545 U.S. 374 (2005)
On the morning of January 14, 1988, James Scanlon was discovered dead in a bar he ran in Allentown, Pennsylvania, his body having been stabbed repeatedly and set on fire.1 Ronald Rompilla was indicted for the murder and related offenses, and the Commonwealth gave notice of intent to ask for the death penalty.2 Two public defenders were assigned to the case.3
The jury at the guilt phase of trial found Rompilla guilty on all counts.4 During the ensuing penalty phase, the prosecutor sought to prove three aggravating factors, including that Rompilla had a significant history of felony convictions indicating the use or threat of violence based on his 1974 conviction for rape, burglary, and theft.5 The Commonwealth presented evidence on all three aggravators and introduced testimony from the victim of the prior rape.6
Rompilla's evidence in mitigation consisted of relatively brief testimony from five family members who argued for residual doubt and beseeched the jury for mercy, along with testimony from his 14-year-old son.7 Rompilla's trial counsel interviewed him extensively about his upbringing and background, arranged for him to be examined by three mental health professionals, and questioned five members of his family in search of mitigating information.8
Counsel did not examine the court file on Rompilla's 1974 prior conviction even though they knew the Commonwealth intended to use that conviction as an aggravating circumstance and to introduce the transcript of the rape victim's testimony.9 The prior conviction file was a public document readily available at the courthouse where Rompilla was tried.10
After the jury sentenced Rompilla to death, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed both conviction and sentence on direct appeal.11 In December 1995 Rompilla filed claims under the Pennsylvania Post Conviction Relief Act alleging ineffective assistance by trial counsel in failing to present significant mitigating evidence.12 The postconviction court denied relief and the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed.13
Rompilla then petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. §2254 in federal district court.14 The District Court granted relief.15 A divided Third Circuit panel reversed.16 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.17
Whether defense counsel's failure to examine the court file on Rompilla's prior conviction for rape and assault constituted deficient performance under Strickland v. Washington?18
Under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), counsel renders deficient performance when assistance falls below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms, measured from counsel's perspective at the time.19
Yes. The established facts demonstrate that Rompilla's trial counsel knew the Commonwealth planned to prove a significant history of violent felony convictions by introducing the 1974 rape conviction and the victim's testimony about its violent details.20 Counsel nevertheless made no effort to examine the prior conviction file, a public document available at the courthouse where Rompilla was tried.21 Counsel instead limited their investigation to interviews with Rompilla and five family members plus examinations by three mental health experts, none of which uncovered the mitigating evidence later found in the file.22
This omission was not a reasonable strategic decision because the file was easily accessible and directly relevant to countering the aggravation case and supporting residual doubt or other mitigation.23
Counsel's failure to examine the court file constituted deficient performance under Strickland.24
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Justice O'Connor joined the majority but stressed that the holding is narrow and case-specific.25 She explained that counsel knew the prior conviction would be central to the prosecution's aggravation case and that the file contained powerful mitigating evidence readily available at the courthouse.26 Because the failure to review it resulted from inattention rather than reasoned tactical judgment about resource allocation, it fell below the Strickland standard of reasonableness considering all circumstances.27
She emphasized that the decision applies the longstanding case-by-case approach rather than imposing any rigid requirement.28
Joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas
Justice Kennedy dissented, contending that counsel's investigation was both adequate and conscientious.29 He noted that counsel interviewed Rompilla extensively, consulted five family members with whom they developed close relationships, and retained three experienced mental health experts.30 In his view, the majority's requirement to review the prior conviction file imposes an unwarranted rigid per se rule that departs from Strickland's command of deference to counsel's judgments and risks diverting limited defense resources from more promising tasks.31
He argued that the state court's conclusion was far from objectively unreasonable under AEDPA.32
Joined by Justice Scalia
Justice Thomas joined Justice Kennedy's dissent and added that the majority's decision is inconsistent with the deference owed to state court adjudications under 28 U.S.C. §2254(d).33 He observed that the Pennsylvania postconviction court carefully reviewed the evidence of counsel's interviews and expert consultations and reasonably concluded that further investigation of the file was unnecessary.34 The state court found that counsel had interviewed Rompilla and his family members and had reviewed the evidence in the case.
He concluded that the state court's decision was far from objectively unreasonable under the deferential AEDPA standard.35
Whether that failure prejudiced Rompilla at the penalty phase by depriving the jury of mitigating evidence about his childhood, mental health, and alcoholism?36
Under Strickland, prejudice exists when there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. In capital sentencing, this inquiry focuses on whether the undiscovered mitigating evidence, taken as a whole, might well have influenced the jury's appraisal of the defendant's culpability so as to undermine confidence in the death sentence.37
Yes. The established facts show that the prior conviction file contained a corrections counselor's report describing Rompilla's slum upbringing, early juvenile involvement, series of incarcerations, and alcohol dependence, as well as test results indicating organic brain damage, schizophrenia indicators, and an IQ in the mentally retarded range.38 Postconviction counsel later used this information to uncover additional evidence of severe childhood abuse, fetal alcohol syndrome, and impaired capacity.39
The jury heard only brief family pleas for mercy and residual doubt without any of this mental health or background detail. There is a reasonable probability that presentation of the file evidence would have altered the balance of aggravating and mitigating factors.40
The failure prejudiced Rompilla at the penalty phase.41
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Justice O'Connor agreed that the specific circumstances created a reasonable probability of a different sentencing outcome.42 She noted that the file evidence would have allowed counsel to challenge the prosecution's aggravation narrative and to present a far more compelling mitigation case than the limited family testimony actually offered.43 The undiscovered evidence would have permitted counsel to anticipate and deflect the prosecutor's aggravation argument more effectively.44
In her view, the likelihood of a different result if the evidence had been presented is sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the sentencing proceeding.45
Joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas
Justice Kennedy maintained that Rompilla failed to carry his burden of demonstrating prejudice.46 He argued that nothing in the transfer petition or other file materials diminished the aggravating force of the prior conviction. Counsel could not reasonably have been expected to discover the obscure notations even if they had examined the file.
He stressed that the defendant bears the burden of showing prejudice and that the majority's theory rested on serendipity rather than a reasonable probability of a different result.47
Whether the state postconviction court's conclusion that counsel's performance was not constitutionally deficient was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law under 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1)?48
Under 28 U.S.C. §2254(d)(1), a state court's adjudication of a federal claim is unreasonable if it identifies the correct governing legal principle from Supreme Court precedent but applies that principle to the facts in an objectively unreasonable manner. Mere incorrectness is insufficient.49
Yes. The established facts reveal that the Pennsylvania postconviction court concluded counsel's interviews with Rompilla, family members, and mental health experts satisfied Strickland even though counsel never reviewed the readily available prior conviction file despite knowing the Commonwealth would rely on it for aggravation.50 That conclusion was an objectively unreasonable application of Strickland. It ignored the specific duty to make reasonable efforts to obtain information the prosecution planned to use and the file's obvious relevance to both rebutting aggravation and developing mitigation.
The state postconviction court's conclusion was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.51
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Scalia
Justice Thomas dissented on this point as well, arguing that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court gave careful consideration to the ineffective-assistance claim and reasonably relied on counsel's discussions with the defendant, family, and experts.52 He observed that the state postconviction court carefully reviewed the evidence and concluded that counsel's performance was not constitutionally deficient.53 The court found that counsel had interviewed Rompilla and his family members and had reviewed the evidence in the case.54
He concluded that the state court's decision was far from objectively unreasonable under the deferential AEDPA standard. He emphasized that the majority's reversal constituted an unwarranted intrusion into the province of the state courts.55
Joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas
Justice Kennedy also dissented on the AEDPA issue, maintaining that the Pennsylvania Supreme Court was not objectively unreasonable in concluding that counsel's investigation satisfied Strickland.56 He argued that the state court properly deferred to counsel's strategic judgments about resource allocation and that the majority failed to apply the required deference under 28 U.S.C. §2254(d).57 The state court's decision was not an unreasonable application of Strickland v. Washington.58
He stressed that the Pennsylvania courts could hardly be faulted for failing to anticipate the majority's abrupt departure from Strickland.59