69 Cal. 2d 108, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 443 P.2d 561 (1968)
Nancy Christian was the tenant of an apartment whose lessors had been notified by her on November 1, 1963, that the knob of the cold water faucet on the bathroom basin was cracked and should be replaced.1 On November 30, 1963, plaintiff Rowland entered the apartment at Christian's invitation as a social guest and was injured while using the bathroom fixtures when the porcelain handle of one of the water faucets broke in his hand.2
The injury severed the tendons and medial nerve in Rowland's right hand.3 He incurred medical and hospital expenses, suffered loss of wages, and sustained damage to his clothing.4 Rowland later filed a complaint alleging that the bathroom fixtures were dangerous, that Christian was aware of the dangerous condition, and that his injuries were proximately caused by her negligence.5
Christian filed an answer containing a general denial except that she admitted telling the lessors the faucet was defective and should be replaced.6 She also alleged contributory negligence and assumption of the risk on the ground that Rowland had failed to use his eyesight and knew of the condition of the premises.7 Christian supported her motion for summary judgment with an affidavit stating that Rowland was a social guest who had used the bathroom on a prior occasion and that the handle broke while he was using the faucet.8
In opposition, Rowland filed an affidavit stating that immediately prior to the accident he told Christian he was going to use the bathroom facilities, that she had known for two weeks that the faucet handle was cracked, that she had warned the manager of the building of the condition but nothing was done to repair it, that she did not warn him of the condition, and that the handle broke when he turned off the faucet.9 The trial court granted summary judgment for Christian, and Rowland appealed.10
Whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment for the defendant in this personal injury action?11
No. Christian's affidavit established only that Rowland was a social guest who suffered injury when the faucet handle broke, without showing whether the crack was obvious or concealed.14 Rowland's opposing affidavit established that Christian had known of the cracked handle for two weeks, had warned the building manager but not Rowland, and that Rowland informed her he was about to use the bathroom immediately before the handle broke in his hand severing tendons and nerves.15 These facts create triable issues on whether Christian failed to exercise reasonable care by neither repairing the condition nor warning Rowland.
The trial court did not properly grant summary judgment for the defendant.16
Whether the common law classifications of trespasser, licensee, and invitee should determine the liability of a possessor of land for injuries to persons entering the land?17
The proper test to be applied to the liability of the possessor of land in accordance with section 1714 of the Civil Code is whether in the management of his property he has acted as a reasonable man in view of the probability of injury to others, and although the plaintiff's status as a trespasser, licensee, or invitee may in the light of the facts giving rise to such status have some bearing on the question of liability, the status is not determinative.18
No. Although Rowland entered as a social guest and thus would have been classified as a licensee under common law classifications, to whom only a duty to avoid willful injury was owed, the established facts show Christian knew of the cracked faucet handle for two weeks, realized Rowland was about to use the bathroom, and neither repaired the defect nor warned him of it.19 Under the proper test of ordinary negligence principles, a trier of fact could conclude that Christian failed to act as a reasonable person in managing her property given the probability of injury.20
The common law classifications of trespasser, licensee, and invitee should not determine the liability of a possessor of land for injuries to persons entering the land.21
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Mccomb, J.
Justice Burke dissented on the ground that the distinctions between trespassers, licensees and invitees have been developed and applied by the courts over a period of many years.22 They supply a reasonable and workable approach to the problems involved, and one which provides the degree of stability and predictability so highly prized in the law.23 He argued that a social guest should be obliged to take the premises in the same condition as his host finds them or permits them to be.24
He further argued that sweeping modifications of tort liability law fall more suitably within the domain of the Legislature.25