536 U.S. 584, 122 S. Ct. 2428, 153 L. Ed. 2d 556 (2002)
In September 1994, a Wells Fargo armored van pulled up to the drive-up window of a bank in Glendale, Arizona.1 Inside the van were a driver, a guard, and a messenger carrying a bag with more than $270,000 in cash.2 As the van waited for the bank to open, a man armed with a rifle approached the driver's side of the van while another man armed with a handgun approached the passenger side.3
The man with the rifle shot and killed the driver.4 The man with the handgun shot at the guard but missed.5 The guard returned fire, shooting and wounding the man with the handgun.6 The wounded man with the handgun was later identified as Timothy Ring.7 Ring was indicted for first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, armed robbery, and other crimes.8
At trial, the prosecutor presented evidence that Ring and two others had planned to rob the armored van.9 The jury deadlocked on premeditated murder.10 It convicted Ring of felony murder occurring in the course of armed robbery.11 At the sentencing stage of the trial, the judge found two aggravating factors.12
The judge found that the murder was committed in expectation of pecuniary gain and in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner.13 The judge found one mitigating factor consisting of Ring's minimal criminal record.14 Finding that the aggravating factors outweighed the mitigating factor, the judge sentenced Ring to death.15 On appeal, Ring argued that Arizona's capital sentencing scheme violates the Sixth Amendment as interpreted in Apprendi v. New Jersey.16 The Arizona Supreme Court rejected that claim, relying on Walton v. Arizona, and affirmed Ring's conviction and sentence.17 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether Walton can be reconciled with Apprendi.18
Whether the Sixth Amendment requires that a jury, not a judge, find the facts necessary to expose a defendant to a death sentence?19
The Sixth Amendment requires that any fact increasing the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.20
Yes. The rule from Apprendi applies directly to the established facts.21 The jury convicted Ring only of felony murder carrying a maximum of life imprisonment.22 Yet the trial judge alone found the two aggravating circumstances of pecuniary gain and heinous manner.23 Those findings exposed Ring to the death penalty under Arizona Revised Statutes section 13-703.24
The Sixth Amendment therefore requires that a jury find the facts necessary to expose a defendant to a death sentence.25
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Justice Thomas joined the opinion of the Court but wrote separately.26 He stressed that the original understanding of the Sixth Amendment jury trial right encompasses the requirement that a jury find all facts exposing a defendant to greater punishment.27 He noted that the text of the Sixth Amendment reflects a fundamental reservation of power against entrusting plenary authority over life and liberty to a single judge.28 Arizona's scheme, under which a judge's finding of an aggravating circumstance exposes the defendant to death, violates this principle.29
Thomas agreed that Walton must be overruled to the extent inconsistent with Apprendi and that the Arizona Supreme Court's judgment must be reversed.30
Joined by Justice Thomas
Justice Scalia concurred to explain his difficult choice in light of his prior views on Furman v. Georgia.31 He reaffirmed that the fundamental meaning of the jury-trial guarantee is that all facts essential to the level of punishment must be found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt.32 Although reluctant to magnify Furman burdens on the States, Scalia concluded that wherever aggravating factors exist they must be found by the jury.33
He rejected any distinction based on whether the factors were coerced by Furman and warned that allowing judges to impose death without jury findings would accelerate the decline of veneration for the jury trial right.34
Whether Arizona's capital sentencing scheme violates the Sixth Amendment by allowing a judge to find aggravating circumstances necessary for imposition of the death penalty?35
A sentencing scheme violates the Sixth Amendment when it permits a judge rather than a jury to find facts that operate as the functional equivalent of elements of a greater offense and thereby increase the maximum penalty.36
Yes. Arizona's scheme violates the rule because first-degree murder is punishable by death or life imprisonment.37 Yet a defendant may receive death only if the judge finds at least one aggravating circumstance under section 13-703(F) and determines that aggravating circumstances outweigh mitigating circumstances.38 This occurred when the trial judge made those findings in Ring's case after the jury's felony-murder verdict.39
Arizona's capital sentencing scheme therefore violates the Sixth Amendment.40
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Justice Kennedy joined the opinion of the Court while noting his continued view that Apprendi was wrongly decided.41 He observed that no principled reading of Apprendi would permit Walton to stand.42 The finding of an aggravating circumstance during Arizona's penalty phase exposes the defendant to greater punishment than authorized by the jury's guilty verdict alone.43
Kennedy emphasized that Apprendi must be implemented in a principled way.44 Settled expectations of the States deserve respect, yet he concluded that Apprendi and Walton cannot stand together.45
Justice Breyer concurred in the judgment on separate Eighth Amendment grounds.46 He explained that the Eighth Amendment requires special procedural safeguards in capital cases.47 Jury sentencing in capital cases is mandated because jurors are more attuned to the community's moral sensibility.48
They are better able to determine whether retribution justifies death in a particular case.49 Breyer cited studies showing inconclusive deterrence effects, low recidivism among life-sentenced offenders, and concerns over arbitrariness, racial disparities, delays, and inadequate representation.50 He concluded that the decision to impose death must be made by a jury rather than a single governmental official.51
Whether Walton v. Arizona is irreconcilable with Apprendi v. New Jersey?52
A prior decision is irreconcilable with a later decision when the reasoning of the later decision directly undermines the holding of the earlier one on the same constitutional question.53
Yes. Walton held that the Sixth Amendment does not require a jury to make the specific findings authorizing a death sentence.54 Apprendi held that any fact increasing the penalty beyond the maximum authorized by the jury verdict alone must be found by a jury.55 These holdings cannot be reconciled, as the Arizona Supreme Court itself acknowledged that Apprendi cast doubt on Walton while still following the earlier precedent.56
Walton v. Arizona is therefore irreconcilable with Apprendi v. New Jersey and is overruled to the extent of the inconsistency.57
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Joined by Justice O'connor, Justice Scalia
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented, joined in part by Justices O'Connor and Scalia.58 He maintained that the Court's decision was not compelled by the Constitution or by Apprendi and that Walton's holding remained consistent with prior precedents.59 Rehnquist argued that Arizona's scheme, requiring a judge to find at least one aggravating circumstance and weigh it against mitigation, does not violate the Sixth Amendment.60
He warned that the decision would impose significant burdens on States using similar schemes, require revisions to capital sentencing procedures, and likely result in delays in imposing the death penalty.61
Joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
Justice O'Connor dissented and would have overruled Apprendi rather than Walton.62 She reiterated her view that Apprendi was a serious mistake not required by the Constitution, history, or prior cases and that it contradicted Patterson v. New York, Almendarez-Torres, and Walton itself.63 O'Connor predicted and documented the destabilizing flood of Apprendi claims in lower courts.64
She argued that expanding Apprendi to capital sentencing would further burden the judiciary by placing numerous death sentences in doubt across multiple States without meaningful justification for deviating from established precedent.65