410 U.S. 113 (1973)
In March 1970, Jane Roe, a single woman residing in Dallas County, Texas, instituted a federal action against the District Attorney of the county.1 She sought a declaratory judgment that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were unconstitutional on their face.2 She also sought an injunction restraining enforcement of the statutes.3
Roe alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant.4 She wished to terminate her pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent licensed physician under safe clinical conditions.5 She was unable to obtain a legal abortion in Texas because her life did not appear to be threatened by continuation of the pregnancy.6 She could not afford to travel to another jurisdiction to secure a legal abortion.7
James Hubert Hallford, a licensed physician, sought and was granted leave to intervene in Roe's action.8 In his complaint he alleged that he had been arrested previously for violations of the Texas abortion statutes.9 Two such prosecutions were pending against him in the Criminal District Court of Dallas County.10 He described conditions of patients who came to him seeking abortions.11 He claimed that for many cases he was unable to determine whether they fell within or outside the exception recognized by Article 1196 of the Texas Penal Code.12
John and Mary Doe, a married couple, filed a companion complaint also naming the District Attorney as defendant.13 The Does alleged that they were a childless couple.14 Mrs. Doe was suffering from a neural-chemical disorder.15 Her physician had advised her to avoid pregnancy until her condition materially improved.16 She had discontinued use of birth control pills pursuant to medical advice.17 If she should become pregnant she would want to terminate the pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent licensed physician under safe clinical conditions.18
The two actions were consolidated and heard together by a duly convened three-judge district court for the Northern District of Texas.19 Upon the filing of affidavits, motions were made for dismissal and for summary judgment.20 The court held that Roe and members of her class and Dr. Hallford had standing to sue and presented justiciable controversies.21 The Does had failed to allege facts sufficient to state a present controversy and did not have standing.22 It concluded that the Texas criminal abortion statutes were void on their face.23 The court dismissed the Does' complaint while denying injunctive relief.24
The plaintiffs Roe and Doe and the intervenor Hallford appealed to the Supreme Court from that part of the District Court's judgment denying the injunction.25 The defendant District Attorney cross-appealed from the grant of declaratory relief.26 Both sides also took protective appeals to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.27 That court ordered the appeals held in abeyance pending decision by the Supreme Court.28
Whether Jane Roe had standing to challenge the Texas criminal abortion statutes?29
A litigant has standing to challenge a statute when she is the immediate object of the statute and presents an actual case or controversy with a personal stake in the outcome.30
Yes. Jane Roe alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant.31 She wished to terminate her pregnancy by an abortion performed by a competent licensed physician under safe clinical conditions. She was unable to get a legal abortion in Texas because her life did not appear to be threatened by the continuation of her pregnancy.32
She could not afford to travel to another jurisdiction to secure a legal abortion. These facts establish that Roe was the immediate object of the Texas statutes and presented a justiciable controversy before the three-judge district court.33
Jane Roe had standing to challenge the Texas criminal abortion statutes.34
Whether John and Mary Doe had standing to challenge the Texas criminal abortion statutes?35
Standing requires a concrete and immediate injury rather than speculative future harm that may or may not occur.36
No. The Does alleged only that they were a childless married couple with the wife suffering from a neural-chemical disorder.37 She had discontinued birth control pills on medical advice.38 They feared possible future pregnancy and would then want an abortion.39 Their claim rested on possible future contraceptive failure, possible future pregnancy, and possible future unpreparedness for parenthood.40 This is too speculative to present an actual case or controversy.41
John and Mary Doe lacked standing to challenge the Texas criminal abortion statutes.42
Whether Dr. James Hubert Hallford had standing to challenge the Texas criminal abortion statutes?43
A physician under pending state criminal prosecutions for violating abortion statutes may not obtain federal declaratory or injunctive relief absent allegations of harassment or bad-faith prosecution.44
No. Dr. Hallford alleged that he had been arrested previously for violations of the Texas abortion statutes.45 Two such prosecutions were pending against him in the Criminal District Court of Dallas County. He sought declaratory and injunctive relief in federal court regarding the same statutes under which he stood charged.46 The district court erred in granting him relief.47 He is remitted to his defenses in the state criminal proceedings.48
Dr. James Hubert Hallford lacked standing to obtain federal declaratory or injunctive relief.49
Whether the termination of Roe's 1970 pregnancy rendered her case moot on appeal?50
A case is not moot when the challenged conduct is capable of repetition yet evading review, as occurs with pregnancy litigation given the short duration of human gestation relative to the appellate process.51
No. Roe was pregnant when she filed suit in March 1970 and remained pregnant at least until May 1970.52 The normal 266-day human gestation period is so short that the pregnancy will come to term before the usual appellate process is complete.53 Pregnancy litigation seldom survives much beyond the trial stage.54 Appellate review would be effectively denied if termination rendered the case moot.55 Pregnancy is capable of repetition yet evading review.56
The termination of Roe's 1970 pregnancy did not render her case moot on appeal.57
Whether the Texas criminal abortion statutes are unconstitutionally vague or overbroad?58
A statute that sweeps too broadly by restricting legal abortions to a single reason without regard to pregnancy stage violates the Due Process Clause when measured against constitutional standards protecting the abortion decision.59
No. The Court did not reach the vagueness challenge.60 It concluded that the Texas statutes sweep too broadly.61 The statutes restrict legal abortions to those procured or attempted by medical advice for the purpose of saving the life of the mother.62 They cannot survive constitutional attack under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.63
The Court resolved the case on due process grounds without reaching the vagueness or overbreadth challenge.64
Whether the right of personal privacy encompasses a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy?65
The right of personal privacy, founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy, though the right is not absolute and must be weighed against important state interests in regulation.66
Yes. The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right of privacy.67 A line of decisions recognizes that a right of personal privacy or zones of privacy exists under the Constitution.68 This right, whether founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's concept of personal liberty or the Ninth Amendment, is broad enough to encompass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.69
The detriment that the State would impose upon the pregnant woman by denying this choice altogether is apparent from medical, psychological, and familial harms.70
The right of personal privacy encompasses a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy.71
Related opinions on this issue
Chief Justice Burger agreed that under the Fourteenth Amendment the abortion statutes of Texas impermissibly limit the performance of abortions necessary in the judgment of a physician to protect the pregnant woman's health.72 He further agreed that the right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision but that this right is not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in regulation.73 He wrote separately to express his concurrence in the Court's opinion in Doe v. Bolton.74
Justice Douglas joined the opinion of the Court while adding a few words.75
Justice Stewart explained that the Griswold decision can be rationally understood only as a holding that the Connecticut statute substantively invaded the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.76 He accepted Griswold as a substantive due process case.77 He concluded that the Texas abortion statute infringes the right of personal choice in matters of marriage and family life protected by the Due Process Clause.78
He joined the Court's opinion holding the Texas law invalid under that Clause.79
Justice White dissented on the ground that the Court values the convenience of the pregnant mother more than the continued existence and development of the life or potential life that she carries.80 He found no constitutional warrant for imposing that philosophy upon the people of the fifty States.81 White concluded that the decision to legalize abortion should be left to the people acting through their elected representatives in the state legislatures rather than imposed by judicial decree.82
He viewed the majority's approach as lacking any firm grounding in the text or history of the Constitution and as an improper substitution of judicial policy preferences for the judgments of state legislatures.83
Justice Rehnquist dissented.84 He argued that the decision to break pregnancy into three distinguishable terms partakes more of judicial legislation than it does of a determination of the intent of the drafters of the Fourteenth Amendment.85 The fact that a majority of the States have had restrictions on abortions for at least a century is a strong indication that the asserted right to an abortion is not so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.86
Even today, when society's views on abortion are changing, the very existence of the debate is evidence that the right to an abortion is not so universally accepted as the appellant would have us believe.87 He concluded that there is no constitutional right to an abortion and that the decision to legalize abortion should be left to the people acting through their elected representatives in the state legislatures.88
Whether a fetus is a person within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment?89
No. The Constitution does not define person in so many words.92 Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment contains three references to person.93 The first defines citizens as persons born or naturalized in the United States.94 Person is used in other places in the Constitution.95
In nearly all instances the word has application only postnatally.96 None indicates with any assurance that it has any possible prenatal application.97 This conclusion is reinforced by the observation that throughout the major portion of the nineteenth century prevailing legal abortion practices were far freer than they are today.98
A fetus is not a person within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment.99
Whether the District Court erred by granting declaratory relief while denying injunctive relief?100
A federal court may grant declaratory relief when a statute is challenged on its face as unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.101 Different considerations govern declaratory versus injunctive relief.102 The Supreme Court reviewed both aspects on appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1253 from denial of injunctive relief.103
Yes. The District Court correctly refused injunctive relief but erred in granting declaratory relief to Roe.104 The Supreme Court reviewed both the injunctive and declaratory aspects because the case was properly before it on appeal from denial of injunctive relief under 28 U.S.C. § 1253. The arguments as to both aspects were necessarily identical.105
The principle that a court may not enjoin enforcement of a statute unless the plaintiff shows immediate irreparable injury does not apply where the plaintiff attacks the facial validity of the statute on the ground that it is unconstitutionally vague or overbroad.106
The District Court erred in granting declaratory relief to Roe.107