573 U.S. 373 (2014)
David Riley was stopped by a police officer for driving with expired registration tags.1 During the stop, the officer learned that Riley's license had been suspended.2 The officer impounded Riley's car pursuant to department policy and conducted an inventory search that located two handguns under the hood.3 Riley was arrested for possession of concealed and loaded firearms.4 An officer searched Riley incident to the arrest and found items associated with the Bloods street gang.5 He also seized a cell phone from Riley's pants pocket.6 The officer accessed information on the phone and noticed that some words were preceded by the letters CK.7 At the police station about two hours after the arrest, a detective specializing in gangs further examined the contents of the phone.8 The detective found videos of young men sparring while someone yelled encouragement using the moniker Blood.9 The police also found photographs of Riley standing in front of a car they suspected had been involved in a shooting a few weeks earlier.10
Riley was charged with firing at an occupied vehicle, assault with a semiautomatic firearm, and attempted murder.11 The State alleged that Riley had committed those crimes for the benefit of a criminal street gang.12 Prior to trial, Riley moved to suppress all evidence that the police had obtained from his cell phone.13 The trial court rejected that argument.14 At Riley's trial, police officers testified about the photographs and videos found on the phone, and some of the photographs were admitted into evidence.15 Riley was convicted on all three counts and received an enhanced sentence of 15 years to life in prison.16 The California Court of Appeal affirmed.17
In the second case, a police officer performing routine surveillance observed respondent Brima Wurie make an apparent drug sale from a car.18 Officers subsequently arrested Wurie and took him to the police station.19 At the station, the officers seized two cell phones from Wurie's person.20 The one at issue here was a flip phone.21 Five to ten minutes after arriving at the station, the officers noticed that the phone was repeatedly receiving calls from a source identified as my house on the phone's external screen.22 A few minutes later, they opened the phone and saw a photograph of a woman and a baby set as the phone's wallpaper.23 They pressed one button on the phone to access its call log, then another button to determine the phone number associated with the my house label.24 They next used an online phone directory to trace that phone number to an apartment building.25 When the officers went to the building, they saw Wurie's name on a mailbox and observed through a window a woman who resembled the woman in the photograph on Wurie's phone.26 They secured the apartment while obtaining a search warrant and, upon later executing the warrant, found and seized 215 grams of crack cocaine, marijuana, drug paraphernalia, a firearm and ammunition, and cash.27
Wurie was charged with distributing crack cocaine, possessing crack cocaine with intent to distribute, and being a felon in possession of a firearm and ammunition.28 He moved to suppress the evidence obtained from the search of the apartment, arguing that it was the fruit of an unconstitutional search of his cell phone.29 The District Court denied the motion.30 Wurie was convicted on all three counts and sentenced to 262 months in prison.31 A divided panel of the First Circuit reversed the denial of Wurie's motion to suppress and vacated Wurie's convictions for possession with intent to distribute and possession of a firearm as a felon.32
The California Court of Appeal affirmed Riley's conviction, rejecting his argument that the cell phone search violated the Fourth Amendment.33 The First Circuit reversed Wurie's conviction, concluding that the search of his cell phone was unconstitutional.34 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases.35
Whether the police may, without a warrant, search digital information on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been arrested?36
The Fourth Amendment provides that the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.37
No. As the text makes clear, the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness.3839 In general, a search requires a warrant.40 But there are exceptions.41 One is a search incident to a lawful arrest.42
The search incident to arrest exception rests on two rationales: officer safety and the preservation of evidence.43 The Court declines to extend the holding of Chimel v. California to searches of data stored on cell phones because cell phones differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense from other objects that might be carried on an arrestee's person.44
The police may not, without a warrant, search digital information on a cell phone seized from an individual who has been arrested.45
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Alito concurred in part and in the judgment.46 He agreed that law enforcement officers must generally obtain a warrant before searching information stored or accessible on a cell phone.47 He expressed the view that the ancient rule on searches incident to arrest is based on the need to obtain probative evidence rather than exclusively on officer safety and evidence preservation.48
Alito noted that the Court's approach leads to anomalies favoring digital information over hard-copy form.49 He suggested that legislatures are better positioned than courts to assess and respond to changes in technology and privacy interests.50
Whether the search incident to arrest exception extends to digital data stored on cell phones under the rationales of officer safety and preservation of evidence?51
The search incident to arrest exception rests on two rationales from Chimel v. California: officer safety and the preservation of evidence.52
No. Digital data stored on a cell phone cannot itself be used as a weapon to harm an arresting officer or to effectuate the arrestee's escape.5354 Officers may still examine the physical aspects of a phone to ensure that it will not be used as a weapon.55 But the interest in protecting officer safety does not justify dispensing with the warrant requirement for a search of the phone's digital contents.56 Once law enforcement officers have secured a cell phone, there is no longer any risk that the arrestee himself could delete incriminating data from the phone.57
The two rationales for the exception do not justify a warrantless search of cell phone data in these cases involving Riley and Wurie.58
The search incident to arrest exception does not extend to digital data stored on cell phones under the rationales of officer safety and preservation of evidence.59
Whether concerns about remote wiping or data encryption justify a warrantless search of a cell phone seized incident to arrest?60
Modern cell phones are not especially vulnerable to remote wiping or encryption in a manner that justifies a categorical exception.61
No. Law enforcement officers can take steps to secure a cell phone to prevent remote wiping.6263 And if officers are worried about encryption, they can leave the phone powered off or in airplane mode.64 These broader concerns about the loss of evidence are distinct from Chimel's focus on a defendant who responds to arrest by trying to conceal or destroy evidence within his reach.65 The briefing gives little indication that either problem is prevalent or that the opportunity to perform a search incident to arrest would be an effective solution.66
Concerns about remote wiping or data encryption do not justify a warrantless search of a cell phone seized incident to arrest.67
Whether a warrantless search of cell phone data is permissible when it is reasonable to believe the phone contains evidence of the crime of arrest?68
A rule permitting warrantless cell phone searches whenever it is reasonable to believe the phone contains evidence of the crime of arrest would prove no practical limit.69
No. In the vehicle context, Gant generally protects against searches for evidence of past crimes.7071 In the cell phone context, however, it is reasonable to expect that incriminating information will be found on a phone regardless of when the crime occurred.72 Such a standard would give officers unbridled discretion to rummage through a person's private effects. The proposal is not appropriate in this context and would prove no practical limit at all when it comes to cell phone searches.73
A warrantless search of cell phone data is not permissible when it is reasonable to believe the phone contains evidence of the crime of arrest.74