458 U.S. 613 (1982)
Burke County, Georgia, is a large, predominantly rural county spanning 831 square miles with a total population of approximately 19,349, of whom 53.6% are black.1
The county is governed by a five-member Board of Commissioners elected at large to concurrent four-year terms.2 Each candidate runs for a specific seat.3 A majority vote is required for nomination or election with a runoff if necessary.4 The county has never been divided into districts for electing commissioners.5 No black person has ever been elected to the Board.6
In 1966 the Georgia General Assembly changed the Board from three single-member districts to the current at-large system.7 The change was submitted to the Attorney General under section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 with no objection interposed.8 As of 1978, 6,373 persons were registered to vote in the county, of whom 38% were black.9 Black candidates have run in every election since the change.10 Two black candidates in the 1978 general election each received more than 30% of the votes cast when there were 2,832 black registered voters and 3,671 white registered voters.11
In 1976 eight black citizens of Burke County filed suit in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Georgia. The suit was brought on behalf of all black citizens in the county against the five white members of the Board of Commissioners and the Burke County Democratic Committee.12 The complaint alleged that the at-large election system diluted the voting power of black citizens.13 Following a bench trial at which both sides introduced extensive evidence, the District Court issued an order on September 29, 1978, stating that the plaintiffs were entitled to prevail and ordering that Burke County be divided into five districts for electing commissioners.14 The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed.15 The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction.16
Whether an at-large system for electing county commissioners in Burke County, Ga., violates the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution?17
An at-large voting system violates the Fourteenth Amendment if maintained for the purpose of diluting the voting strength of a racial minority.18
Yes. Applying the standards from Village of Arlington Heights and Washington v. Davis, the District Court properly found that the at-large system in Burke County was being maintained for a discriminatory purpose.19 There was substantial underrepresentation of blacks on the Board.20 This conclusion rested on the long history of official racial discrimination in the county, the timing of the 1966 change to at-large elections when blacks were beginning to register in significant numbers, the existence of bloc voting along racial lines, the depressed socio-economic status of blacks resulting from past discrimination, and the unresponsiveness of elected officials to black needs.21
These findings, supported by extensive evidence from the trial, demonstrate that the system was maintained with the intent to minimize black voting strength.22
The at-large system violates the Fourteenth Amendment.23
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Rehnquist
Justice Powell dissented on the ground that the evidence relied upon by the lower courts was the same type held insufficient in Mobile v. Bolden to establish discriminatory intent.24 Powell noted that in Mobile the Court reversed a finding of unconstitutional vote dilution because the lower courts had relied on factors insufficient as a matter of law to establish discriminatory intent. Powell emphasized that the factors cited by the District Court and Court of Appeals were too attenuated as a matter of law to support an inference of discriminatory intent.25
He believed that Mobile controls this case and would reverse the judgment on that basis rather than affirm the finding of purposeful discrimination.26
Justice Stevens contended that the Court erred by adopting a subjective intent standard for adjudicating the constitutionality of electoral structures without identifying a judicially manageable rule.2728 He argued that the focus should instead be on objective factors that provide direct and reliable indices of discriminatory intent.29 Stevens maintained that the subjective approach leads to inconsistent results across identical electoral structures depending on the motivations of local officials.30
He would not find the system unconstitutional without first articulating an acceptable, reviewable standard that avoids case-by-case appraisals of legislative motive.31
Whether the District Court's finding that the at-large system was being maintained for a discriminatory purpose was clearly erroneous under the standards of Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp. and Washington v. Davis?32
A district court's finding of discriminatory purpose in maintaining an at-large election system is a question of fact subject to the clearly erroneous standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a).33 Such findings are not to be set aside unless clearly erroneous.34 Deference is given when two lower courts have concurred in the findings.35
No. The District Court correctly applied the legal standard from Arlington Heights and Washington v. Davis by considering the totality of the circumstances.36 The Zimmer factors were relevant but not dispositive.37 The Court of Appeals affirmed that the findings were not clearly erroneous.38 The Supreme Court, applying the clearly erroneous standard, found no basis to disturb the findings given the extensive evidence of past discrimination, bloc voting, and other factors supporting the inference of discriminatory intent.39
The finding was not clearly erroneous.40
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Rehnquist
Justice Powell maintained that the lower courts had relied on factors insufficient as a matter of law under Mobile v. Bolden.41 He observed that the evidence presented fell far short of showing that the at-large electoral scheme was conceived or operated as a purposeful device to further racial discrimination.42 Powell noted that in Mobile the Court reversed a finding of unconstitutional vote dilution because the lower courts had relied on factors insufficient as a matter of law to establish discriminatory intent.
He believed that Mobile controls this case and would warrant reversal rather than affirmance of the factual finding of discriminatory purpose. Powell argued that the subjective inquiry into motivations of local officials was unseemly and intruded federal courts into intensely local political concerns without sufficient standards.43
Justice Stevens criticized the subjective intent inquiry as inherently unmanageable and prone to inconsistent application across identical electoral structures in neighboring communities.44 He argued that the standard itself renders the factual finding constitutionally infirm regardless of the evidence amassed because it invites federal judges to engage in deeply subjective appraisals of local officials' motivations without judicially manageable criteria.45 Stevens contended that the Court erred by adopting a subjective intent standard for adjudicating the constitutionality of electoral structures without identifying a judicially manageable rule.
He maintained that the focus should instead be on objective factors that provide direct and reliable indices of discriminatory intent.46 Stevens would not find the system unconstitutional without first articulating an acceptable, reviewable standard that avoids case-by-case appraisals of legislative motive.47