439 U.S. 128 (1978)
Petitioners were convicted of armed robbery in the Circuit Court of Kankakee County, Illinois, after a trial in which the prosecution introduced a sawed-off rifle and rifle shells seized by police from an automobile in which the petitioners had been passengers.1 Neither petitioner owned the automobile, and neither asserted ownership of the rifle or the shells.2 The Illinois Appellate Court affirmed the convictions after upholding the denial of a motion to suppress, and the Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal.3
The events began when a police officer on routine patrol received a radio call reporting a robbery of a clothing store in Bourbonnais, Illinois, and describing the getaway car.4 The officer spotted a vehicle he believed matched the description, followed it until backup arrived, and then stopped the car.5 The occupants, consisting of the petitioners and two female companions with the owner driving, were ordered out of the vehicle.6
After the occupants exited, officers searched the interior of the car and discovered a box of rifle shells inside the locked glove compartment along with a sawed-off rifle beneath the front passenger seat.7 The officers then took the petitioners to the station and placed them under arrest.8 Before trial the petitioners moved to suppress the rifle and shells, conceding they did not own the automobile and were merely passengers while also declining to claim ownership of the seized items.9
The prosecutor challenged the petitioners' standing to object to the search on the ground that neither the car nor the evidence belonged to them.10 The trial court agreed and denied the motion to suppress without reaching the question of probable cause.11 The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to address the standing issue because of its importance to the administration of criminal justice.12
Whether passengers in an automobile who neither own the vehicle nor assert any ownership interest in items seized during a search have standing to challenge the constitutionality of that search under the Fourth Amendment?13
The Fourth Amendment protects personal rights that may not be asserted vicariously by those whose own legitimate expectation of privacy has not been infringed by the governmental intrusion.14
No. The established facts demonstrate that petitioners were passengers ordered out of the vehicle after the stop prompted by the radio report of the clothing store robbery.15 Officers then searched the interior and recovered the rifle shells from the locked glove compartment and the sawed-off rifle from under the front passenger seat.16 Petitioners conceded they neither owned the automobile nor asserted any property interest in the rifle or shells, and they made no showing of a legitimate expectation of privacy in those specific areas of the car.17
Petitioners lacked standing to challenge the search because their own Fourth Amendment rights were not violated.18
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by The Chief Justice
Justice Powell wrote separately to emphasize that the Court's decision does not preclude passengers from ever having standing to challenge searches.19 A passenger who can demonstrate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched would retain the ability to object to the search.20 In the present case the petitioners made no such demonstration regarding the glove compartment or the area under the seat.21
The narrow question was whether the search of the friend's automobile after the petitioners had exited violated any Fourth Amendment right of their own.22 Powell stressed that the decision rests on legitimate expectations of privacy rather than rigid property-law concepts.23 He noted the well-established distinction between automobiles and other locations for Fourth Amendment purposes.24
Joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, And Stevens
Justice White dissented on the ground that petitioners possessed a legitimate expectation of privacy by virtue of their lawful presence as passengers in the private automobile.25 He argued that the majority's approach improperly ties Fourth Amendment protection to property concepts.26 The ruling effectively declares open season on vehicles containing multiple occupants.27
This result is contrary to the privacy focus established in Katz and the principle that legitimate presence suffices to confer standing under Jones.28 White maintained that the logic of prior decisions supports allowing defendants legitimately present to contest the legality of the search.29 He argued that the majority distorts Fourth Amendment doctrine in an effort to limit the exclusionary rule rather than addressing its validity directly.30
Whether a criminal defendant may assert standing to suppress evidence by claiming that a search was directed at him even though his own Fourth Amendment rights were not violated?31
Fourth Amendment rights are personal and may not be asserted vicariously. A defendant therefore cannot obtain suppression by showing only that the search was directed at him rather than that his own protected interest was invaded.32
No. Petitioners advanced the target theory under which any defendant at whom a search is directed would have standing regardless of whether his personal rights were infringed.33 The facts establish that the search targeted the automobile owned and driven by a third party.34 Petitioners sought to suppress the evidence on the ground that the search was aimed at them.35 The Court rejected this expansion because it would permit assertion of third-party rights and would extend the exclusionary rule beyond its proper scope.36
The target theory of standing is rejected.37
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, And Stevens
Justice White dissented from the rejection of broader standing principles.38 He maintained that the logic of prior decisions, including those assuming passengers may challenge automobile searches, supports allowing defendants legitimately present to contest the legality of the search.39 In his view the majority's refusal to permit such challenges distorts Fourth Amendment doctrine in an effort to limit the exclusionary rule rather than addressing its validity directly.40
White emphasized that many prior opinions had assumed a mere passenger in an automobile is entitled to protection against unreasonable searches occurring in his presence.41 He argued that the Court's new rule undercuts the force of the exclusionary rule in situations where its use is most justified.42
Whether the Jones v. United States rule that anyone legitimately on the premises may challenge a search applies to confer standing on automobile passengers who lack any property or possessory interest in the vehicle or seized items?43
The phrase legitimately on the premises from Jones is too broad a gauge for Fourth Amendment rights.44 The proper inquiry is whether the defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the particular area searched.45 Mere presence as a passenger does not automatically create such an expectation in the glove compartment or under the seat of another's car.46
No. Although petitioners were legitimately present in the automobile with the owner's permission, the facts show they were mere passengers who neither owned nor leased the vehicle and who asserted no interest in the areas searched or the items seized.47 The Court held that this status alone does not generate a legitimate expectation of privacy in the glove compartment or the area beneath the seat.48 These are areas where passengers qua passengers would not normally possess such an expectation.49
The Jones legitimately on premises rule does not confer standing on these petitioners.50
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by The Chief Justice
Justice Powell joined the majority but wrote separately to underscore that the decision rests on legitimate expectations of privacy rather than rigid property-law concepts.51 He noted that the distinction between automobiles and other locations is well established.52 Passengers who lack control over the vehicle or its locked compartments ordinarily cannot claim a reasonable expectation that the interior will remain free from official examination after a lawful stop.53
Powell explained that the ultimate question is whether one's claim to privacy from government intrusion is reasonable in light of all the surrounding circumstances.54 He stated that no single factor is invariably determinative.55