526 U.S. 489 (1999)
California participates in the federal AFDC program under the Social Security Act.1 In 1992 California enacted section 11450.03 of its Welfare and Institutions Code.2 That statute limited the maximum AFDC benefits payable to any family that had resided in California for less than twelve months to the amount the family would have received in its state of prior residence.3
In one year the AFDC program served an average of 2,645,814 persons per month at an annual state cost of $2.9 billion.4 The full monthly grant for a family of two was $456, compared with $275 in Arizona.5 Three California residents who had recently moved from Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Colorado filed suit in the Eastern District of California.6 They alleged that their grants would be reduced from $641 or $504 to $190, $341, or $280 for the first year.7
The district court issued a temporary restraining order and later a preliminary injunction.8 The Ninth Circuit summarily affirmed.9 The Supreme Court vacated the judgment in Anderson v. Green because the Secretary of Health and Human Services had not yet determined whether the statute complied with federal requirements.10 After the Secretary issued a waiver the case was dismissed.11
In 1996 Congress enacted the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act.12 That statute replaced AFDC with TANF and expressly authorized states to apply the benefit rules of a family’s prior state for the first twelve months of residence.13 California then announced that enforcement of section 11450.03 would begin April 1, 1997.14
On that date two new plaintiffs, one who had moved from Oklahoma and one from the District of Columbia, filed the present action in the Eastern District of California.15 They acted on behalf of a certified class of all present and future TANF applicants who would be denied full California benefits because they had not resided in the state for twelve consecutive months.16 The district court again issued a temporary restraining order and, after hearing evidence, a preliminary injunction.17
The evidence showed that California’s benefits ranked sixth highest in absolute terms but eighteenth when housing costs were considered.18 New residents from forty-three states would face higher living costs.19 The statute would save the state approximately $10.9 million annually.20 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the preliminary injunction without finally deciding the merits.21 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.22
The All County Letter implementing the statute provided that even lifelong California residents who left the state for part of a year would have their benefits calculated under the law of the other state for that period.23 The lower benefit level applied regardless of whether the family had received welfare in the prior state or the motive for moving.24 Families arriving from another country were exempt.25 The district court noted that other programs such as homeless assistance and an extra food-stamp allowance partially offset the disparity.26 The state did not dispute that the statute created significant differences between newcomers and longer-term residents.27
Whether a state statute that limits the maximum AFDC or TANF benefits available to families who have resided in the state for less than twelve months to the amount payable by the state of prior residence violates the Fourteenth Amendment?28
The right to travel is protected by the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.29 This right prohibits states from imposing durational residency requirements that create subclasses of citizens based on length of residence or prior residence location. Such a classification is invalid unless necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest.30
Yes. The California statute imposes a discriminatory burden on new residents who have completed their move to the state.31 This burden is shown by the two respondents who moved from Oklahoma and the District of Columbia and faced reduced benefits for their first year.32 The classifications defined by duration of prior residence in California or another state are irrational.33
They cannot survive review because the statute's purpose of conserving resources for long-time residents is not compelling.34 The interest in deterring migration is impermissible.35 An evenhanded reduction across all beneficiaries would achieve the same $10.9 million savings without discriminating against new arrivals.36
The statute violates the Fourteenth Amendment.37
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Thomas
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissents on the ground that the right to become a citizen of another state is distinct from the right to travel and is not a necessary component of it.38 He argues that the statute constitutes a permissible good-faith residency requirement that tests the bona fides of residence without barring entry into the state.39 Rehnquist emphasizes that states retain the ability to use objective durational criteria to ensure that only bona fide residents receive benefits.40
He notes that Congress expressly approved such requirements in PRWORA, confirming their reasonableness for protecting state resources during welfare reform.41 The majority's approach, he concludes, improperly revives the Privileges or Immunities Clause to invalidate a reasonable measure.42
Joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
Justice Thomas dissents separately to address the majority's use of the Privileges or Immunities Clause.43 He contends that the majority attributes an unintended expansive meaning to the Clause that contradicts its original understanding.44 Thomas explains that the Clause was intended to protect only fundamental rights identified in Corfield v. Coryell rather than every positive-law benefit such as welfare payments.45
He observes that the Clause was sapped of meaning in the Slaughter-House Cases and should not be revived to invalidate a state's objective durational test for new citizens.46 Thomas would look to history to ascertain the original meaning before expanding the Clause in this manner.47
Whether the Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment permits a state to impose a durational residency requirement that creates subclasses of citizens based on the length of their residence or the location of their prior residence?48
The Citizenship Clause expressly equates citizenship with residence and does not tolerate degrees of citizenship or a hierarchy of subclasses of similarly situated citizens based on length of residence or location of prior residence.49
No. The Clause does not allow California to treat new arrivals differently from longer-term residents by tying benefit levels to prior state law or to the fact that a family has resided in California for less than twelve months.50 The All County Letter's rules extending the lower benefit calculation even to lifelong residents who briefly left the state further illustrate the impermissible subclassification based on prior residence location.51
The Citizenship Clause forbids the durational residency requirement.52
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Thomas
Chief Justice Rehnquist maintains that the Citizenship Clause was intended only to overrule Dred Scott and establish national citizenship.53 It supplies no sweeping substantive right to immediate equal welfare benefits upon establishing bona fide residence.54 Rehnquist warns that the majority's novel interpretation will undermine states' ability to set their own welfare policies through reasonable durational tests.55
He stresses that the Clause does not preclude objective criteria for confirming residency before full benefits attach.56 The majority's holding will have far-reaching consequences for the States' ability to set their own welfare policies.57 The Constitution does not require the States to provide identical benefits to all citizens regardless of how long they have resided in the State.58
Whether congressional authorization in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 permits states to enforce durational residency requirements for welfare benefits that would otherwise be unconstitutional?59
Congress may not authorize states to violate the Fourteenth Amendment, and the protection of the Citizenship Clause limits the powers of the national government as well as the states.60
No. Although PRWORA expressly authorizes states to apply the benefit rules of a family's prior state for the first twelve months, this statutory permission cannot resuscitate section 11450.03 because Congress lacks power to validate state laws that abridge rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.61 The Solicitor General's arguments about choice-of-law rules or preventing a race to the bottom do not alter the constitutional prohibition.62
Congressional authorization does not render the statute constitutional.63
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
Justice Thomas joins the Chief Justice's dissent and adds that the majority's expansive reading of the Privileges or Immunities Clause is inconsistent with the original understanding of the Clause.64 He notes that the Clause protects only those rights understood at the time of the Fourteenth Amendment's adoption to be privileges or immunities of citizens.65 The right to receive welfare benefits at the new state's level immediately upon arrival was not among those rights.66
Thomas concludes that the majority's interpretation should be rejected and the judgment of the Court of Appeals reversed.67