404 U.S. 71 (1971)
Richard Lynn Reed, a minor, died intestate in Ada County, Idaho, on March 29, 1967.1 His adoptive parents, who had separated sometime prior to his death, are the parties to this appeal.2 Approximately seven months after Richard's death, his mother, Sally Reed, filed a petition in the Probate Court of Ada County seeking appointment as administratrix of her son's estate.3 In her petition, Sally Reed alleged that her son's estate, consisting of a few items of personal property and a small savings account, had an aggregate value of less than $1,000.4
Prior to the date set for a hearing on the mother's petition, Cecil Reed, the father of the decedent, filed a competing petition seeking to have himself appointed administrator of the son's estate.5 The probate court held a joint hearing on the two petitions and thereafter ordered that letters of administration be issued to Cecil Reed upon his taking the oath and filing the bond required by law.6 The court treated §§ 15-312 and 15-314 of the Idaho Code as the controlling statutes and read those sections as compelling a preference for Cecil Reed because he was a male.7
Sally Reed appealed from the probate court order, and her appeal was treated by the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of Idaho as a constitutional attack on § 15-314.8 The matter was ordered returned to the Probate Court for its determination of which of the two parties was better qualified to administer the estate.9
Cecil Reed took a further appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, which reversed the District Court and reinstated the original order naming the father administrator of the estate.10 Sally Reed thereupon appealed for review by the Supreme Court of the United States pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1257(2), and the Court noted probable jurisdiction.11
Whether § 15-314 of the Idaho Code violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by requiring that males be preferred to females when persons are equally entitled to administer an estate?12
In applying the Equal Protection Clause, this Court has consistently recognized that the Fourteenth Amendment does not deny to States the power to treat different classes of persons in different ways.13 The Equal Protection Clause of that amendment does, however, deny to States the power to legislate that different treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute into different classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objective of that statute.14 A classification must be reasonable, not arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.15
Yes. The objective of reducing the workload on probate courts by eliminating one class of contests is not without some legitimacy.16 The crucial question, however, is whether § 15-314 advances that objective in a manner consistent with the command of the Equal Protection Clause.17 To give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the other, merely to accomplish the elimination of hearings on the merits, is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.18
Sally Reed and Cecil Reed were members of the same entitlement class under § 15-312 as the father or mother and thus equally entitled to administer the estate of Richard Lynn Reed.19 The Ada County Probate Court preferred Cecil Reed solely because he was male under § 15-314 without any determination of relative capabilities.20 The Idaho Supreme Court upheld the mandatory preference as resolving contests without a hearing on the relative merits of the two petitioning relatives.21 By providing dissimilar treatment for men and women who are similarly situated with respect to the objective of § 15-312, the challenged section violates the Equal Protection Clause.22
The arbitrary preference established in favor of males by § 15-314 of the Idaho Code cannot stand in the face of the Fourteenth Amendment's command that no State deny the equal protection of the laws to any person within its jurisdiction.23 The judgment of the Idaho Supreme Court is reversed.24 The case is remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.25