448 U.S. 98 (1980)
On October 18, 1976, six police officers arrived at Lawrence Marquess’ house in Bowling Green, Kentucky, with a warrant to arrest Marquess on drug distribution charges.1 Present in the house were Dennis Saddler, Keith Northern, Linda Braden, Vanessa Cox, and petitioner David Rawlings.2 While searching for Marquess, officers smelled marijuana smoke and saw marijuana seeds on a bedroom mantel.3 Officers Eddie Railey and John Bruce left to obtain a search warrant, while the remaining officers detained the occupants in the living room, permitting departure only upon consent to a body search.4 Northern and Braden consented and left; Saddler, Cox, and Rawlings remained.5
Approximately 45 minutes later, Railey and Bruce returned with a search warrant.6 After reading the warrant and Miranda warnings, Officer Don Bivens directed Cox to empty her purse onto a coffee table.7 The purse contained a jar with 1,800 LSD tablets and vials of other controlled substances.8 Cox then told Rawlings to take what was his, and he immediately claimed ownership of the substances.9 Railey searched Rawlings, finding $4,500 in cash and a knife, then placed him under arrest.10
Rawlings had arrived in Bowling Green about a week earlier and brought the drugs with him.11 On the morning of the arrest, he transferred the drugs from a green bank bag into Cox’s purse while at the house.12 There was conflicting testimony about whether Cox consented to carrying the drugs.13 Rawlings testified he asked Cox to carry them and she agreed, while Cox testified she refused and asked him to remove them.14
Rawlings was indicted for possession with intent to sell the controlled substances.15 The trial court denied his motion to suppress the drugs, money, and his statements, finding the search of the purse authorized by the warrant, that Rawlings lacked standing to contest it, and that the search of his person was justified by exigent circumstances.16 After a bench trial, he was convicted.17
The Kentucky Court of Appeals affirmed on the ground that the police had probable cause to arrest all occupants upon smelling marijuana.18 The Supreme Court of Kentucky affirmed on different grounds. It held that Rawlings had no standing because he lacked a legitimate expectation of privacy in Cox’s purse. The court also concluded that the search of his person was incident to a lawful arrest.19 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.20
Whether petitioner had a legitimate expectation of privacy in Cox’s purse so as to challenge the search of that purse?21
Under the Fourth Amendment as interpreted in Rakas v. Illinois, a defendant may challenge the legality of a search only if he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the area searched, determined by the totality of the circumstances rather than by property law concepts alone.22
No. The Supreme Court of Kentucky correctly concluded that Rawlings lacked such an expectation.23 Rawlings had known Cox for only a few days when he placed the drugs in her purse.24 He had never sought or received access to her purse prior to that sudden bailment.25 Cox's longtime acquaintance had free access to the purse on the morning of the arrest.26
The transfer of the drugs was precipitous, hardly supporting an inference that Rawlings took normal precautions to maintain privacy.27 Additionally, Rawlings admitted he had no subjective expectation that the purse would remain free from governmental intrusion.28 Although Rawlings owned the drugs, ownership alone does not establish a legitimate expectation of privacy after Rakas.29
Petitioner did not have a legitimate expectation of privacy in Cox’s purse.30
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Justice Blackmun joined the majority but wrote separately to explain his approach to the privacy issue.31 He viewed Rakas as recognizing two analytically distinct yet invariably intertwined issues under the Fourth Amendment.32 The first asks whether the search infringed an interest the Amendment protects.33
The second asks whether the search violated that right.34 Both inquiries are addressed under the principles of Katz.35 Property interests, particularly the right to exclude, can be weighty factors in establishing a legitimate expectation of privacy.36
On the facts here, however, the possessory interest in the vials was insufficient to create such an interest in Cox's purse, and no agreement conferred it.37
Justice Marshall dissented on the privacy issue.38 He contended that an ownership or possessory interest in the items seized is independently sufficient to invoke Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures.39 The majority's focus solely on privacy in the place searched improperly narrowed the Amendment's text protecting effects.40
This contradicted precedents such as Jeffers and Jones that recognized property interests as a basis for standing.41 The Fourth Amendment guarantees security in effects against unreasonable searches and seizures, so an interest in the seized property allows challenge to the search that produced it.42
Whether petitioner’s admission of ownership of the drugs was the fruit of an illegal detention of the occupants of the house?43
Under Brown v. Illinois, the admissibility of statements following an illegal detention depends on whether the statements were the product of free will, considering Miranda warnings, temporal proximity, intervening circumstances, purpose and flagrancy of misconduct, and voluntariness.44
No. Assuming the detention was illegal as the Court did, the statements were not the fruit of that detention.45 Rawlings received Miranda warnings only moments before admitting ownership.46 The detention lasted approximately 45 minutes under congenial conditions where the occupants sat quietly, moved freely about the first floor, and even offered the officers coffee.47 The admission was a spontaneous reaction to Cox directing him to take what was his, motivated by a desire to protect her rather than by police exploitation.48
The officers' conduct was not flagrant because they believed they were lawfully securing the premises pending the warrant.49 The statements were voluntary.50
Petitioner’s admission was not the fruit of the illegal detention and was admissible.51
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Joined by Justice Stewart
Justice White concurred in the privacy holding but declined to join the fruits analysis.52 He would have vacated the judgment and remanded to the Kentucky Supreme Court.53 That court had not addressed the fruits question even though it was presented.54
The record appeared inadequate for this Court to decide the factual issue in the first instance. The state court itself had noted that the search was not explored in detail at the suppression hearing and that the sequence of events was not clearly established.55
Justice Marshall dissented on the fruits issue as well.56 He maintained that the admission was plainly the fruit of the illegal detention. The admission was made in direct response to Cox's demand after the search of her purse.
That search itself was made possible only by the refusal to allow anyone to leave without consenting to a search. Under these circumstances the statements were obviously the product of the prior unconstitutional conduct and should have been suppressed.57
Whether the search of petitioner’s person that uncovered money and a knife was illegal?58
A search incident to a lawful arrest is valid under the Fourth Amendment, and where the formal arrest follows quickly on the heels of the search, the search may be upheld if probable cause existed at the time of the search.59
No. Once Rawlings admitted ownership of the sizable quantity of drugs, the police had probable cause to arrest him. The search of his person that uncovered the cash and knife was incident to that arrest. The admission immediately preceded the search and formal arrest, satisfying the requirement that the arrest follow quickly on the heels of the search.60
The search of petitioner’s person was lawful as incident to arrest.61
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Marshall dissented on this issue as well. He maintained that the search of petitioner's person should fall because it was the direct result of the prior unconstitutional conduct. That conduct included the illegal detention and the search of the purse that produced the admission of ownership.
The vials and the admission established guilt conclusively, yet both were obtained through violations of the Fourth Amendment. The search therefore could not be upheld as incident to a lawful arrest.62