147 N.E.2d 599 (Ohio 1958), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 814 (1958)
On or about September 20, 1951, plaintiff was a passenger on a motorcycle operated by her husband.1 She was proceeding in an easterly direction on Schreiber Road within the limits of Maple Heights at a speed of not more than 20 miles per hour.2 She was thrown to the ground and injured.3
Plaintiff alleged that the defendant city was negligent in failing to keep Schreiber Road in good repair and free from nuisance.4 She alleged that the city suffered large holes, bumps and dips to exist in the regularly traveled portion of the street.5 She also alleged that the city failed to erect warning signs giving notice of the unsafe condition.6 The city had notice, and her injuries were caused directly and proximately by the negligence of the defendant.7
Prior to the present suit, plaintiff filed an action for damage to personal property in the Municipal Court of Cleveland, cause number A 241 307, against the city of Maple Heights arising out of the same incident.8 That cause proceeded to trial.9 The Municipal Court rendered judgment for plaintiff in the amount of $100.10 It found among other things that the city had actual notice of the condition of Schreiber Road, that the city was negligent in not repairing the hole, and that such negligence was the proximate cause of the damages.11 The Municipal Court overruled defendant's motion for a new trial.12 The Court of Appeals affirmed.1314 The Supreme Court of Ohio denied the motion to certify and affirmed the judgment.15
Plaintiff then filed the instant action for personal injuries in the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County.16 In her second amended petition she set forth the facts of the accident and her injuries.17 She filed a motion for an order setting the cause for trial on the issue of damages alone for the reason that the liability of the defendant had been determined in the prior municipal court action.18 Defendant denied negligence and that the prior judgment was controlling.19
After a pretrial conference the trial court sustained the motion to set the cause for trial on damages only.20 The court instructed the jury that issues of negligence, proximate cause and contributory negligence had been resolved in plaintiff's favor.21 The jury returned a verdict for plaintiff in the amount of $12,000.22 The Court of Appeals affirmed. This cause is before this court on a motion to certify the record.23
Whether a person who suffers both personal injuries and property damage as a result of the same wrongful act may maintain separate actions for each type of injury?24
Where a person suffers both personal injuries and property damage as a result of the same wrongful act, only a single cause of action arises, the different injuries occasioned thereby being separate items of damage from such act.25
No. The single-cause-of-action rule treats personal injuries and property damage as separate items of damage arising from the same wrongful act.26 This rule directly controls the outcome here.27 It precludes the plaintiff from maintaining a second lawsuit after obtaining judgment on the first.28
The facts establish that both claims originated from the identical event on September 20, 1951.29 The plaintiff was riding as a passenger on her husband's motorcycle.30 The motorcycle was traveling eastbound on Schreiber Road in the city of Maple Heights at a speed of no more than twenty miles per hour.31 She was thrown to the ground and injured when the motorcycle encountered large holes, bumps, and dips in the road.32 The city had failed to repair them despite having actual notice of the dangerous condition.33
Before commencing the present personal injury action in the Court of Common Pleas of Cuyahoga County, the plaintiff had already litigated her property damage claim to a successful conclusion in the Municipal Court of Cleveland under cause number A 241 307.34 The municipal court entered judgment for one hundred dollars in her favor.35 It found that the city was negligent in failing to repair the hole.36 It found that this negligence proximately caused her property damage.37 That judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.38 The Supreme Court of Ohio denied certification.39
After the property damage judgment became final, the plaintiff filed her second amended petition in the common pleas court.40 She sought damages for personal injuries from the same accident.41 She moved to have the case set for trial on damages alone on the theory that liability had already been established.42 The trial court granted the motion.43 It instructed the jury that negligence, proximate cause, and contributory negligence had been resolved in the plaintiff's favor.44 The jury returned a verdict of twelve thousand dollars.45 The Court of Appeals affirmed. This court granted review on the motion to certify.46
Application of the rule to these facts requires reversal.47 The prior judgment on property damage bars the subsequent personal injury action.48 Both arise from the same cause of action.49 Allowing the split would promote the multiplicity of suits and vexatious litigation that the single-action rule is designed to prevent.50
Related opinions on this issue
Judge Stewart concurred in the result.54 In Vasu v. Kohlers, Inc., the opinion stated that the majority rule was that a single wrongful act producing both property and personal injury gives rise to only one action, but then announced the opposite rule in the fourth paragraph of the syllabus.55 Because that paragraph was not necessary to the decision in Vasu, it is obiter dicta.56
He would be reluctant to disturb a necessary holding, but here the language in paragraph four of Vasu was unnecessary to that case and, accordingly, less persuasive.57 The court is justified in departing from that obiter dictum and adopting the single-cause-of-action rule as announced by the majority in this case.58
Judge Zimmerman dissented from the decision to overrule the prior precedent.59 He stressed that stability in the law is important so that lower courts and the bar may rely on precedent.60 He noted that the question had been considered and decided by a unanimous court in Vasu v. Kohlers, Inc. While acknowledging the conflict among authorities, he found no compelling reason to change the rule at this time.61
He observed that the separate causes of action may be joined in a single proceeding if the plaintiff elects to do so.62