455 U.S. 745 (1982)
In November 1973, after incidents reflecting parental neglect, respondent Kramer, Commissioner of the Ulster County Department of Social Services, initiated a neglect proceeding under the Family Court Act and removed Tina Santosky from her natural home.1 About ten months later, he removed John III and placed him with foster parents.2 On the day John was taken, Annie Santosky gave birth to a third child, Jed, who was transferred to a foster home three days later on the ground that immediate removal was necessary to avoid imminent danger to his life or health.3
In October 1978, respondent petitioned the Ulster County Family Court to terminate petitioners' parental rights in the three children.4 Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the fair preponderance of the evidence standard specified in the Family Court Act.5 The Family Court Judge rejected this constitutional challenge, weighed the evidence under the statutory standard, acknowledged that the Santoskys had maintained contact with their children but found those visits at best superficial and devoid of any real emotional content, decided that the agency had made diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship, concluded that the Santoskys were incapable even with public assistance of planning for the future of their children, and after a dispositional hearing ruled that the best interests of the three children required permanent termination of the Santoskys' custody.6
Petitioners appealed, again contesting the constitutionality of the standard of proof.7 The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, affirmed, holding application of the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard proper and constitutional on the ground that it recognizes and seeks to balance rights possessed by the child with those of the natural parents.8 The New York Court of Appeals then dismissed petitioners' appeal upon the ground that no substantial constitutional question is directly involved.9 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider petitioners' constitutional claim.10
Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that allegations of permanent parental neglect be supported by at least clear and convincing evidence before a state may terminate parental rights?11
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires states to support allegations of permanent parental neglect by at least clear and convincing evidence before terminating parental rights.12
Yes. In November 1973, after incidents reflecting parental neglect, respondent Kramer, Commissioner of the Ulster County Department of Social Services, initiated a neglect proceeding under the Family Court Act and removed Tina Santosky from her natural home. About ten months later, he removed John III and placed him with foster parents. On the day John was taken, Annie Santosky gave birth to a third child, Jed, who was transferred to a foster home three days later on the ground that immediate removal was necessary to avoid imminent danger to his life or health.
In October 1978, respondent petitioned the Ulster County Family Court to terminate petitioners' parental rights in the three children. Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the fair preponderance of the evidence standard specified in the Family Court Act. The Family Court Judge rejected this constitutional challenge, weighed the evidence under the statutory standard, acknowledged that the Santoskys had maintained contact with their children but found those visits at best superficial and devoid of any real emotional content, decided that the agency had made diligent efforts to encourage and strengthen the parental relationship, concluded that the Santoskys were incapable even with public assistance of planning for the future of their children, and after a dispositional hearing ruled that the best interests of the three children required permanent termination of the Santoskys' custody.
Petitioners appealed, again contesting the constitutionality of the standard of proof. The New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, affirmed, holding application of the preponderance-of-the-evidence standard proper and constitutional on the ground that it recognizes and seeks to balance rights possessed by the child with those of the natural parents. The New York Court of Appeals then dismissed petitioners' appeal upon the ground that no substantial constitutional question is directly involved. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider petitioners' constitutional claim.
The private interest affected is commanding because the Santoskys faced the irrevocable loss of their parental rights in their three children.13 The risk of error from using a preponderance standard is substantial because the factfinding hearing is an adversary contest where the State has superior litigation resources.14 The countervailing governmental interest favoring that standard is comparatively slight because a stricter standard is consistent with the state's parens patriae interest in the child's welfare.15
The fair preponderance of the evidence standard violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.16
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by The Chief Justice, Justice White, And Justice O'connor
Justice Rehnquist dissented on the ground that New York's comprehensive termination scheme as a whole satisfies due process. It incorporates extensive procedural protections such as the right to counsel, multiple hearings, rules of evidence, and the diligent efforts requirement. These protections together minimize the risk of erroneous termination.17
He maintained that the preponderance standard reflects a constitutionally permissible allocation of the risk of error. The interests of parents in preserving the family unit and the interests of the child and state in a stable home are of roughly equal societal importance. Therefore, neither side should bear a disproportionate share of the risk.18
Rehnquist further warned that imposing a federal constitutional standard of proof would inevitably lead to additional federal-court intrusion into state family law. This is an area traditionally reserved for state experimentation and creative solutions to the vexing problems of child abuse and neglect.19