503 U.S. 429 (1992)
In the late 1980s, environmental groups and timber industry groups filed lawsuits challenging the federal government's management of old-growth forests in the Pacific Northwest that serve as habitat for the northern spotted owl.1 The Seattle Audubon Society and other environmental organizations sued the Chief of the Forest Service in the Western District of Washington in 1989, alleging that a 1988 amendment to the regional guide provided insufficient protection for the owl under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, and the National Forest Management Act.2 The Washington Contract Loggers Association and industry groups filed a related action claiming the amendment was too restrictive.3 The district court consolidated the cases and issued a preliminary injunction against 163 proposed timber sales.4
Separately, the Portland Audubon Society and others sued the Secretary of the Interior in the District of Oregon in 1987, challenging timber management plans developed by the Bureau of Land Management between 1979 and 1983 and a 1987 agreement with the Oregon Department of Fish and Wildlife.5 Their claims rested on the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, the National Environmental Policy Act, the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, and the Oregon-California Railroad Land Grant Act.6 The district court dismissed the action twice, and the Ninth Circuit issued injunctions against some harvesting pending appeal.7
In response to the ongoing litigation, Congress passed the Northwest Timber Compromise as section 318 of the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1990.8 The provision applied only to the thirteen national forests in Oregon and Washington and Bureau of Land Management districts in western Oregon known to contain northern spotted owls, and it expired on September 30, 1990, except for sales offered under it.9 Subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2) required the agencies to offer specified quantities of timber for sale, while subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5) prohibited harvesting in designated areas, and other subsections set environmental criteria for site selection.10
The first sentence of subsection (b)(6)(A) provided that management of areas according to subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5) constituted adequate consideration for meeting the statutory requirements underlying the Seattle Audubon and Portland Audubon cases.11 After the enactment, the government defendants moved to dismiss the suits, arguing that the provision had superseded the statutes on which the claims were based.12 The district courts in both cases upheld the provision and either vacated the injunction or dismissed the action.13
The Ninth Circuit consolidated the appeals and reversed, interpreting the provision as directing specific results in the pending cases without amending the law.14 On remand, the Seattle Audubon district court enjoined sixteen timber sales offered to meet the harvesting quota.15 The agencies then sought Supreme Court review of the Ninth Circuit's constitutional ruling, and the Court granted certiorari in 1991.16
Whether the first sentence of subsection (b)(6)(A) of the Department of the Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1990, amended the statutory requirements that formed the basis for the Seattle Audubon and Portland Audubon litigation?17
Congress possesses the authority to change the law applicable to pending cases provided that the change is accomplished through amendment of the legal standards rather than through direction of specific outcomes.18 The distinction drawn by the Court is between a statute that modifies the criteria for compliance and one that tells the court how to decide the case under the old criteria.19 When Congress enacts a provision that deems compliance with new requirements to constitute compliance with old requirements, it has amended the law through the operation of the canon that specific provisions qualify general ones.20 The reference to pending cases by name serves only to identify the statutory provisions at issue and does not transform the amendment into a direction of results.21
Yes. The first sentence of subsection (b)(6)(A) replaced the five old statutory requirements with the two new provisions in subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5).22 In the Seattle Audubon litigation the claims under the Migratory Bird Treaty Act would now be satisfied if the harvesting complied with the new area protections rather than the old prohibition on killing migratory birds.23 The same substitution applied to the claims under the National Environmental Policy Act and the National Forest Management Act.24 In the Portland Audubon litigation the claims under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act and the Oregon-California Railroad Land Grant Act were likewise modified by the new standards.25 The district courts applied this change when they vacated the preliminary injunction and dismissed the action.26 This substitution of standards constitutes an amendment to the statutory requirements.27
The operation of the provision is shown by the example of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act claims.28 Before the Compromise the courts had to determine whether the harvesting would kill or take any northern spotted owl.29 After the provision the courts determined whether the harvesting violated the prohibitions in subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5).30 Compliance with the new provisions meant the statutory requirements were met.31 This change in the statutory criteria demonstrates that the provision amended the law rather than directing results under the old law.32 The Ninth Circuit had held that the provision directed specific results but that interpretation overlooked the substitution of standards.33
The first sentence of subsection (b)(6)(A) amended the statutory requirements that formed the basis for the Seattle Audubon and Portland Audubon litigation.34
Whether subsection (b)(6)(A) directed particular factual findings or results under preexisting law in the two pending cases?35
A statute directs particular results under old law if it instructs the court to make specific factual findings or to reach a particular outcome in pending cases without changing the legal standards.36 If the statute instead changes the law and leaves the application to the courts it does not direct results.37 The provision must not tell the courts whether particular sales violate the standards.38
No. Subsection (b)(6)(A) did not instruct the courts whether any particular timber sales would violate the new standards in subsections (b)(3) and (b)(5).39 The provision expressly reserved judgment upon the legal and factual adequacy of the administrative documents for challenges to sales offered before or after fiscal year 1990.40 For sales offered during fiscal year 1990 the provision provided for judicial determination of lawfulness under subsection (g)(1).41 The district court on remand enjoined sixteen timber sales after applying the new standards to the facts of those sales.42
The provision could not direct that particular BLM sales were lawful because subsection (b)(5) incorporated a BLM agreement not yet in existence when the Compromise was enacted.43 These elements show that the provision left the application of the new law to the courts.44
Subsection (b)(6)(A) did not direct particular factual findings or results under preexisting law in the two pending cases.45