146 Mass. 349, 15 N.E. 768 (1888)
Rogers brought an action against Elliott seeking to hold him responsible for acts done in the use of property belonging to the Roman Catholic Church.1 Elliott served as the custodian and authorized manager of that property, which was used for religious worship. The sole question presented was whether the use of the property was unlawful because the ringing of the bell constituted a nuisance.2
The church was built upon a public street in a thickly settled part of the town.3 The acts were done in the use of this property for religious purposes.4
The plaintiff's claim rested upon the injury done to him on account of his peculiar condition.5 There was no contention that the ringing of the bell for church services in the manner shown by the evidence materially affected the health or comfort of ordinary people in the vicinity.6 The plaintiff conceded that there was no evidence of express malice on the part of the defendant.7
Judgment was entered on the verdict.8
Whether the standard by which one's right to use real estate is measured against a neighbor's interests is the effect of the use upon ordinary people rather than upon those with peculiar susceptibility?9
In an action alleging a private nuisance from the use of property, the fundamental question is by what standard one's right to use real estate is to be measured as against the interests of a neighbor.10 In densely populated communities, the use of property in many ways which are legitimate and proper necessarily affects the property or persons of others in the vicinity to a greater or lesser degree.11 The inquiry is what is reasonable under the circumstances.12 If a use of property is objectionable solely on account of the noise which it makes, it is a nuisance, if at all, by reason of its effect upon the health or comfort of those who are within hearing.13 The right to make a noise for a proper purpose must be measured in reference to the degree of annoyance which others may reasonably be required to submit to.14 That must be determined by the effect of noise upon people generally and not upon those who are peculiarly susceptible to it.15 This standard avoids uncertainty that would arise if rights depended on peculiar temperaments or conditions.16
Yes. The established facts indicate that Rogers brought an action against Elliott who was the custodian and authorized manager of property of the Roman Catholic Church. The church was built upon a public street in a thickly settled part of the town. The plaintiff's claim rested upon the injury done him on account of his peculiar condition.17
There was no contention that the ringing of the bell for church services in the manner shown by the evidence materially affected the health or comfort of ordinary people in the vicinity. Applying the rule, since the standard is the effect on ordinary people, the ringing of the bell was not a nuisance.18 The plaintiff could not put himself in a place of exposure to noise and demand as of legal right that the bell should not be used.19 In the absence of evidence that he acted wantonly or with express malice, the defendant was exercising his legal rights.20