to express an opinion regarding the weight of the evidence when reviewing judgment on a jury verdict.”
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 343 Md. at 521, 682 A.2d 1143. If the party challenging the weight of the evidence properly moved for judgment at the close of the opposing party’s case and, thus, specifically preserved the challenge, we will review the trial court’s decision that the evidence was sufficient to send the case to the jury, “but we do not review the weight of the evidence after it has been passed upon by a jury.”
Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted). Parex does not contend that it moved for judgment as to the four homes on the ground now urged, and we have unearthed no such argument in the voluminous record extract. Under the circumstances, we deem the argument to be unpreserved.
We note, however, that no impropriety is apparent. Parex offered no testimony or other evidence to explain the purported significance of the documents in Defendant’s Exhibit 24A. Parex presented no reason for the jury to believe that the Barrier EIFS was necessarily applied to the four homes before the documents were issued. Specifically, the document offered for the home at 9808 Claggett Farm Drive in Potomac, Maryland, is titled “Building Inspection Detail” and was issued by the Montgomery County Department of Permitting Services. The document indicates that the home was inspected on June 27, 1996 for the purpose of a “building residential permit.” As to precisely what was inspected, the document is vague. It lists, without comment or notation, the cryptic terms “check list pre construction,” “county well inspectio[n],” “inspection detail,” and “state well permit approval.”
Documents titled “Certificate of Final Inspection” that were issued by the Montgomery County Department of Environmental Protection were offered for the homes at 9712 Claggett Farm Drive and 20700 Delta Drive in Potomac. These documents state that the homes were inspected and received their building permits, electrical permits, and mechanical permits on June 3, 1997 and June 13, 1996, respectively. They do not specify which, if any, of the permits pertained to the exterior coverings of the homes. Similarly, the document offered for the home at 9603 Savannah Crossing in Fairfax, Virginia is a “Residential Use Permit” issued by the Department of Environmental Management of Fairfax County. The permit indicates, without explanation, that the home underwent electrical, plumbing, mechanical, building, and public utilities inspections on June 24, 1996 and June 27, 1996. Again, there is no specific mention of the Barrier EIFS application.
In his closing argument, counsel for Parex stated:
[O]ur contention is that if you find ... that [closing on the sale of the home] was ... more than four years before the lawsuit is filed, then it’s barred by limitations.
The importance of that is, and one of the reasons that courts and statutes have periods of limitations is because memories fade, documents tend to get lost, and when you’re trying to defend yourself against allegations four and five years down the road, it’s hard to do if you can’t gather the information and get access to it. And, so, the courts set a period beyond which you can’t bring a claim. It’s really undisputed what the settlement dates are here, and I think it’s an easy math problem that there are only 23 homes settled after June 14, 1997 that got in within the statute of limitations period.
Now, the settlement date indicates, you know, these people went to settlement, and it’s a reasonable inference that the EIFS was on the house or they wouldn’t settle, which means the goods have been delivered, certainly, to CSS. Th[at] can hardly be disputed, and there’s certainly no evidence that’s presented that any EIFS was delivered after this date of settlement.
So, since the statute of limitations runs from the date of delivery of the goods, we know the EIFS was at least on at this time.
Now, four of these homes are model homes. They were built long before they went to settlement. And for that reason we introduced into evidence Exhibit 24A. Now, Exhibit 24A shows you the certificates of occupancy on the four model homes, and you will be able to see that they were completed, and a certificate of occupancy issued well before June 14, 1997 ....
(Emphasis added.) Closing argument is not evidence, however.
See generally Farley v. Allstate Ins. Co., 355 Md. 34, 56, 733 A.2d 1014 (1999). In any event, counsel’s closing argument contained no insight into what the documents in question truly revealed. The jury’s decision was supported by the evidence.
In the fourth argument of its cross-appeal, Parex launches a two-pronged attack on the award of $1,500,000 in damages to Pulte. Parex first contends that the trial court erred by permitting Pulte to recover any damages at all on the assigned cross-claims in light of the admissions of fault made by Coronado and CSS in their settlement agreement with Pulte.21
In the alternative, Parex argues that the court erred by permitting Pulte to recover on the assigned cross-claims an amount greater than the amount Coronado and CSS paid Pulte to settle Pulte’s claims against them.
The first prong of Parex’s argument is without merit.22 Parex proceeds under the mistaken assumption that fault on the part of the plaintiff — in this case, apparently, negligence on the part of Coronado and CSS — precludes recovery as a matter of course on a breach of warranty claim as it does on a negligence claim. That is not the case. “In an action based on breach of warranty it is necessary for the plaintiff to show the existence of the warranty, the fact that the warranty was broken and that the breach of warranty was the proximate cause of the loss sustained.”
Sheeskin v. Giant Food, Inc., 20 Md. App. 611, 620-21, 318 A.2d 874 (1974), aff’d sub nom. Giant Food, Inc. v. Washington Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 273 Md. 592, 332 A.2d 1 (1975). A plaintiff may not recover for breach of warranty if the trier of fact determines that the plaintiff’s own, intervening conduct, and not the breach, was “ ‘the proximate cause of the loss.’ ”
Erdman v. Johnson Bros. Radio & Television Co., Inc., 260 Md. 190, 200, 271 A.2d 744 (1970) (holding that even though defendants breached implied warranty of fitness, plaintiffs could not recover damages for fire in home that started when television burst into flames since plaintiffs continued watching television even after it began emitting smoke and sparks).
See also Mattos, Inc. v. Hash, 279 Md. 371, 381-84, 368 A.2d 993 (1977) (evidence supported jury’s determination that plaintiff auto body repairman did not act negligently or assume risk in using clamp purchased from defendant seller and, thus, could recover for breach of implied warranty of merchantability).
Here, the trial court instructed the jury, in pertinent part, as follows:
Any warranty of goods involved in this case was based on the assumption that they would be used in a reasonable manner appropriate for the purpose for which they were intended. A person cannot recover damages for a breach of warranty if the injury or damages the person suffered resulted from the person’s improper use of the goods unless the seller had reason to know that the plaintiff intended the improper use and nevertheless warranted that the use was acceptable....
A person using a product after the person knew or should have known of the defect or condition which the person claims was a breach of warranty may not recover unless a reasonable person would have used the product in spite of that knowledge.
In this case, the plaintiff has been assigned or otherwise acquired certain rights of other parties to bring the claims against Parex. This case concerns the rights [against] Parex that have been assigned by the suppliers and installers, Coronado Corporation and CSS, LLC. Pulte has brought suit against Parex in both of these capacities as though it were standing in the shoes of each of Coronado and CSS, LLC.
Pulte does not have a direct claim against Parex. Pulte alleges that it has taken by written agreement an assignment of all claims, if any, of CSS and Coronado against Parex as part of that agreement and as a part of that agreement, CSS and Coronado have admitted their liability to Pulte for the damages alleged in this case.
Thereafter, the jury determined, in essence, that: the Barrier EIFS sold by Parex was defective; Parex had breached the implied warranties; and the breaches by Parex were the cause of damages to Coronado and CSS in the amount $50,000 per home. Parex does not dispute the particular findings but merely contends that, because of the undefined admission of fault in connection with their settlement with Pulte, Coronado and CSS may not recover from Parex. The jury, however, agreed with Pulte that it was Parex’s breaches, and not any wrongdoing on the part of Coronado or CSS, that caused the damages. Recovery by Pulte on the assigned cross-claim was therefore proper.
Parex shall prevail on the second prong of its argument, however. We agree with Parex that Pulte cannot recover more damages than Coronado and CSS were, or could be, required to pay. To recount, Coronado and CSS were parties to the settlement agreement with Pulte. The essential terms of the settlement agreement were:
Pulte defends against Parex’s argument by asserting that, under the “judgment rule,” Pulte is entitled to recover by way of the assignment the full amount of damages suffered by Coronado and CSS even though Coronado and CSS reached a settlement agreement with Pulte and will never be required to pay that amount. Pulte reasons that, since the $3,800,000 jury award did not exceed the amount of the consent judgment entered against Coronado and CSS pursuant to the settlement agreement, it is entitled to retain the full amount of the award. The judgment rule simply is not applicable to this case, however.
This Court has explained that the judgment rule applies if a case involves a contract that “is an ‘indemnity against liability.’ ”
Roebuck v. Steuart, 76 Md. App. 298, 307, 544 A.2d 808 (1988). If such a contract exists, “recovery from the indemnitor is allowed when judgment is entered against the indemnitee, even though it has not been paid....”
Id. at 307-08, 544 A.2d 808. If, however, “the contract is ‘an indemnity against loss or damage’ ... the indemnitee cannot recover from the indemnitor until payment is made or he has otherwise suffered actual loss or damage....”
Id. at 308, 544 A.2d 808.
See also 42 C.J.S. Indemnity §§ 22 and 23 (1991). As the cases cited by Pulte reflect, the judgment rule most often comes into play when an insured defendant or his or her assignee pursues a claim against the insurance carrier for bad faith failure to settle.
See, e.g., Gray v. Grain Dealers Mut. Ins. Co., 871 F.2d 1128, 1132-33 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Gaskill v. Preferred Risk Mut. Ins. Co., 251 F. Supp. 66, 68-69 (D. Md. 1966), aff’d, 371 F.2d 792 (4th Cir. 1967); Lee v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 286 F.2d 295, 298 (4th Cir. 1961). The insured or his or her assignee will be permitted to recover the difference between the amount of the policy limit and the amount of the judgment.
See Med. Mut. Liab. Ins. Soc’y of Md. v. Evans, 330 Md. 1, 25, 622 A.2d 103 (1993); Gaskill, 251 F. Supp. at 72. The judgment rule may also be applicable in cases involving contracts of indemnity that do not involve insurance carriers.
See, e.g., Deminsky v. Arlington Plastics Mach., 259 Wis. 2d 587, 657 N.W.2d 411 (2003) (where contract of sale expressly provided that buyer of machine would indemnify seller in any suit for damages caused by machine).
Pulte does not suggest that Parex expressly contracted to indemnify Coronado or CSS for any loss or liability resulting from the Barrier EIFS. Moreover, we have explained at length that at the close of Pulte’s case the trial court dismissed the assigned indemnity claims, and the claims that went to the jury were the breach of implied warranty claims assigned by Coronado and CSS to Pulte. We decline to expand the scope of the judgment rule to apply to situations such as this. Under the circumstances of this case, Pulte’s damages must be limited to the recovery that Coronado and CSS could recover — that is, the amount they paid to settle the claims against them.
We reject Parex’s suggestion that Pulte is not entitled to recover any amount because it did not prove what portion of the $725,000.00 settlement agreement, if any, was paid on behalf of Coronado and CSS. The settlement agreement clearly states, “Defendants’ Insurers agree to pay Pulte $725,000.00.” The agreement identifies certain insurers but makes clear, by defining “Defendants’ Insurers” to include “any other insurer or companies providing insurance coverage for the time periods outlined in the Lawsuit,” that some insurers may not yet have been identified. The agreement does not identify the particular parties whom each insurer insures; nor does it apportion liability among the parties. It is, thus, apparent that the payment obligation was intended to be joint and several.
When two or more promisors agree to pay a sum of money under a contract the amount promised is the promise of all and the promisee is entitled to a joint judgment against them, or judgments against them severally. In satisfying such judgments execution may be levied upon the goods of any one of them.... Even though the judgment may be joint, the payment of the entire judgment might be satisfied from any one of them....
Ramsey, Inc. v. Davis, 66 Md. App. 717, 728, 505 A.2d 899 (1986) (applying objective law of contracts to consent judgment and quoting Traylor v. Grafton, 273 Md. 649, 684-85, 332 A.2d 651 (1975)).
It was not Pulte’s burden to prove that the $725,000 settlement amount had been paid and what portion, if any, had been paid by, or on behalf of, each of the settling defendants. Rather, it was Parex’s burden to prove that the settlement had been paid, either partially or entirely.
See Md. Rule 2-323(g) (identifying accord and satisfaction as an affirmative defense); Wickman v. Kane, 136 Md. App. 554, 561-62, 766 A.2d 241 (2001) (defendant bears burden of proving that payment contemplated by settlement agreement was made). Parex directs us to no evidence that it satisfied this burden. Absent proof that the settlement had been paid, it could properly be inferred that the obligation remained a debt for which Coronado and CSS remained jointly and severally liable. Pulte, as assignee of the applicators, could thus recover the full amount from Parex.
Parex next contends that the trial court erred in permitting Pulte to recover on the assigned claims of Coronado and CSS for breach of the implied warranties of merchantability and fitness for a particular purpose, in that Parex expressly excluded the assigned warranties in its distributorship with American EIFS. Parex points out that the jury answered in the affirmative the question:
Do you find by a preponderance of the evidence that Parex, Inc. has proven that a contract existed between Parex and American EIFS Stone & Stucco Supply, Inc., as represented by Parex Exhibit #41?
In a brief argument that spans less than one page of Parex’s fifty-nine page appellee/cross-appellant brief, Parex asserts that, in agreeing to the “General Conditions of Sale” which were appended to the contract and included in Exhibit 41, American EIFS “waived all warranties and agreed to indemnify Parex if suit were instituted against Parex.” (Parex’s brief at 53).
Parex does not indicate that it raised the argument in the trial court, and does not provide this Court with a citation to the record extract that would confirm that it did so. We decline to comb through the eight-volume, 3,876-page record extract to ascertain information that Parex should have provided — a clear reference to a page or pages of the record extract that show the matter was presented to the trial court.
See Md. Rule 8-504(a)(4). “[A]ppellate courts are not obliged to go through the record to find where a point was actually ruled upon, if it was.”
Schaefer v. Cusack, 124 Md. App. 288, 300, 722 A.2d 73 (1998). “Under the circumstances, [we shall assume that] the matter was not raised in or addressed by the trial court and therefore is not properly before this Court for review.”
Harper v. State, 162 Md. App. 55, 88, 873 A.2d 395 (2005) (by failing to provide citations to the record to establish that appellant pursued generic motion to sever criminal counts, appellant waived right to argue on appeal that trial court erred by failing to sever the counts).
As Maryland Rule 8-131(a) provides, an “appellate court will not decide any ... issue [other than jurisdiction] unless it plainly appears by the record to have been raised in or decided by the trial court .... ” We see no reason to exercise our discretion to do otherwise in this case.
See, e.g., Kennedy v. Mobay Corp., 84 Md. App. 397, 430, 579 A.2d 1191 (1990) (appellant’s argument that trial court erred by postponing the case several times was not properly before this Court where appellant “fail[ed] to provide us with a record reference to any objection to these continuances ...”), aff’d, 325 Md. 385, 601 A.2d 123 (1992).
Parex next contends that Pulte repeatedly and egregiously violated a trial court ruling prohibiting it from questioning witnesses or otherwise offering evidence regarding subsequent remedial measures taken in regard to its Barrier EIFS. Parex posits that “[t]he prejudicial statements were driven home time after time after time and culminated in Pulte’s ‘coup de grace,’ egregious violations of the court’s ruling during closing.” Parex concludes that the cumulative effect of the perceived violations necessitated that a mistrial be declared during closing argument.
Prior to trial, Parex moved in limine to bar evidence regarding “changes in regulations and manufacturers’ recommendations” concerning Barrier EIFS that were made after the events in question. At the start of the hearing on the motion, the trial court commented:
Remedial measures are generally not admitted. However, if expert opinions ... or lay opinions are expressed, that the original product was never defective or wasn’t a problem, then typically the remedial measure could then be raised in an impeachment mode. And that would be my intended ruling....
Upon hearing argument on the motion, the trial court stated:
... What I’m going to do is, I’m going to give you some guidance. I would not admit the presentation of changes in building codes that are post event, absent some showing of rel[evance] to the event and what that really means is I’m postponing it to the trial but that’s how I’m going to rule. So, unless you’re telling me something different, it probably isn’t going to come in. Except in impeachment, you always have the right in impeachment.
Thus, Pulte was given the delicate task of proving the assigned claims of Coronado, CSS, and American EIFS— including proving the damages measured in part by the cost of replacing the product — without informing the jury that, after the Parex product was used on the homes in question, Parex itself or any government entity, by way of changing building codes, had taken remedial measures in regard to Barrier EIFS or barrier cladding systems in general.
As expected, the issue of subsequent remedial measures arose several times during trial. Citations to the record extract, provided by Parex, indicate that on one occasion the trial court overruled an objection by counsel for Parex to a question asking a witness to explain the difference between the Barrier EIFS used on the homes and the drainable EIFS product that replaced it. On a second occasion, after much debate at a bench conference, the court sustained Parex’s objection to a question asking Parex president Francua Bouan whether Parex no longer recommended using Barrier EIFS for residential construction. The question was clearly designed to impeach the witness after he stated, confusingly, that the product is still “installed successfully with all re[spec]t to the specification in a lot of residential comm[er]cial construction.”
Three times bench conferences were called to discuss whether counsel for Pulte could properly ask questions of a witness that broached the subject of subsequent remedial measures. Each time the court denied permission to ask the questions and, contrary to Parex’s assertions, no evidence or improper questioning was placed before the jury. On one occasion, counsel for Pulte asked a question of a witness that elicited a response that, in accordance with current building codes, Barrier EIFS is no longer used on single-family, wood-frame, residential housing. No objection was lodged to the question or response. Parex directs us to two instances where, without objection, counsel for Pulte elicited testimony from witnesses to the effect that the replacement of the Barrier EIFS with drainable EIFS was successful. Parex also directs us to two instances that have no apparent bearing on any subsequent remedial measure.
The citations to the record extract provided by Parex demonstrate that the perceived references to prior remedial measures during trial were far more oblique and far less frequent than Parex would have us believe. In addition, Parex may well have waived its argument, as it pertains to the admission of evidence during trial, by failing to consistently object. “Under Md. Rule 2-517, an objection to the admission of evidence must be made at the time the evidence is offered, or the objection is waived. A motion in limine to exclude evidence ordinarily will not preserve the issue for review if no objection is made to the introduction of the evidence at trial.”
Lewin Realty III, Inc. v. Brooks, 138 Md. App. 244, 261, 771 A.2d 446 (2001), aff’d, 378 Md. 70, 835 A.2d 616 (2003). Moreover, absent a continuing objection, an “appellant waive[s] its objection to [the] admission [of testimony] by permitting subsequent testimony to the same effect to come in without objection.”
State Roads Comm’n v. Bare, 220 Md. 91, 95, 151 A.2d 154 (1959).
In any event, it is Parex’s position that the references during trial combined with improper closing argument to warrant a mistrial. In his closing argument, counsel for Pulte explained that, in response to complaints from homeowners, Pulte launched an investigation and ultimately decided to re-clad the damaged homes. Counsel’s argument then proceeded as follows:
Now Pulte, as it stripped off the homes with the old cladding and replaced it with new, and what they replaced it with was a new type of cladding that gave the same appearance, so the homeowners were going to have the same look that they selected initially when they made the purchase of their home, but it has a secondary—
MR. FERGUSON [(counsel for Parex)]: Objection.
MR. McMANUS [(counsel for Pulte)]: — barrier.
THE COURT: Basis?
MR. FERGUSON: May we approach?
THE COURT: Yes. Please pardon the interruption.
(Bench conference follows:)
MR. FERGUSON: He’s just described how the homes were reclad with a new type of product with a secondary weather barrier.
MR. McMANUS: Which is exactly how we were instructed to do it before, exactly what the evidence is in the case. I read it all from the transcripts.
THE COURT: Well—
MR. FERGUSON: That was excluded from evidence, Your Honor.
THE COURT: — it was but I don’t, I don’t think it will—
MR. FERGUSON: This is really terrible.
MR. McMANUS: Stop.
THE COURT: I’ll give a curative instruction.
(Bench conference concluded.)
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, the Court wishes to advise you that the issue that is before the Court and before you, ladies and gentlemen, for consideration is the nature of the product that is produced by Parex in this lawsuit. You need not concern yourself with whatever happened after the events that are involved and what wa[s] done methodology wise, except insofar as there was, if you reach this, an issue of cost. So you need to focus on the Parex product and the issues in accordance with the instructions....
Shortly thereafter, counsel for Pulte explained that Pulte re-clad even those homes that had suffered very little water damage because increased damage was “inevitable.” As counsel’s argument continued, the following occurred:
Pulte stopped that risk for each and every one of its homeowners by taking the action now, by repairing the product as soon as it reasonably found out that yes we have a systemic problem, yes we are going to accept our responsibility and yes, we are going to reclad these houses to make sure that the damage does not spread.
Parex never did that. As I said earlier, Parex never even bothered to test this product at any time, to this day they still haven’t done it. But, of course, as we also heard from the evidence, this is a good reason again why you know that this product is defective, and why the codes are so important, where the codes didn’t really initially contemplate EIFS, they do now. You heard the testimony from Mr. Bouan, codes don’t permit the use of—
MR. FERGUSON: Objection.
MR. McMANUS: — barrier EIFS any more.
THE COURT: Just a moment, please. As you heard from the testimony of Mr. Bouan[?]
MR. FERGUSON: May we approach?
THE COURT: Yes.
(Bench conference follows:)
MR. FERGUSON: Mr. McManus has just told the jury that the codes no longer permit the use of barrier EIFS on residential construction as you heard from Mr. Bouan. That was specifically excluded in the motion in limine.
THE COURT: It was.
MR. FERGUSON: And, Your Honor—
THE COURT: It was.
MR. FERGUSON: — I move for a mistrial.
THE COURT: Denied.
MR. McMANUS: May I be heard?
THE COURT: No.
(Bench conference concluded.)
THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen, the status of building codes and what they permit or don’t permit today is not before you and that’s not an issue in this case. You are not to concern yourself with what the status is today. Proceed.
MR. McMANUS: Thank you, sir. Mr. Harrison also told you that Parex no longer recommends this product for use in this type of building. They just don’t.
MR. FERGUSON: Objection, Your Honor, ask for instruction.
THE COURT: Well, once again it is—
MR. FERGUSON: Same issue.
THE COURT: Mr. McManus, I caution you on this most directly but again, ladies and gentlemen, it’s not what the status is today. We are looking at a window of events of the time period which this Court has permitted evidence upon back in the ’90s. That’s what you are to concern yourselves with. What was the state of being then and what were the rights of the parties then....
Finally, counsel for Pulte argued that counsel for Parex was trying to shift the blame to other, non-culpable companies such as the applicators:
He also [stated] to you that the applicators would come. He [stated] that the Parex product works fine and is not defective. We never saw Mr. Franks, neither Ben nor Bernie Franks. We never saw a single applicator from any other company or anybody else come in and say yeah, I’ve applied the stuff and it’s a good product. He made that promise to you. They didn’t put on a single piece of evidence.
Mr. Ferguson also told you that this was Parex[’s] best selling product today in 2005 used both in residential and commercial construction, our best selling product. We now know from Mr. Harrison they don’t recommend it for this type of housing.
MR. FERGUSON: I ask for the same instruction again and I ask counsel—
THE COURT: Mr. McManus, I don’t want to say this again to you. It is not what it is today. Don’t refer to that to the jury.
In Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., supra, the Court of Appeals addressed an argument similar to that now made by Parex. There, as here, the appellant argued that the trial court erred by refusing to grant a mistrial “based on prejudicial events which occurred during trial and improper remarks during plaintiffs closing argument.”
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 343 Md. at 514, 682 A.2d 1143.
Garrett, supra, involved a suit against manufacturers and distributors of asbestos products brought by persons who suffered asbestos-related illnesses. During closing argument, plaintiffs counsel made “repeated references to murder and analogies to ‘Nazis’ and the ‘Holocaust.’ ”
Id. at 518, 682 A.2d 1143. Defense counsel demanded a mistrial and argued that the improper argument, combined with other perceived improprieties that occurred during trial, rendered a fair trial impossible. The trial court declined to grant the motion but instructed the jury to disregard the comments.
In rejecting the defendant’s argument on appeal that the trial court erred, the Court of Appeals explained:
In reviewing the trial judge’s denial of a mistrial motion, we will not disturb the ruling absent a clear showing of abuse of discretion. When trial judges exercise discretion, they “balanc[e] alternative solutions and decid[e] which one to apply, in order to advance the interests of justice.” Our first question in determining abuse of discretion in denying a motion to mistrial is if and to what extent the movant was prejudiced by the denial.
“ ‘Where the [motion for mistrial] is denied and the trial judge gives a curative instruction, we must determine whether the evidence was so prejudicial that it denied the defendant a fair trial; that is, whether the damage in the form of prejudice to the defendant transcended the curative effect of the instruction.’ ”
Id. at 517-18, 682 A.2d 1143 (citations omitted). The court concluded, “[T]he trial judge did not abuse his discretion when he evaluated the conduct of the entire four-month trial, weighed the improper remarks against that backdrop, and determined that granting a mistrial would not be just.”
Id. at 519-20, 682 A.2d 1143.
In the instant case, Parex contends that the closing argument of Pulte’s counsel reflected a deliberate attempt to inject improper information into the jury’s considerations. We are not convinced. Throughout the trial, counsel for Pulte walked a fine line between attempting to establish that the Parex product was defective while at the same time complying with the court’s ruling regarding evidence of subsequent remedial measures. The record reflects considerable confusion among counsel for both parties as to the precise scope of that ruling. Indeed, as counsel for Pulte pointed out to the court in response to an objection during closing argument, evidence that current building codes prohibit the use of barrier cladding on single-family, wood-frame, residential housing had been admitted without objection.23
The trial court twice instructed the jury to the effect that, in determining whether the Barrier EIFS was defective, it was not to consider any building code changes regarding the product or any changes in Parex’s own policies regarding the use of it.
There is a presumption that jurors understand and follow the court’s instructions.... More specifically, [w]hen curative instructions are given, it is generally presumed that the jury can and will follow them.... Furthermore, the trial judge is in the best position to determine whether his instructions achieved the desired curative effect on the jury....
Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Gianotti, 148 Md. App. 457, 476, 813 A.2d 280 (2002), aff’d, 386 Md. 468, 872 A.2d 969 (2005). In light of the abundant evidence that the damages to the relevant homes were caused by some failure of the Barrier EIFS, we have no reason to question the trial court’s assessment. We perceive no abuse of discretion.
Finally, Parex argues that the trial court erred by accepting the jury’s finding that Pulte was entitled to prejudgment interest, and by awarding pre-judgment interest based on the jury’s finding that Parex was liable for $50,000 in damages as to each of twenty-three homes. Under the circumstances of this case, we must agree.
As this Court has explained, “The purpose of the allowance of prejudgment interest is to compensate the aggrieved party for the loss of the use of the principal liquidated sum found due it and the loss of income from such funds.”
I.W. Berman Props. v. Porter Bros., Inc., 276 Md. 1, 24, 344 A.2d 65 (1975). “Pre-judgment interest is allowable as a matter of right when ‘the obligation to pay and the amount due had become certain, definite, and liquidated by a specific date prior to judgment so that the effect of the debtor’s withholding payment was to deprive the creditor of the use of a fixed amount as of a known date.’ ”
Buxton v. Buxton, 363 Md. 634, 656, 770 A.2d 152 (2001) (citation omitted). “[E]ven when the amount is certain, a legitimate dispute as to the obligation to pay deprives the claimant of an absolute right to interest, and places the case into that category where interest is discretionary with the fact-finder.”
Gordon v. Posner, 142 Md. App. 399, 438, 790 A.2d 675 (2002).
Ordinarily, “[w]hether a party is entitled to prejudgment interest ... is left to the discretion of the fact finder. ‘The exercise of discretion to award prejudgment interest must be based on the “equity and justice appearing between the parties and a consideration of all the circumstances.” ’ ” Ver Brycke v. Ver Brycke, 150 Md. App. 623, 656-57, 822 A.2d 1226 (2003) (citation omitted), aff’d in part, rev’d in part on other grounds, 379 Md. 669, 843 A.2d 758 (2004).24
In this case, Pulte’s entitlement to pre-judgment interest was not a matter of right but rather was within the discretion of the jury as fact finder. Because the only claims that went to the jury were the assigned breach of implied warranty claims of Coronado and CSS, it was essential that, in exercising its discretion to award pre-judgment interest, the jury determine whether Parex’s “obligation to pay and the amount due had become certain, definite, and liquidated by a specific date prior to judgment,” and if so when that payment should have been made.
Buxton, 363 Md. at 656, 770 A.2d 152. Pulte’s posits that Parex became obligated to pay Coronado and CSS on the date the consent judgments against them were entered, and that the trial court correctly calculated the pre-judgment interest from “Pulte’s date of payment.”25
Even assuming that there was one single date of payment for repairs to all twenty-three homes for which the jury determined damages, Pulte’s position is untenable.
Clearly, Parex has consistently denied liability for any portion of the damages. The fact that Coronado and CSS settled with Pulte and permitted the entries of consent judgments against them could not render Parex’s obligation to pay the applicators “certain, definite, and liquidated” by any “specific date.”
Id. The dispute as to liability was legitimate, and it denied Coronado and CSS — and therefore Pulte — an absolute right to interest and left the matter to the discretion of the fact-finder.
See Gordon, 142 Md. App. at 438, 790 A.2d 675.
The jury determined that Pulte, as assignee of Coronado and CSS, was entitled to pre-judgment interest. As we explained in Part IV of our discussion of Parex’s cross-appeal, however, Pulte presented no evidence to the jury regarding the settlement. Although ample evidence was presented from which the jury could determine that Coronado and CSS were liable to Pulte for the damages to the relevant homes, the jury was never told when, if ever, Coronado and CSS paid Pulte for repairs, or how much, if anything, they paid. There was simply no basis for the jury’s decision that Coronado and CSS — and thus Pulte — were entitled to interest for the loss of income from funds paid out.
We thus vacate the summary judgment entered by the trial court in favor of Parex on the implied indemnity claims brought by Pulte as assignee of American EIFS, as well as the award of $1,429,380.16 in damages. We remand the case to the trial court with instructions to enter judgment in favor of Pulte for $725,000. Because Pulte is limited in the amount it may recover by the amount of its agreement with the settling defendants, and because the settlement obligation is joint and several, we shall not remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings as to the assigned claims of American EIFS, and our vacation of the summary judgment as to those claims is of no significant consequence.
JUDGMENT OF THE CIRCUIT COURT FOR MONTGOMERY COUNTY IN FAVOR OF APPELLEE AS TO CLAIMS BROUGHT BY APPELLANT AS ASSIGNEE OF AMERICAN EIFS VACATED; AWARD OF DAMAGES TO APPELLANT VACATED; FINDINGS OTHERWISE AFFIRMED; CASE REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS TO ENTER JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF APPELLANT, AS TO CLAIMS BROUGHT BY APPELLANT AS ASSIGNEE OF CORONADO AND CSS, FOR $725,000.00.
COSTS TO BE PAID ⅔ BY APPELLANT AND ⅓ BY APPELLEE.
Morris v. Osmose Wood Preserving, 340 Md. 519, 529, 667 A.2d 624 (1995). The rule is supplanted only when the plaintiff passes the “legal threshold of pleading the existence of a clear and extreme danger of death or serious personal injury.”
Id. at 536, 667 A.2d 624. We perceive no indication from the record that the trial court applied the economic loss rule — a rule pertaining only to tort law — to this breach of warranties claim.
Copiers Typewriters Calculators, Inc. v. Toshiba Corp., 576 F. Supp. 312, 323 (D. Md. 1983). “Maryland does not recognize [an] exception to the privity requirement when the claim of breach of express warranty does not involve a claim of personal injury....”
Id.
See id. at 318-25, 818 A.2d 237. The Court further observed: