522 U.S. 52 (1997)
In 1984 the United States Marshals Service entered into agreements with Hidalgo County, Texas, under which the county would take custody of federal prisoners in its jail.1 The Federal Government agreed to make a grant for jail improvements and to pay the county a specific daily amount for each federal prisoner housed, with payments projected at $915,785 per year.2 In each of the two relevant periods the program produced federal payments to the county well in excess of $10,000.3
Homero Beltran-Aguirre, a federal prisoner housed under the arrangement, paid a series of bribes to Sheriff Brigido Marmolejo in exchange for contact visits during which Beltran remained alone with his wife or girlfriend.4 Beltran paid Marmolejo a fixed rate of $6,000 per month plus $1,000 for each contact visit, which occurred twice a week.5
Petitioner Mario Salinas served as chief deputy responsible for managing the jail and supervising custody of the prisoners.6 When Marmolejo was unavailable, Salinas arranged the contact visits and on occasion stood watch outside the room.7 In return for his assistance Salinas received from Beltran a pair of designer watches and a pickup truck.8
Salinas and Marmolejo were indicted together on one count of violating RICO under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c), one count of conspiracy to violate RICO under § 1962(d), and two counts of bribery under § 666(a)(1)(B).9 The jury acquitted Salinas on the substantive RICO count but convicted him on the RICO conspiracy count and the two bribery counts.10
A divided panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit affirmed the convictions in United States v. Marmolejo, 89 F. 3d 1185 (1996).11 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1997.12
Whether the federal bribery statute codified at 18 U.S.C. § 666 is limited to cases in which the bribe has a demonstrated effect upon federal funds?
The plain language of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) does not require the government to prove that a bribe affected federal funds.13 The statute applies whenever an organization receives more than $10,000 in federal benefits in any one-year period and an agent of that organization corruptly accepts anything of value intending to be influenced in connection with any business, transaction, or series of transactions involving anything of value of $5,000 or more.14
No. The statute's expansive and unqualified language reaches bribes in connection with any business or transaction of a covered organization and contains no requirement that federal funds be affected.15
The word 'any' that prefaces the business or transaction clause undercuts any narrowing construction that would limit the prohibition to transactions involving federal funds.16 The broad definition of the circumstances to which the statute applies likewise provides no textual basis for limiting the bribery prohibition to cases in which federal funds are affected.17
In this case the county received federal payments well in excess of $10,000 for housing federal prisoners under agreements with the United States Marshals Service.18 Salinas, as chief deputy responsible for managing the jail, accepted designer watches and a pickup truck from the federal prisoner Beltran in exchange for arranging contact visits.19 These facts satisfy the statutory requirements without any showing that the bribes diverted or otherwise affected federal funds.20
The federal bribery statute codified at 18 U.S.C. § 666 is not limited to cases in which the bribe has a demonstrated effect upon federal funds.21
Whether the conspiracy prohibition contained in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act applies only when the conspirator agrees to commit two of the predicate acts RICO forbids?22
Under 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) a person may be guilty of RICO conspiracy by agreeing to facilitate the substantive RICO offense even if the person does not agree to commit or facilitate every part of that offense.23 It suffices that the conspirator adopts the goal of furthering or facilitating the criminal endeavor that would satisfy all elements of the substantive offense if completed.24
No. A conspiracy may exist even if a conspirator does not agree to commit or facilitate each and every part of the substantive offense.25 The partners in the criminal plan must agree to pursue the same criminal objective and each is responsible for the acts of the others so long as the partnership in crime continues.26
The RICO conspiracy provision contains no requirement of an overt act and does not impose the additional requirement that each conspirator agree to commit two predicate acts.27 When Congress uses the term 'to conspire' it is presumed to intend the conventional meaning under which a person may conspire for the commission of a crime by a third person.28 A person may be liable even though incapable of committing the substantive offense.29
In this case the evidence showed that Marmolejo committed at least two acts of racketeering activity by accepting numerous bribes.30 Salinas knew about and agreed to facilitate the scheme by arranging contact visits and standing watch when Marmolejo was unavailable.31 This evidence is sufficient to support the conviction under § 1962(d) even though the jury acquitted Salinas on the substantive RICO count.32
The conspiracy prohibition contained in the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act does not apply only when the conspirator agrees to commit two of the predicate acts RICO forbids.33