504 U.S. 127 (1992)
In the early hours of November 20, 1987, Paul Wade was found dead in his Las Vegas apartment from multiple stab wounds to the head, chest, and back.1 David Riggins was arrested for the killing 45 hours later.2
A few days after being taken into custody, Riggins told Dr. R. Edward Quass, a private psychiatrist who treated patients at the Clark County Jail, about hearing voices in his head and having trouble sleeping.3 Riggins informed Dr. Quass that he had been successfully treated with Mellaril in the past.4 After this consultation, Dr. Quass prescribed Mellaril at a level of 100 milligrams per day.5 Because Riggins continued to complain of voices and sleep problems in the following months, Dr. Quass gradually increased the Mellaril prescription to 800 milligrams per day.6 Riggins also received a prescription for Dilantin, an antiepileptic drug.7
In January 1988, Riggins successfully moved for a determination of his competence to stand trial.8 Three court-appointed psychiatrists performed examinations during February and March while Riggins was taking 450 milligrams of Mellaril daily.9 Dr. William O'Gorman, a psychiatrist who had treated Riggins for anxiety in 1982, and Dr. Franklin Master concluded that Riggins was competent to stand trial.10 The third psychiatrist, Dr. Jack Jurasky, found that Riggins was incompetent.11 The Clark County District Court determined that Riggins was legally sane and competent to stand trial, so preparations for trial went forward.12
In early June 1988, the defense moved the District Court for an order suspending administration of Mellaril and Dilantin until the end of Riggins' trial.13 On July 14, 1988, the District Court held an evidentiary hearing on the motion.14 At the hearing, Dr. Master guessed that taking Riggins off medication would not noticeably alter his behavior or render him incompetent to stand trial.15 Dr. Quass testified that Riggins would be competent to stand trial even without Mellaril, but that the effects of Mellaril would not be noticeable to jurors if medication continued.16 Dr. O'Gorman told the court that Mellaril made the defendant calmer and more relaxed but that an excessive dose would cause drowsiness.17 Dr. O'Gorman was unable to predict how Riggins might behave if taken off antipsychotic medication, yet he questioned the need to give Riggins the high dose he was receiving.18 The court also had before it a written report in which Dr. Jurasky held to his earlier view that Riggins was incompetent to stand trial.19 The report predicted that if taken off Mellaril the defendant would most likely regress to a manifest psychosis and become extremely difficult to manage.20 The District Court denied Riggins' motion to terminate medication with a one-page order that gave no indication of the court's rationale.21 Riggins continued to receive 800 milligrams of Mellaril each day through the completion of his trial the following November.22
At trial, Riggins presented an insanity defense and testified on his own behalf.23 He indicated that on the night of Wade's death he used cocaine before going to Wade's apartment.24 Riggins admitted fighting with Wade, but claimed that Wade was trying to kill him and that voices in his head said that killing Wade would be justifiable homicide.25 A jury found Riggins guilty of murder with use of a deadly weapon and robbery with use of a deadly weapon.26 After a penalty hearing, the same jury set the murder sentence at death.27 The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed Riggins' convictions and death sentence in 1991.28 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1991.29
Whether forced administration of antipsychotic medication during trial violated rights guaranteed by the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments?30
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, once a defendant moves to terminate administration of antipsychotic medication the State must establish the need for the drug and its medical appropriateness.31 The State satisfies due process if it demonstrates and the court finds that treatment is medically appropriate and, considering less intrusive alternatives, essential for the defendant's safety or the safety of others or that it could not obtain an adjudication of guilt or innocence by using less intrusive means.32
Yes. The District Court denied Riggins' motion to terminate medication with a one-page order that gave no indication of the court's rationale.33 This followed an evidentiary hearing at which Dr. Master guessed that taking Riggins off medication would not noticeably alter his behavior or render him incompetent.34 Dr. Quass testified that Riggins would be competent even without Mellaril.35 Dr. O'Gorman questioned the need for the high dose.36
The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed without requiring the prosecution to demonstrate overriding justification or medical appropriateness under the standard from Washington v. Harper.37 This failure left an unacceptable risk that side effects such as drowsiness or confusion impaired the content of Riggins' testimony, his ability to follow proceedings, or his communication with counsel during the trial at which he presented an insanity defense.38
Forced administration of Mellaril during trial violated Riggins' rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments because the Nevada courts failed to make findings sufficient to support the involuntary medication.39
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Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment but wrote separately to stress that involuntary medication with antipsychotic drugs poses a serious threat to a defendant's right to a fair trial.40 He stated that absent an extraordinary showing by the State the Due Process Clause prohibits administering involuntary doses for the purpose of rendering the accused competent.41 He expressed doubt that the showing can be made in most cases given present understanding of the drugs' properties.42
Justice Kennedy noted that the side effects can alter demeanor in ways that prejudice reactions and presentation in the courtroom.43 He also noted that the drugs can render the defendant unable or unwilling to assist counsel, requiring the State to show no significant risk of such impairment.44
Whether the Nevada courts made findings sufficient to support continued involuntary administration of Mellaril to the defendant throughout his trial?45
A court may not permit continued involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication during trial without making any determination of the need for that course or any findings about reasonable alternatives.46 The Fourteenth Amendment requires an overriding justification and a determination of medical appropriateness before forcing such drugs on a pretrial detainee.47
No. The District Court issued only a one-page order denying the motion to terminate medication and provided no indication of its rationale.48 This occurred despite hearing testimony that Riggins could remain competent without Mellaril and that the high dose might cause drowsiness or confusion.49
The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed on the ground that expert testimony informed the jury of the drug's effects.50 It did not address whether the State had shown that medication was essential or that less intrusive means were unavailable.51
Because the record contains no finding that administration was necessary to accomplish an essential state policy, the substantial probability of trial prejudice was not justified.52
The Nevada courts did not make findings sufficient to support continued involuntary administration of Mellaril throughout Riggins' trial.53
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Scalia (except As To Part Ii-a)
Justice Thomas dissented and would have affirmed the conviction.54 He argued that Riggins had a full and fair trial because expert testimony sufficiently informed the jury of Mellaril's effects on demeanor and because Riggins remained competent under the Nevada statute.55
Justice Thomas contended that the Harper liberty-interest claim was not properly raised below, that the record did not establish involuntary medication after the motion was denied, and that reversal of a criminal conviction requires either trial error or structural defect rather than a standalone due-process violation in the administration of medication.56