525 U.S. 471, 119 S. Ct. 936, 142 L. Ed. 2d 940 (1999)
Respondents sued petitioners for allegedly targeting them for deportation because of their affiliation with a politically unpopular group. While their suit was pending, Congress passed the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), which contains a provision restricting judicial review of the Attorney General's "decision or action" to "commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this Act." We must decide whether, as petitioners contend, this provision deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction over respondents' suit.
The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), a division of the Department of Justice, instituted deportation proceedings in 1987 against Bashar Amer, Aiad Barakat, Julie Mungai, Amjad Obeid, Ayman Obeid, Naim Sharif, Khader Hamide, and Michel Shehadeh, all of whom belong to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), a group that the Government characterizes as an international terrorist and communist organization. The INS charged all eight under the McCarran-Walter Act, which, though now repealed, provided at the time for the deportation of aliens who "advocate . . . world communism." In addition, the INS charged the first six, who were only temporary residents, with routine status violations such as overstaying a visa and failure to maintain student status.
Almost immediately, the aliens filed suit in District Court, challenging the constitutionality of the anticommunism provisions of the McCarran-Walter Act and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against the Attorney General, the INS, and various immigration officials in their personal and official capacities. The INS responded by dropping the advocacy-of-communism charges, but it retained the technical violation charges against the six temporary residents and charged Hamide and Shehadeh, who were permanent residents, under a different section of the McCarran-Walter Act, which authorized the deportation of aliens who were members of an organization advocating "the duty, necessity, or propriety of the unlawful assaulting or killing of any [government] officer or officers" and "the unlawful damage, injury, or destruction of property." INS regional counsel William Odencrantz said at a press conference that the charges had been changed for tactical reasons but the INS was still seeking respondents' deportation because of their affiliation with the PFLP. Respondents amended their complaint to include an allegation that the INS was selectively enforcing immigration laws against them in violation of their First and Fifth Amendment rights.
Since this suit seeking to prevent the initiation of deportation proceedings was filed—in 1987, during the administration of Attorney General Edwin Meese—it has made four trips through the District Court for the Central District of California and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The first two concerned jurisdictional issues not now before us. Then, in 1994, the District Court preliminarily enjoined deportation proceedings against the six temporary residents, holding that they were likely to prove that the INS did not enforce routine status requirements against immigrants who were not members of disfavored terrorist groups and that the possibility of deportation, combined with the chill to their First Amendment rights while the proceedings were pending, constituted irreparable injury. With regard to Hamide and Shehadeh's claims, however, the District Court granted summary judgment to the federal parties for reasons not pertinent here.
The Ninth Circuit's first merits determination in this case upheld the injunction as to the six and reversed the District Court with regard to Hamide and Shehadeh. The opinion rejected the Attorney General's argument that selective-enforcement claims are inappropriate in the immigration context, and her alternative argument that the special statutory-review provision of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) precluded review of such a claim until a deportation order issued. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the District Court, which entered an injunction in favor of Hamide and Shehadeh and denied the Attorney General's request that the existing injunction be dissolved in light of new evidence that all respondents participated in fundraising activities of the PFLP.
While the Attorney General's appeal of this last decision was pending, Congress passed IIRIRA which, inter alia, repealed the old judicial-review scheme and instituted a new (and significantly more restrictive) one. The Attorney General filed motions in both the District Court and Court of Appeals, arguing that the new provision deprived them of jurisdiction over respondents' selective-enforcement claim. The District Court denied the motion, and the Attorney General's appeal from that denial was consolidated with the appeal already pending in the Ninth Circuit.
It is the judgment and opinion in that appeal which is before us here. It affirmed the existence of jurisdiction and reaching the merits of the injunctions, again affirmed the District Court. The Attorney General's petition for rehearing en banc was denied over the dissent of three judges. The Attorney General sought our review, and we granted certiorari.
Before enactment of IIRIRA, judicial review of most administrative action under the INA was governed by a special statutory-review provision directing that "the sole and exclusive procedure for . . . the judicial review of all final orders of deportation" shall be that set forth in the Hobbs Act, which gives exclusive jurisdiction to the courts of appeals. Much of the Court of Appeals' analysis was devoted to the question whether this pre-IIRIRA provision applied to selective-enforcement claims. Since neither the Immigration Judge nor the Board of Immigration Appeals has authority to hear such claims (a point conceded by the Attorney General), a challenge to a final order of deportation based upon such a claim would arrive in the court of appeals without the factual development necessary for decision. The Attorney General argued unsuccessfully below that the Hobbs Act permits a court of appeals to remand the case to the agency or transfer it to a district court, for further factfinding. The Ninth Circuit, believing these options unavailable, concluded that an original district-court action was respondents' only means of obtaining factual development and thus judicial review of their selective-enforcement claims. Relying on our decision in Cheng Fan Kwok v. INS, it held that the District Court could entertain the suit under either its general federal-question jurisdiction, or the general jurisdictional provision of the INA.
Whether we must delve further into the details of this issue depends upon whether, after the enactment of IIRIRA, the old provision continues to apply to this case. On the surface of things, at least, it does not. Although the general rule is that the revised procedures for removing aliens, including the judicial-review procedures, do not apply to aliens who were already in either exclusion or deportation proceedings on IIRIRA's effective date, a single provision shall apply "without limitation to claims arising from all past, pending, or future exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings." That provision reads as follows:
"(g) Exclusive Jurisdiction
"Except as provided in this section and notwithstanding any other provision of law, no court shall have jurisdiction to hear any cause or claim by or on behalf of any alien arising from the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under this Act."
This provision seemingly governs here, depriving the federal courts of jurisdiction "[e]xcept as provided in this section." But whether it is as straightforward as that depends upon the scope of the quoted text. Here, and in the courts below, both petitioners and respondents have treated it as covering all or nearly all deportation claims. The Attorney General has characterized it as "a channeling provision, requiring aliens to bring all deportation-related claims in the context of a petition for review of a final order of deportation filed in the court of appeals." Respondents have described it as applying to "most of what INS does." This broad understanding, combined with IIRIRA's effective-date provisions, creates an interpretive anomaly. If the jurisdiction-excluding provision eliminates other sources of jurisdiction in all deportation-related cases, and if the phrase "[e]xcept as provided in this section" incorporates (as one would suppose) all the other jurisdiction-related provisions, then the general rule that the new procedures do not apply to pending cases would be rendered a virtual nullity. To say that there is no jurisdiction in pending INS cases "except as" the new section provides jurisdiction is simply to say that the new section's jurisdictional limitations apply to pending cases as well as future cases—which seems hardly what the general rule is about. If, on the other hand, the phrase "[e]xcept as provided in this section" were (somehow) interpreted not to incorporate the other jurisdictional provisions—if it stood alone, so to speak—judicial review would be foreclosed for all deportation claims in all pending deportation cases, even after entry of a final order.
The Attorney General would have us avoid the horns of this dilemma by interpreting the phrase "[e]xcept as provided in this section" to mean "except as provided in" the old judicial review provision. Because that old provision authorizes review of only final orders, respondents must, she says, wait until their administrative proceedings come to a close and then seek review in a court of appeals. (For reasons mentioned above, the Attorney General of course rejects the Ninth Circuit's position that application of the old provision would leave respondents without a judicial forum because evidence of selective prosecution cannot be introduced into the administrative record.) The obvious difficulty with the Attorney General's interpretation is that it is impossible to understand how the qualifier "[e]xcept as provided in this section" (emphasis added), can possibly mean "except as provided in" the old provision. And indeed the Attorney General makes no attempt to explain how this can be, except to observe that what she calls a "literal application" of the statute "would create an anomalous result."
Respondents note this deficiency, but offer an equally implausible means of avoiding the dilemma. The statute allows the Attorney General to terminate pending deportation proceedings and reinitiate them under the new provision. They argue that the new provision applies only to those pending cases in which the Attorney General has made that election. That way, they claim, the phrase "[e]xcept as provided in this section" can, without producing an anomalous result, be allowed to refer (as it says) to all the rest of the new section. But this approach collides head-on with the prescription that the new provision shall apply "without limitation to claims arising from all past, pending, or future exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings." (Respondents argue in the alternative, of course, that if the Attorney General is right and the old provision does apply, their claims will be effectively unreviewable upon entry of a final order. For this reason, and because they say that habeas review, if still available after IIRIRA, will come too late to remedy this First Amendment injury, respondents contend that we must construe the new provision not to bar constitutional claims.)
The Ninth Circuit, for its part, accepted the parties' broad reading and concluded, reasonably enough, that on that reading Congress could not have meant it to stand alone:
"Divorced from all other jurisdictional provisions of IIRIRA, subsection (g) would have a more sweeping impact on cases filed before the statute's enactment than after that date. Without incorporating any exceptions, the provision appears to cut off federal jurisdiction over all deportation decisions. We do not think that Congress intended such an absurd result."
It recognized, however, the existence of the other horn of the dilemma ("that retroactive application of the entire amended version would threaten to render meaningless" the general rule for pending cases), and resolved the difficulty to its satisfaction by concluding that "at least some of the other provisions must be included when it applies to pending cases." (emphasis added). One of those provisions, it thought, must be the subsection entitled "Limit on Injunctive Relief," which reads as follows:
"Regardless of the nature of the action or claim or of the identity of the party or parties bringing the action, no court (other than the Supreme Court) shall have jurisdiction or authority to enjoin or restrain the operation of the provisions of chapter 4 of title II, as amended by [IIRIRA], other than with respect to the application of such provisions to an individual alien against whom proceedings under such chapter have been initiated."
The Ninth Circuit found in this an affirmative grant of jurisdiction that covered the present case. The Attorney General argued that any such grant of jurisdiction would be limited (and rendered inapplicable to this case) by another subsection which provides:
"Judicial review of all questions of law and fact, including interpretation and application of constitutional and statutory provisions, arising from any action taken or proceeding brought to remove an alien from the United States under this chapter shall be available only in judicial review of a final order under this section."
The Ninth Circuit replied that, even if that subsection were one of those provisions incorporated into the transitional application, it could not preclude this suit for the same reason the earlier opinion had held that the old provision could not do so—namely, the Court of Appeals' lack of access to factual findings regarding selective enforcement.
Even respondents scarcely try to defend the Ninth Circuit's reading of the "Limit on Injunctive Relief" provision as a jurisdictional grant. By its plain terms, and even by its title, that provision is nothing more or less than a limit on injunctive relief. It prohibits federal courts from granting classwide injunctive relief against the operation of the relevant sections, but specifies that this ban does not extend to individual cases. To find in this an affirmative grant of jurisdiction is to go beyond what the language will bear.
We think the seeming anomaly that prompted the parties' strained readings—and that at least accompanied the Court of Appeals' strained reading—is a mirage. The parties' interpretive acrobatics flow from the belief that the transitional rule cannot be read to envision a straightforward application of the "[e]xcept as provided in this section" portion, since that would produce in all pending INS cases jurisdictional restrictions identical to those that were contained in IIRIRA anyway. That belief, however, rests on the unexamined assumption that the new provision covers the universe of deportation claims—that it is a sort of "zipper" clause that says "no judicial review in deportation cases unless this section provides judicial review." In fact, what it says is much narrower. The provision applies only to three discrete actions that the Attorney General may take: her "decision or action" to "commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders." (Emphasis added.) There are of course many other decisions or actions that may be part of the deportation process—such as the decisions to open an investigation, to surveil the suspected violator, to reschedule the deportation hearing, to include various provisions in the final order that is the product of the adjudication, and to refuse reconsideration of that order.
It is implausible that the mention of three discrete events along the road to deportation was a shorthand way of referring to all claims arising from deportation proceedings. Not because Congress is too unpoetic to use synecdoche, but because that literary device is incompatible with the need for precision in legislative drafting. We are aware of no other instance in the United States Code in which language such as this has been used to impose a general jurisdictional limitation; and that those who enacted IIRIRA were familiar with the normal manner of imposing such a limitation is demonstrated by the text of the "zipper clause" subsection, which stands in stark contrast.
It could be argued, perhaps, that the new provision is redundant if it channels judicial review of only some decisions and actions, since the zipper clause channels judicial review of all of them anyway. But that is not so, since only the new provision, and not the zipper clause (except to the extent it is incorporated within the new provision), applies to what the transitional rule calls "transitional cases," that is, cases pending on the effective date of IIRIRA. That alone justifies its existence. It performs the function of categorically excluding from non-final-order judicial review—even as to transitional cases otherwise governed by the old provision rather than the unmistakable "zipper" clause—certain specified decisions and actions of the INS. In addition, even after all the transitional cases have passed through the system, the new provision as we interpret it serves the continuing function of making it clear that those specified decisions and actions, which (as we shall discuss in detail below) some courts had held not to be included within the non-final-order review prohibition of the old provision, are covered by the "zipper" clause. It is rather the Court of Appeals' and the parties' interpretation which renders the new provision entirely redundant, adding to one "zipper" clause that does not apply to transitional cases, another one of equal scope that does apply to transitional cases. That makes it entirely inexplicable why the transitional provisions refer to the new provision instead of the zipper clause—and why the new provision exists at all.
There was good reason for Congress to focus special attention upon, and make special provision for, judicial review of the Attorney General's discrete acts of "commenc[ing] proceedings, adjudicat[ing] cases, [and] execut[ing] removal orders"—which represent the initiation or prosecution of various stages in the deportation process. At each stage the Executive has discretion to abandon the endeavor, and at the time IIRIRA was enacted the INS had been engaging in a regular practice (which had come to be known as "deferred action") of exercising that discretion for humanitarian reasons or simply for its own convenience. As one treatise describes it:
"To ameliorate a harsh and unjust outcome, the INS may decline to institute proceedings, terminate proceedings, or decline to execute a final order of deportation. This commendable exercise in administrative discretion, developed without express statutory authorization, originally was known as nonpriority and is now designated as deferred action. A case may be selected for deferred action treatment at any stage of the administrative process. Approval of deferred action status means that, for the humanitarian reasons described below, no action will thereafter be taken to proceed against an apparently deportable alien, even on grounds normally regarded as aggravated."
Since no generous act goes unpunished, however, the INS's exercise of this discretion opened the door to litigation in instances where the INS chose not to exercise it.
"[I]n each such instance, the determination to withhold or terminate deportation is confined to administrative discretion. . . . Efforts to challenge the refusal to exercise such discretion on behalf of specific aliens sometimes have been favorably considered by the courts, upon contentions that there was selective prosecution in violation of equal protection or due process, such as improper reliance on political considerations, on racial, religious, or nationality discriminations, on arbitrary or unconstitutional criteria, or on other grounds constituting abuse of discretion."
Such litigation was possible because courts read the old provision's prescription that the Hobbs Act shall be "the sole and exclusive procedure for the judicial review of all final orders of deportation" to be inapplicable to various decisions and actions leading up to or consequent upon final orders of deportation, and relied on other jurisdictional statutes to permit review. The new provision seems clearly designed to give some measure of protection to "no deferred action" decisions and similar discretionary determinations, providing that if they are reviewable at all, they at least will not be made the bases for separate rounds of judicial intervention outside the streamlined process that Congress has designed.
Of course many provisions of IIRIRA are aimed at protecting the Executive's discretion from the courts—indeed, that can fairly be said to be the theme of the legislation. It is entirely understandable, however, why Congress would want only the discretion-protecting provision applied even to pending cases: because that provision is specifically directed at the deconstruction, fragmentation, and hence prolongation of removal proceedings.
Our narrow reading makes sense of the statutory scheme as a whole, for it resolves the supposed tension between the transitional rules. In cases to which the new provision applies, the rest of the judicial review section is incorporated through the "[e]xcept as provided in this section" clause. This incorporation does not swallow the general rule that the new judicial review provisions do not apply to pending cases, for the new provision applies to only a limited subset of deportation claims. Yet it is also faithful to the command that the new provision be applied "without limitation" (i. e., including the "[e]xcept as provided" clause) to "claims arising from all past, pending, or future exclusion, deportation, or removal proceedings."
Respondents' challenge to the Attorney General's decision to "commence proceedings" against them falls squarely within the new provision—indeed, as we have discussed, the language seems to have been crafted with such a challenge precisely in mind—and nothing elsewhere in the judicial review section provides for jurisdiction. As we concluded earlier, the "Limit on Injunctive Relief" provision plainly serves as a limit on injunctive relief rather than a jurisdictional grant.
Finally, we must address respondents' contention that, since the lack of prior factual development for their claim will render the exception to the new provision unavailing; since habeas relief will also be unavailable; and since even if one or both were available they would come too late to prevent the "chilling effect" upon their First Amendment rights; the doctrine of constitutional doubt requires us to interpret the new provision in such fashion as to permit immediate review of their selective-enforcement claims. We do not believe that the doctrine of constitutional doubt has any application here. As a general matter—and assuredly in the context of claims such as those put forward in the present case—an alien unlawfully in this country has no constitutional right to assert selective enforcement as a defense against his deportation.
Even in the criminal-law field, a selective prosecution claim is a rara avis. Because such claims invade a special province of the Executive—its prosecutorial discretion—we have emphasized that the standard for proving them is particularly demanding, requiring a criminal defendant to introduce "clear evidence" displacing the presumption that a prosecutor has acted lawfully. We have said:
"This broad discretion [afforded the Executive] rests largely on the recognition that the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited to judicial review. Such factors as the strength of the case, the prosecution's general deterrence value, the Government's enforcement priorities, and the case's relationship to the Government's overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind of analysis the courts are competent to undertake. Judicial supervision in this area, moreover, entails systemic costs of particular concern. Examining the basis of a prosecution delays the criminal proceeding, threatens to chill law enforcement by subjecting the prosecutor's motives and decisionmaking to outside inquiry, and may undermine prosecutorial effectiveness by revealing the Government's enforcement policy. All of these are substantial concerns that make the courts properly hesitant to examine the decision whether to prosecute."
These concerns are greatly magnified in the deportation context. Regarding, for example, the potential for delay: Whereas in criminal proceedings the consequence of delay is merely to postpone the criminal's receipt of his just deserts, in deportation proceedings the consequence is to permit and prolong a continuing violation of United States law. Postponing justifiable deportation (in the hope that the alien's status will change—by, for example, marriage to an American citizen—or simply with the object of extending the alien's unlawful stay) is often the principal object of resistance to a deportation proceeding, and the additional obstacle of selective-enforcement suits could leave the INS hard pressed to enforce routine status requirements. And as for "chill[ing] law enforcement by subjecting the prosecutor's motives and decisionmaking to outside inquiry": What will be involved in deportation cases is not merely the disclosure of normal domestic law enforcement priorities and techniques, but often the disclosure of foreign-policy objectives and (as in this case) foreign-intelligence products and techniques. The Executive should not have to disclose its "real" reasons for deeming nationals of a particular country a special threat—or indeed for simply wishing to antagonize a particular foreign country by focusing on that country's nationals—and even if it did disclose them a court would be ill equipped to determine their authenticity and utterly unable to assess their adequacy. Moreover, the consideration on the other side of the ledger in deportation cases—the interest of the target in avoiding "selective" treatment—is less compelling than in criminal prosecutions. While the consequences of deportation may assuredly be grave, they are not imposed as a punishment. In many cases (for six of the eight aliens here) deportation is sought simply because the time of permitted residence in this country has expired, or the activity for which residence was permitted has been completed. Even when deportation is sought because of some act the alien has committed, in principle the alien is not being punished for that act (criminal charges may be available for that separate purpose) but is merely being held to the terms under which he was admitted. And in all cases, deportation is necessary in order to bring to an end an ongoing violation of United States law. The contention that a violation must be allowed to continue because it has been improperly selected is not powerfully appealing.
To resolve the present controversy, we need not rule out the possibility of a rare case in which the alleged basis of discrimination is so outrageous that the foregoing considerations can be overcome. Whether or not there be such exceptions, the general rule certainly applies here. When an alien's continuing presence in this country is in violation of the immigration laws, the Government does not offend the Constitution by deporting him for the additional reason that it believes him to be a member of an organization that supports terrorist activity.
Because the new provision deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction over respondents' claims, we vacate the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and remand with instructions for it to vacate the judgment of the District Court.
It is so ordered.
I agree that the new provision applies to this case and deprives the federal courts of jurisdiction over respondents' pre-final-order suit. Under the judicial review section, respondents may obtain circuit court review of final orders of removal pursuant to the Hobbs Act. I would not prejudge the question whether respondents may assert a selective enforcement objection when and if they pursue such review. It suffices to inquire whether the First Amendment necessitates immediate judicial consideration of their selective enforcement plea. I conclude that it does not.
Respondents argue that they are suffering irreparable injury to their First Amendment rights and therefore require instant review of their selective enforcement claims. We have not previously determined the circumstances under which the Constitution requires immediate judicial intervention in federal administrative proceedings of this order. Respondents point to our cases addressing federal injunctions that stop state proceedings, in order to secure constitutional rights. They feature in this regard Dombrowski v. Pfister, as interpreted in Younger v. Harris. Respondents also refer to Oestereich v. Selective Serv. System Local Bd. No. 11. Those cases provide a helpful framework.
In Younger, this Court declared that federal restraint of state prosecutions is permissible only if the state defendant establishes "great and immediate" irreparable injury, beyond "that incidental to every criminal proceeding brought lawfully and in good faith." A chilling effect, the Court cautioned, does not "by itself justify federal intervention." Younger recognized, however, the prospect of extraordinary circumstances in which immediate federal injunctive relief might be obtained. The Court referred, initially, to bad faith, harassing police and prosecutorial actions pursued without "any expectation of securing valid convictions." Further, the Court observed that there may be other "extraordinary circumstances in which the necessary irreparable injury can be shown even in the absence of the usual prerequisites of bad faith and harassment," for example, where a statute is "flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions in every clause, sentence and paragraph, and in whatever manner and against whomever an effort might be made to apply it."
In Oestereich, the Selective Service Board had withdrawn a ministry student's statutory exemption from the draft after he engaged in an act of protest. The student brought suit to restrain his induction, and this Court allowed the suit to go forward, notwithstanding a statutory bar of preinduction judicial review. Finding the Board's action "blatantly lawless," the Court concluded that to require the student to raise his claim through habeas corpus or as a defense to a criminal prosecution would be "to construe the Act with unnecessary harshness."
The precedent in point suggests that interlocutory intervention in Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) proceedings would be in order, notwithstanding a statutory bar, if the INS acts in bad faith, lawlessly, or in patent violation of constitutional rights. Resembling, but more stringent than, the evaluation made when a preliminary injunction is sought, this test would demand, as an essential element, demonstration of a strong likelihood of success on the merits. The merits of respondents' objection are too uncertain to establish that likelihood. The Attorney General argued in the court below and in the petition for certiorari that the INS may select for deportation aliens who it has reason to believe have carried out fundraising for a foreign terrorist organization. Whether the INS may do so presents a complex question in an uncharted area of the law, which we should not rush to resolve here.
Relying on Middlesex County Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Assn., respondents argue that their inability to raise their selective enforcement claims during the administrative proceedings makes immediate judicial intervention necessary. As we explained in Middlesex County, Younger abstention is appropriate only when there is "an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges." Here, Congress has established an integrated scheme for deportation proceedings, channeling judicial review to the final order, and deferring issues outside the agency's authority until that point. Given Congress' strong interest in avoiding delay of deportation proceedings, I find the opportunity to raise a claim during the judicial review phase sufficient.
If a court of appeals reviewing final orders of removal against respondents could not consider their selective enforcement claims, the equation would be different. Respondents argue that that is the case, because their claims require factfinding beyond the administrative record.
The judicial review section authorizes judicial review of "final order[s] of removal." We have previously construed such "final order" language to authorize judicial review of "all matters on which the validity of the final order is contingent, rather than only those determinations actually made at the hearing." Whether there is here a need for factfinding beyond the administrative record is a matter properly postponed. I note, however, the Attorney General's position that the reviewing court of appeals may transfer a case to a district court for resolution of pertinent issues of material fact, and counsel's assurance at oral argument that petitioners will adhere to that position.
The petition for certiorari asked this Court to review the merits of respondents' selective enforcement objection, but we declined to do so, granting certiorari on the jurisdictional question only. We thus lack full briefing on respondents' selective enforcement plea and on the viability of such objections generally. I would therefore leave the question an open one. I note, however, that there is more to "the other side of the ledger" than the Court allows.
It is well settled that "[f]reedom of speech and of press is accorded aliens residing in this country." Under our selective prosecution doctrine, "the decision to prosecute may not be deliberately based upon an unjustifiable standard such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification, including the exercise of protected statutory and constitutional rights." I am not persuaded that selective enforcement of deportation laws should be exempt from that prescription. If the Government decides to deport an alien "for reasons forbidden by the Constitution," it does not seem to me that redress for the constitutional violation should turn on the gravity of the governmental sanction. Deportation, in any event, is a grave sanction. As this Court has long recognized, "[t]hat deportation is a penalty—at times a most serious one—cannot be doubted." Deportation places "the liberty of an individual . . . at stake. . . . Though deportation is not technically a criminal proceeding, it visits a great hardship on the individual and deprives him of the right to stay and live and work in this land of freedom."
In sum, were respondents to demonstrate strong likelihood of ultimate success on the merits and a chilling effect on current speech, and were we to find the agency's action flagrantly improper, precedent and sense would counsel immediate judicial intervention. But respondents have made no such demonstration. Further, were respondents to assert a colorable First Amendment claim as a now or never matter—were that claim not cognizable upon judicial review of a final order—again precedent and sense would counsel immediate resort to a judicial forum. In common with the Attorney General, however, I conclude that in the final judicial episode, factfinding, to the extent necessary to fairly address respondents' claims, is not beyond the federal judiciary's ken.
For the reasons stated, I join in Parts I and II of the Court's opinion and concur in the judgment.
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA or Act) is a part of an omnibus enactment that occupies 750 pages in the Statutes at Large. It is not surprising that it contains a scrivener's error. Despite that error, Congress' intended disposition of cases like this is plain. It must be dismissed.
The textual difficulty that is debated by my colleagues concerns the impact of IIRIRA on proceedings that were pending on the effective date of the Act. Putting those cases to one side for the moment, the meaning of the judicial review subsections is perfectly clear. The former postpones judicial review of removal proceedings until the entry of a final order and the latter deprives federal courts of jurisdiction over collateral challenges to ongoing administrative proceedings. Thus, if the judicial review section applies to these respondents, the deportation proceedings pending before the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) are not yet ripe for review, and this collateral attack on those proceedings must be dismissed.
If we substitute the word "Act" for the word "section" in the introductory clause of the jurisdiction bar, the impact of this provision on pending proceedings is equally clear. That substitution would remove any obstacle to giving effect to the plain meaning of the effective date and transitional provisions. The former defines the effective date of the Act and makes the jurisdiction bar's prohibition against collateral attacks effective immediately; the latter makes the new rules inapplicable to aliens in exclusion or deportation proceedings pending before the INS on the effective date of the Act. Judicial review of those administrative proceedings remains available in the courts of appeal under the old statutory regime.
Admittedly, there is a slight ambiguity in the text of the transitional provision because it refers to the "case of an alien who is in exclusion or deportation proceedings" before the effective date of the new Act. Respondents are such aliens, and therefore the word "case" arguably could be read to include their present collateral attack on the INS proceedings as well as to an eventual challenge to the final order of deportation. Because that reading would be inconsistent with the effective date provision, however, it is clear that Congress intended the transitional provision to apply only to the INS "exclusion or deportation" proceedings that it expressly mentions.
To summarize, I think a fair reading of all relevant provisions in the statute makes it clear that Congress intended its prohibition of collateral attacks on ongoing INS proceedings to become effective immediately while providing that pending administrative proceedings should be completed under the scheme of judicial review in effect when they were commenced.
I should add that I agree with Justice Souter's explanation of why the jurisdiction bar applies broadly to removal proceedings rather than to only three discrete parts of such proceedings. I do not, however, share his constitutional doubt concerning the prohibition of collateral proceedings such as this one. Of course, Congress could not authorize punishment of innocent persons because they happen to be members of an organization that engaged in terrorism. For the reasons stated in Part III of the Court's opinion, however, I have no doubt that the Attorney General may give priority to the removal of deportable aliens who are members of such an organization. Accordingly, I agree that the judgment of the District Court must be vacated.
The unhappy history of the provisions at issue in this case reveals that Congress, apparently unintentionally, enacted legislation that simultaneously grants and denies the right of judicial review to certain aliens who were in deportation proceedings before April 1, 1997. Finding no trump in the two mutually exclusive statutory provisions, I would invoke the principle of constitutional doubt and apply the provision that avoids a potential constitutional difficulty. Because the Court today instead purports to resolve the contradiction with a reading that strains the meaning of the text beyond what I think it can bear, I respectfully dissent.
The first of the contradictory provisions is put in play by the effective date rule, which makes the new jurisdiction bar immediately applicable as of the date of its enactment (i. e., October 11, 1996) to "claims arising from all past, pending, or future" removal proceedings. The jurisdiction bar, for its part, bars review in any court of "the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien," except as provided in the judicial review section. The exception, however, is cold comfort to applicants for review of proceedings pending when IIRIRA took effect, because the rest of the judicial review section is inapplicable to "an alien who is in exclusion or deportation proceedings" on the effective date of IIRIRA, April 1, 1997. Hence, by operation of the effective date rule, it would appear that aliens who did not obtain judicial review as of the enactment date of October 11, 1996, and who were in proceedings as of IIRIRA's effective date of April 1, 1997, can never obtain judicial review of "the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien" in any forum. In short, the effective date rule appears to bar members of this class of aliens from any review of any aspect of their claims.
Yet the effective date rule is not the only statutory provision applicable to aliens in proceedings before April 1, 1997. The transitional rule provides that, in the case of aliens in proceedings before the effective date, "the proceedings (including judicial review thereof) shall continue to be conducted without regard to" the new judicial review section. The parenthetical expression in this section specifically provides that the judicial review available to aliens before the April 1, 1997, effective date of the new judicial review section continues to be available even after the effective date to aliens who were already in proceedings before the effective date. In other words, the terms of the transitional rule preserve pre-existing judicial review for the self-same class of aliens to whom the effective date rule bars review.
We do not have to dwell on how this contradiction arose. What matters for our purposes is that the effective date rule and the transitional rule cannot be reconciled. Either aliens in proceedings on April 1, 1997, have no access to judicial review or else they have the access available under the law that applied before the new judicial review section came into effect.
The Court acknowledges the existence of an "interpretive anomaly," and attempts to avoid the contradiction by a creative interpretation of the jurisdiction bar. It reads the jurisdiction bar to review of "the decision or action by the Attorney General to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien" to "appl[y] only to three discrete actions that the Attorney General may take." The Court claims that a bar to review of commencement of proceedings, adjudication of cases, and execution of removal orders does not bar review of every sort of claim, because "many other decisions or actions that may be part of the deportation process" remain unaffected by the limitation. On this reading, the Court says, review of some aspects of the Attorney General's possible actions regarding aliens in proceedings before April 1, 1997, is preserved, even though the rest of the judicial review section does not apply. The actions that still may be reviewed when challenged by aliens already in proceedings before the effective date of IIRIRA include, the Court tells us, "decisions to open an investigation, to surveil the suspected violator, to reschedule the deportation hearing, to include various provisions in the final order that is the product of the adjudication, and to refuse reconsideration of that order."
The Court's interpretation, it seems to me, parses the language of the jurisdiction bar too finely for the business at hand. The chronological march from commencing proceedings, through adjudicating cases, to executing removal orders, surely gives a reasonable first impression of speaking exhaustively. While it is grammatically possible to read the series without total inclusion, the implausibility of doing this appears the moment one asks why Congress would have wanted to preserve interim review of the particular set of decisions by the Attorney General to which the Court adverts. It is hard to imagine that Congress meant to bar aliens already in proceedings before the effective date from challenging the commencement of proceedings against them, but to permit the same aliens to challenge, say, the decision of the Attorney General to open an investigation of them or to issue a show-cause order. Nor is there a plausible explanation of why the exclusivity provisions of the jurisdiction bar should not apply after the effective date to review of decisions to open investigations or invite cause to be shown.
The Court offers two arguments in support of its ingenious reading, neither of which suffices to convince me of its plausibility. First, the Court suggests that Congress could not have intended the words "commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, and execute removal orders" to refer to all deportation-related claims, because this would require these parts of deportation proceedings to stand for the whole of the process, and such a use of language "is incompatible with the need for precision in legislative drafting." But without delving into the wisdom of using rhetorical figures in statutory drafting, one can still conclude naturally that Congress employed three subject headings to bar review of all those stages in the deportation process to which challenges might conceivably be brought. Indeed, each one of the Court's examples of reviewable actions of the Attorney General falls comfortably into one or another of the three phases of the deportation process captured under the headings of commencement, adjudication, and removal. The decisions to open an investigation or subject an alien to surveillance belong to the commencement of proceedings (which presumably differs from adjudication, separately mentioned); issuing an order to show cause, composing the final order, and refusing reconsideration all easily belong to an adjudication. Far from employing synecdoche, Congress used familiar, general terms to refer to the familiar stages of the exclusion process, and the acceptability of interpreting the three items to exclude others requires considerable determination to indulge in such a reading.
Second, the Court explains that Congress had "good reason" to focus on commencement, adjudication, and execution, because these are distinct stages of the deportation process at which the Executive was in the habit of exercising its discretion to defer action. To show the existence of this practice, the Court quotes a passage from a treatise on immigration law, which says descriptively that "the INS may decline to institute proceedings, terminate proceedings, or decline to execute a final order of deportation.'" The treatise also says that the courts have sometimes entertained efforts to challenge the refusal to exercise discretion. The Court notes, perfectly plausibly, that the purpose of the jurisdiction bar may well have been to bar such challenges. But this is hardly a smoking gun. The passage in question uses the notions of instituting and terminating proceedings, and declining to execute final removal orders, in the very same inclusive sense that the jurisdiction bar does. The treatise says that "[a] case may be selected for deferred action treatment at any stage of the administrative process,'" by which its authors evidently meant to say simply that from time to time the Executive exercises discretion at various points in the process, and that some courts have considered challenges to the failure to exercise discretion. This is no support for the Court's argument that Congress meant to bar review only of the "discrete" actions of commencement, adjudication, or execution.
Because I cannot subscribe to the Court's attempt to render the inclusive series incomplete, I have to confront the irreconcilable contradiction between the effective date rule and the transitional rule. Both context and principle point me to the conclusion that the latter provision must prevail over the former. First, it seems highly improbable that Congress actually intended to raise a permanent barrier to judicial review for aliens in proceedings ongoing on April 1, 1997. Judicial review was available under the old provision to those aliens whose proceedings concluded before the enactment of the amended effective date rule on October 11, 1996, and judicial review of a different scope is also available under the new judicial review section to those whose proceedings commenced after the effective date of IIRIRA, April 1, 1997. There is no reason whatever to believe that Congress intentionally singled out for especially harsh treatment the hapless aliens who were in proceedings during the interim. This point is underscored by the transitional rule for judicial review, which expressly applies subsections (a) and (c) of the old judicial review provision (but not subsection (b) thereof) to judicial review of final orders of deportation or exclusion filed more than 30 days after the date of enactment. The transitional rule for judicial review, in other words, contemplates judicial review of final orders of exclusion against aliens who were in proceedings as of the date of enactment.
Second, complete preclusion of judicial review of any kind for claims brought by aliens subject to proceedings for removal would raise the serious constitutional question whether Congress may block every remedy for enforcing a constitutional right. The principle of constitutional doubt counsels against adopting the interpretation that raises this question. "[W]here a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter." Here, constitutional doubt lends considerable weight to the view that the transitional rule ought to prevail over the effective date rule and preserve judicial review under the law as it was before the enactment of IIRIRA for aliens in proceedings before April 1, 1997. While I do not lightly reach the conclusion that the effective date rule is essentially without force, my respect for Congress's intent in enacting the transitional rule is necessarily balanced by respect for Congress's intent in enacting the effective date rule. No canon of statutory construction familiar to me specifically addresses the situation in which two simultaneously enacted provisions of the same statute flatly contradict one another. We are, of course, bound to avoid such a dilemma if we can, by glimpsing some uncontradicted meaning for each provision. But the attempt to salvage an application for each must have some stopping place, and the Court's attempt here seems to me to go beyond that point. In this anomalous situation where the two statutory provisions are fundamentally at odds, constitutional doubt will have to serve as the best guide to breaking the tie.
Because I think that the transitional rule applies to aliens in proceedings before April 1, 1997, I think it applies to respondents in this case. The law governing their proceedings and subsequent judicial review should therefore be the law prevailing before IIRIRA. That law, in my view, afforded respondents an opportunity to litigate their claims before the District Court. The old judicial review provision governed "judicial review of all final orders of deportation." For actions that fell outside the scope of this provision, an "alien's remedies would, of course, ordinarily lie first in an action brought in an appropriate district court." In McNary v. Haitian Refugee Center, Inc., we applied this principle in finding a right of action before the district court in a constitutional challenge to procedures of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. Respondents' challenge to the constitutionality of their prosecution was filed prior to the entry of a final order of deportation, and so district court jurisdiction was appropriate here.
The approach I would take in this case avoids a troubling problem that the Court chooses to address despite the fact that it was not briefed before the Court: whether selective prosecution claims have vitality in the immigration context. Of course, in principle, the Court's approach itself obviates the need to address that issue: if respondents' suit is barred by the jurisdiction bar, the Court need not address the merits of their claims. Yet the Court goes on, in what I take as dictum, to argue that the alien's interest in avoiding selective treatment in the deportation context "is less compelling than in criminal prosecutions," either because the alien is not being punished for an act he has committed, or because the presence of an alien in the United States is, unlike a past crime, "an ongoing violation of United States law" (emphasis deleted). While the distinctions are clear, the difference is not. The interest in avoiding selective enforcement of the criminal law, shared by the government and the accused, is that prosecutorial discretion not be exercised to violate constitutionally prescribed guaranties of equality or liberty. This interest applies to the like degree in immigration litigation, and is not attenuated because the deportation is not a penalty for a criminal act or because the violation is ongoing. If authorities prosecute only those tax evaders against whom they bear some prejudice or whose protected liberties they wish to curtail, the ongoing nature of the nonpayers' violation does not obviate the interest against selective prosecution.
No doubt more could be said with regard to the theory of selective prosecution in the immigration context, and I do not assume that the Government would lose the argument. That this is so underscores the danger of addressing an unbriefed issue that does not call for resolution even on the Court's own logic. Because I am unconvinced by the Court's statutory interpretation, and because I do not think the Court should reach the selective prosecution issue, I respectfully dissent.
It appears that Congress noticed this discrepancy. On October 4, 1996, Representative Lamar Smith of Texas explained on the floor of the House that he had "become aware of an apparent technical error in two provisions" of IIRIRA. 142 Cong. Rec. H12293. He explained that "[i]t was the clear intent of the conferees that, as a general matter, the full package of changes made by [new 8 U. S. C. § 1252] effect [sic] those cases filed in court after the enactment of the new law, leaving cases already pending before the courts to continue under existing law." Ibid. By "before the courts," Representative Smith seems to have meant the immigration courts. He went on to explain § 309(c)(4): "The conferees also intended, however, to accelerate the implementation of certain of the reforms [in new § 1252]. This intent is clearly spelled out in section 309 of the act. Specifically, section 309(c)(4) calls for accelerated implementation of some of the reforms made in section 306 regarding judicial review, but does not call for immediate implementation of all of these reforms." Ibid. Representative Smith then proposed the first technical change, which does not concern us. He then added that "there is a need to clarify the scope of section 306(c) to ensure that it does not conflict with section 309(c)(4)," and introduced an amendment to § 306(c)(1). Ibid. That amendment, enacted October 11, 1996, eliminated the part of the original § 306(c)(1) that applied new § 1252 to final orders filed on or after the date of enactment, but left untouched the immediate application of subsection (g). 110 Stat. 3657. The result of this amendment was that § 306(c)(1) no longer qualified its preclusion of judicial review for aliens from the date of enactment with the application of the new judicial review provisions of § 1252 to those aliens once final orders were issued against them. Instead, the amended language of § 306(c)(1) now simply barred judicial review altogether. Thus the anomaly appears to have resulted from incomplete technical amendment.
It might also be thought that, because § 309(a) announces that IIRIRA shall take effect on April 1, 1997, except as provided in various sections, including § 306(c), and § 309(c)(1) is enacted "[s]ubject to the succeeding provisions of this subsection," somehow § 309(c)(1) does not apply to § 306(c). Ante, at 477, n. 5. This cannot be so, of course, because the "subsection" in question is § 309(c), not § 309(a). The exception in § 309(a) means only to acknowledge that § 306(c) is effective immediately upon enactment, not on April 1, 1997.
Finally, neither § 306(c) nor § 309(c) may be said to be enacted later than the other for purposes of implicit repeal. Both were enacted on September 30, 1996, and both were amended by the removal or alteration of some language on October 11, 1996. Because of this simultaneous enactment, to give primary influence to the "notwithstanding" clause would simply beg the question of legislative intent.