457 U.S. 731 (1982)
In January 1970 respondent A. Ernest Fitzgerald lost his job as a management analyst with the Department of the Air Force when his position was eliminated during a departmental reorganization and reduction in force.1 One year earlier, on November 13, 1968, Fitzgerald had testified before the Subcommittee on Economy in Government of the Joint Economic Committee that cost overruns on the C-5A transport plane could approximate $2 billion.2
Concerned that the dismissal might constitute retaliation for the congressional testimony, the subcommittee held public hearings.3 At a December 8, 1969 news conference President Richard Nixon promised to look into the matter and directed White House Chief of Staff H. R. Haldeman to arrange for Fitzgerald's reassignment to another administration position.4 An internal White House memorandum from aide Alexander Butterfield recommended that Fitzgerald "bleed, for a while at least" because of perceived disloyalty, and no further White House efforts to reemploy him occurred.5
Fitzgerald complained to the Civil Service Commission alleging unlawful retaliation.6 The Examiner held that Fitzgerald's dismissal had offended applicable civil service regulations based on a finding that the departmental reorganization was motivated by reasons purely personal to respondent. The Examiner recommended Fitzgerald's reappointment to his old position or to a job of comparable authority.7 The Commission explicitly found that the evidence did not support Fitzgerald's allegation of retaliation for his 1968 testimony.8
At a January 31, 1973 news conference President Nixon stated that he had approved Fitzgerald's dismissal.9 A day later the White House press office issued a retraction of the President's statement.10 In 1978 Fitzgerald filed a second amended complaint in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia naming Nixon as a defendant and alleging violations of the First Amendment and two federal statutes.11 The District Court denied Nixon's motion for summary judgment on absolute immunity grounds.12 The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit dismissed the collateral appeal.13 Shortly after Nixon petitioned for certiorari the parties agreed that Nixon would pay Fitzgerald $142,000 immediately and an additional $28,000 if the Supreme Court ruled he was not entitled to absolute immunity.14
Whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254 to review a court of appeals dismissal of an interlocutory appeal from a district court order denying a claim of absolute presidential immunity?15
Under the collateral order doctrine of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., a small class of interlocutory orders that conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue completely separate from the merits, and are effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment are immediately appealable, provided they present a serious and unsettled question of law.16
Yes. The District Court order denying absolute immunity conclusively determined the immunity question and resolved an issue separate from the merits that would be effectively unreviewable after final judgment.17 The Court of Appeals dismissal raised a serious and unsettled question because this Court had never ruled on the scope of presidential immunity and a petition for certiorari was pending in the related Halperin case at the time of dismissal.18 The District Court denied Nixon's motion for summary judgment on absolute immunity grounds after Fitzgerald named him as a defendant in the 1978 amended complaint, prompting the collateral appeal that the Court of Appeals dismissed on the basis of its prior Halperin decision.19
The Supreme Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1254 to review the court of appeals dismissal.20
Whether an agreement between the parties to liquidate damages has mooted the controversy over presidential immunity?21
A case remains a definite and concrete controversy touching the legal relations of parties with adverse interests when the parties retain a financial stake in the outcome despite a partial settlement agreement.22
No. The agreement provided that Nixon would pay Fitzgerald an additional $28,000 only if the Court ruled against absolute immunity, leaving both parties with a continuing financial interest in the resolution of the immunity question.23 The parties reached this agreement shortly after Nixon petitioned for certiorari, with Nixon having already paid $142,000 immediately, yet the contingent payment preserved adversity between the parties.24
The agreement between the parties has not mooted the controversy over presidential immunity.25
Whether the President of the United States is entitled to absolute immunity from civil damages liability for acts within the outer perimeter of his official authority?26
The President is entitled to absolute immunity from civil damages liability for acts within the outer perimeter of his official authority because the unique constitutional position of the President under Article II requires freedom from the distraction of private damages actions to ensure the effective functioning of the executive branch under the separation of powers.27
Yes. The President's broad discretionary responsibilities in enforcing federal law, conducting foreign affairs, and managing the executive branch would be impaired by the threat of personal liability in civil suits, and inquiries into motive would prove highly intrusive.28 Fitzgerald alleged Nixon approved his dismissal in retaliation for congressional testimony, an action the Court determined fell within the outer perimeter of presidential authority to prescribe reorganizations and reductions in force within the Air Force under 10 U.S.C. § 8012(b).29
The President of the United States is entitled to absolute immunity from civil damages liability for acts within the outer perimeter of his official authority.30
Related opinions on this issue
Chief Justice Burger joined the Court's opinion but wrote separately to underscore that presidential immunity derives from and is mandated by the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers.31 He emphasized that exposing the President to civil damages actions would subject presidential decisions to undue judicial scrutiny as well as divert attention from executive duties.32 Burger stressed that the immunity is limited to civil damages claims for acts within official duties and does not place the President above the law.
He distinguished judicial process in the subpoena sense from civil damages suits and rejected any notion that the holding revives a monarchical concept of immunity.33
Justice Rehnquist concurred in the judgment and in the opinion of the Court.34 He stated that the President's unique position in the constitutional scheme requires that he be accorded absolute immunity from civil damages for his official acts.35 Rehnquist viewed the immunity as necessary to preserve the independence of the Executive Branch.
Joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, And Blackmun
Justice White dissented, arguing that the Court improperly attached absolute immunity to the office of the President rather than to particular functions.36 He contended that this approach places the President above the law in a manner inconsistent with Marbury v. Madison and prior functional immunity precedents.37 White maintained that personnel decisions like the one at issue do not implicate a constitutionally assigned presidential function that would be substantially impaired by potential liability.38
He noted that Congress had already regulated such decisions through civil service statutes and that the majority's approach contradicted the policy of encouraging caution rather than vigor in employment actions affecting constitutional and statutory rights of employees.39
Joined by Justices Brennan And Marshall
Justice Blackmun joined Justice White's dissent.40 He added that the Court's holding leaves unanswered the argument that no person, including the President, is absolutely and fully above the law.41 Blackmun noted the inconsistency between declaring absolute immunity compelled by separation of powers while leaving open the possibility that Congress could still impose liability.42
He would have dismissed the writ as improvidently granted due to the parties' undisclosed settlement agreement that effectively wagered on the outcome.43