358 U.S. 354, 79 S. Ct. 468, 3 L. Ed. 2d 368 (1959)
In October 1953 Francisco Romero, a Spanish subject, signed on as a crew member of the S.S. Guadalupe, a vessel of Spanish registry owned by the Spanish corporation Compania Trasatlantica.1
Romero continued to serve on the Guadalupe after the initial voyage, so that under Spanish law the original contract of hire remained in force.2 The ship sailed from Bilbao, touched other Spanish ports, proceeded to New York and Hoboken, made a brief trip to Vera Cruz and Havana, and returned to Hoboken.3
On May 12, 1954, while the vessel lay in Hoboken, Romero was struck by a cable on deck and seriously injured.4 Romero filed suit on the law side of the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York against four corporate defendants.5
He asserted Jones Act and general maritime claims for unseaworthiness, maintenance and cure, and maritime tort against Compania Trasatlantica and its New York husbanding agent Garcia & Diaz, Inc.6 He asserted maritime-tort claims against stevedore International Terminal Operating Co. and carpenter Quin Lumber Co., both of which were performing work aboard the Guadalupe under oral contracts with Garcia & Diaz.7 Jurisdiction was invoked under the Jones Act and under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332.8
After a pre-trial hearing the district court dismissed the entire complaint.9 It held that the Jones Act supplied no right of action against the foreign shipowner, that § 1331 did not confer jurisdiction over general maritime claims, that Garcia & Diaz was not Romero's employer, and that complete diversity was lacking under Strawbridge v. Curtiss.10 The court also declined to exercise discretionary admiralty jurisdiction after examining Spanish law, which provided Romero a lifetime pension of 35 to 55 percent of his wages plus maintenance and cure enforceable through the Spanish consul.11 The Court of Appeals affirmed.12 The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of conflicts among the circuits concerning the construction of § 1331 and the applicability of Lauritzen v. Larsen to the facts presented.13
Whether the Jones Act provides a right of action for a Spanish seaman injured on a Spanish-flag vessel against his Spanish corporate employer when the injury occurred in an American port during a voyage beginning and ending abroad?14
The Jones Act was applied to foreign events, foreign ships and foreign seamen only in accordance with the usual doctrine and practices of maritime law.15
No. Applying the Lauritzen factors to the established facts, the ship is of foreign registry and sails under a foreign flag.16 Both the injured seaman and the owner of the ship have a Spanish status: Romero is a Spanish subject and Compania Trasatlantica a Spanish corporation.17 Romero's agreement of hire was entered into in Spain.18
The foreign law provides a remedy for the injury, and claims under that law may be conveniently asserted before the Spanish consul in New York.19 The injury occurred while temporarily in American territorial waters, but this difference does not call for a difference in result because the test of location of the wrongful act is of limited application to shipboard torts.20
The dismissal of petitioner's claims against Compania Trasatlantica under the Jones Act is affirmed.21
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Douglas (in Part)
Although the Jones Act by its terms applies to any seaman who shall suffer personal injury in the course of his employment, the Court in Lauritzen held that the words any seaman did not include foreign seamen sailing foreign ships and injured in foreign waters.22 I dissented from that holding.23
It was based on the Court's concepts of what would be good or bad for the country internationally rather than on an actual interpretation of the language of the Jones Act.24 Thus, it seemed to me that the Lauritzen holding rested on notions of what Congress should have said, not on what it did say.25 Such notions, weak enough in Lauritzen, seem much weaker still in this case where the tort involved occurred in our own waters.26 I cannot but feel that, at least as to torts occurring within the United States, Congress knew what it was doing when it said any seaman and I must dissent from today's further and, I believe, unjustifiable reduction in the scope of the Jones Act.27
Whether 28 U.S.C. § 1331 confers jurisdiction on federal district courts sitting at law over claims for unseaworthiness, maintenance and cure, and maritime tort rooted in general federal maritime law?28
The Act of 1875 drew on the scope of this provision of Clause 1, just as the Judiciary Act of 1789 reflected the constitutional authorization of Clause 1 of Section 2, which extended the judicial power to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction.29 The words of that statute do not extend, and could not reasonably be interpreted to extend, to cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.30
No. The language and construction of the Act of 1875, the history and reason, and the policy considerations all point to the rejection of any infusion of general maritime jurisdiction into the Act of 1875.31 The far-reaching extension of national power resulting from the victory of the North did not suggest the inclusion of maritime claims within the scope of that statute.32
The federal admiralty courts had been completely adequate to the task of protecting maritime rights rooted in federal law.33 There is not the slightest indication of any intention to change the time-sanctioned mode of trying suits in admiralty without a jury.34
Section 1331 does not confer jurisdiction over the general maritime claims.35
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by The Chief Justice; Justices Black And Douglas (in Part)
Since petitioner's causes of action for unseaworthiness and for maintenance and cure are created by federal law, his case arises under the laws of the United States within the meaning of § 1331, for it is clear that a suit arises under the law that creates the cause of action.36 The contention cannot be accepted that since petitioner's rights are judicially defined, they are not created by the laws of the United States within the meaning of § 1331.37
These rules are as fully laws of the United States as if they had been enacted by Congress.38 Plainly there is nothing in the language of § 1331 which would exclude jurisdiction of maritime claims of the nature asserted by petitioner.39
Whether a district court may exercise pendent jurisdiction over general maritime law claims against a non-diverse employer when the complaint also properly alleges a Jones Act claim?40
Rejection of the proposed new reading of § 1331 does not preclude consideration of petitioner's claims under the general maritime law.41 The District Court may have jurisdiction of them pendent to its jurisdiction under the Jones Act.42 We perceive no barrier to the exercise of pendent jurisdiction in the very limited circumstances before us.43
Yes. Here we merely decide that a district judge has jurisdiction to determine whether a cause of action has been stated if that jurisdiction has been invoked by a complaint at law rather than by a libel in admiralty, as long as the complaint also properly alleges a claim under the Jones Act.44
We are not called upon to decide whether the District Court may submit to the jury the pendent claims under the general maritime law in the event that a cause of action be found to exist.45
The district court may exercise pendent jurisdiction over the general maritime claims.46
Whether the rule of Strawbridge v. Curtiss requires dismissal of maritime claims against diverse corporate defendants when the Jones Act supplies an independent basis of federal jurisdiction over a non-diverse defendant?
Since the Jones Act provides an independent basis of federal jurisdiction over the non-diverse respondent, Compania Trasatlantica, the rule of Strawbridge v. Curtiss does not require dismissal of the claims against the diverse respondents.
No. Respondents Garcia & Diaz and Quin Lumber Company, New York corporations, and International Terminal Operating Company, a Delaware corporation, are of diverse citizenship from the petitioner, a Spanish subject.47
Since the Jones Act provides an independent basis of federal jurisdiction over the non-diverse respondent, the rule of Strawbridge v. Curtiss does not require dismissal of the claims against the diverse respondents. Accordingly, the dismissal of these claims for lack of jurisdiction was erroneous.48
The claims against the diverse defendants should not be dismissed for lack of complete diversity.49
Whether the principles of Lauritzen v. Larsen preclude application of United States maritime law to claims by a Spanish seaman against a Spanish shipowner for an injury sustained in an American port?50
The principles of choice of law that are consonant with the needs of a general federal maritime law and with due recognition of our self-regarding respect for the interests of foreign nations in the regulation of maritime commerce as part of the legitimate concern of the international community preclude application of American law to the claims here asserted.
Yes. Due regard for the factors we there enumerated, and the weight we indicated to be given to each, preclude application of American law to the claims here asserted.51 In this case, as in Lauritzen v. Larsen, the ship is of foreign registry and sails under a foreign flag.52
Both the injured seaman and the owner of the ship have a Spanish status: Romero is a Spanish subject and Compania Trasatlantica a Spanish corporation. Romero's agreement of hire was entered into in Spain. The foreign law provides a remedy for the injury.53 The injury occurred while temporarily in American territorial waters, but this difference does not call for a difference in result.54
The principles of Lauritzen v. Larsen preclude application of United States maritime law to the claims.55
Whether a district court properly dismissed Jones Act and general maritime claims against a New York husbanding agent on the ground that the agent was not the seaman's employer and did not operate or control the vessel?56
The District Court concluded that Garcia & Diaz was not Romero's employer and did not operate and control the vessel at the time of the injury.57 These issues were properly adjudicated, and thus the claims for unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure were properly dismissed.58 However, the District Court did not consider whether petitioner was asserting a claim based upon the negligence of Garcia & Diaz.59
No. The claims for unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure were properly dismissed.60 However, the District Court did not consider, and its disposition of the case did not require it to consider, whether petitioner was asserting a claim based upon the negligence of Garcia & Diaz, a claim independent of the employment relationship or operation and control.61
Thus it is necessary to remand the case for further proceedings as to this respondent.62
The dismissal of the Jones Act and general maritime claims against Garcia & Diaz for unseaworthiness and maintenance and cure is affirmed, but the case is remanded for consideration of the negligence claim.63