483 U.S. 378 (1987)
On January 12, 1981, Ardith McPherson, a nineteen-year-old black woman who had attended college for one year studying secretarial science, was appointed a deputy in the office of the Constable of Harris County, Texas, on a conditional ninety-day probationary basis.1 Although titled a deputy constable, McPherson performed only clerical duties typing data from court papers into a computer that maintained records of civil process status. She worked at a desk in a room without public access, received two days of training on her terminal, wore no uniform, carried no gun, and lacked authority to make arrests.2
On March 30, 1981, McPherson and coworkers heard a radio report of an attempt to assassinate the President. In a private conversation with coworker and boyfriend Lawrence Jackson she stated she felt it would happen sooner or later, discussed the President's policies on welfare, Medicaid, food stamps, and CETA, and remarked "shoot, if they go for him again, I hope they get him."3
The remark was overheard by another deputy constable and reported to Constable Rankin, who summoned McPherson. She admitted making the statement and told him she did not mean anything by it, though Rankin recalled her saying she meant it. Rankin then discharged her.4
McPherson sued Rankin in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 seeking reinstatement, backpay, and other relief. The District Court granted summary judgment for Rankin after an initial hearing and again ruled against her from the bench after remand. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit vacated and remanded after the first ruling and reversed after the second. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.567
Whether Ardith McPherson's remark addressed a matter of public concern?8
The threshold question in applying this balancing test is whether McPherson's speech may be fairly characterized as constituting speech on a matter of public concern.9 Whether an employee's speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record.10
Yes. Considering the statement in context discloses that it plainly dealt with a matter of public concern.11 The statement was made in the course of a conversation addressing the policies of the President's administration.12 It came on the heels of a news bulletin regarding an attempt on the life of the President.13
McPherson engaged a co-worker in a brief conversation after hearing the radio report and remarked that if they go for him again she hoped they get him.14
Ardith McPherson's remark addressed a matter of public concern.15
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Justice Powell concurs in the judgment. He notes that McPherson was a nineteen-year-old probationary employee whose only job was to type information from court papers into a computer. She had no law enforcement responsibility.
Her remark was made during a private conversation with a co-worker who happened also to be her boyfriend.16 Powell concludes that if a statement is on a matter of public concern, as it was here, it will be an unusual case where the employer's legitimate interests will be so great as to justify punishing an employee for this type of private speech that routinely takes place at all levels in the workplace. The risk that a single, offhand comment directed to only one other worker will lower morale, disrupt the work force, or otherwise undermine the mission of the office borders on the fanciful.17
Whether Constable Rankin's interest in discharging McPherson outweighed her interest in making the statement?18
Because McPherson's statement addressed a matter of public concern, Pickering next requires that the court balance McPherson's interest in making her statement against the interest of the State as an employer in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees.19 The State bears a burden of justifying the discharge on legitimate grounds.20
No. In performing the balancing the statement will not be considered in a vacuum.21 Petitioners fail to demonstrate a state interest that outweighs McPherson's First Amendment rights.22 There is no evidence that the remark interfered with the efficient functioning of the office.23 McPherson's duties were purely clerical and limited solely to the civil process function of the Constable's office.24
There is no indication that she would ever be in a position to further the minimal law enforcement activity engaged in by the Constable's office.25
Constable Rankin's interest in discharging McPherson did not outweigh her interest in making the statement.26
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Justice Scalia dissents. He argues that McPherson's statement expressing a desire that the President be assassinated does not constitute speech on a matter of public concern because it lies only one step removed from completely unprotected speech such as assassination threats against the President.27 Scalia further maintains that even if the statement addressed a matter of public concern, the Constable's interest in preventing the expression of such statements in his agency outweighed McPherson's First Amendment interest.
Statements approving violent crimes carry a clear potential for undermining office relations and public confidence in a law enforcement office.28