519 U.S. 357, 375-376 (1997)
Respondents include three physicians and four medical facilities that provide abortions along with Pro-Choice Network of Western New York.1 On September 24, 1990, they filed a complaint in the United States District Court for the Western District of New York against fifty individuals and three organizations including Operation Rescue, Project Rescue Western New York, and Project Life of Rochester.2
The complaint alleged that defendants had consistently engaged in illegal blockades and other disruptive conduct at the clinics and sought a temporary restraining order, permanent injunction, and damages.3 Between 1988 and 1991 the clinics faced large-scale blockades in which protesters marched, stood, knelt, sat, or lay in parking lot driveways and doorways.4
Smaller-scale activities also occurred in which protesters trespassed onto clinic property, crowded around cars attempting to enter parking lots, and engaged in aggressive sidewalk counseling that included yelling in patients' faces, surrounding and jostling women, and sometimes grabbing, pushing, or shoving them and their escorts.5 Male companions of patients sometimes had to be restrained from fighting with counselors, and clinic volunteers who escorted patients were elbowed, grabbed, or spit on.6
On September 27, 1990, three days after the complaint was filed, the District Court issued a temporary restraining order that banned demonstrating within fifteen feet of any person entering or leaving the clinics except for two sidewalk counselors who could engage in nonthreatening conversation but had to cease and desist if the individual indicated a desire to be left alone.7 Defendants initially complied but later resumed constructive blockades involving demonstrations around entrances, harassment of patients and staff, and attempts to impede cars and people.8
The District Court held twenty-seven days of hearings on five contempt motions arising from incidents between October 1990 and 1991.9 In February 1992, after twelve additional days of testimony, the District Court issued the preliminary injunction containing fixed fifteen-foot buffer zones around doorways, driveway entrances, and parking lot entrances, floating fifteen-foot buffer zones around any person or vehicle seeking access, and a cease-and-desist requirement that forced sidewalk counselors inside the zones to retreat fifteen feet once a targeted person indicated a desire not to be counseled.10
The injunction applied to named defendants, their officers, agents, representatives, and all persons acting in concert with them.11 Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which affirmed en banc in 1995.12 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1996.13
Whether the injunction restricting demonstrations outside abortion clinics is content based?14
An injunction is content neutral if it is based on the conduct of the protesters rather than the content of their speech.15
No. The District Court found that petitioners had engaged in a pattern of blockades, disruptions, and other harassing activities that went beyond peaceful protest.16 The injunction was issued to address that conduct, not because of the content of petitioners' speech.17 The injunction's restrictions serve to promote the government's interest in ensuring that patients have access to medical care without regard to the content of the speech.18
The injunction is content neutral.19
Whether the fixed 15-foot buffer zones around clinic doorways, driveways, and parking lot entrances burden more speech than necessary to serve significant government interests?20
Content-neutral injunctions must burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest.21
No. The government has significant interests in ensuring public safety and order, promoting the free flow of traffic on streets and sidewalks, protecting property rights, and protecting a woman's freedom to seek pregnancy-related services. The District Court found that protesters had blocked access to the clinics and harassed patients and staff.22 Based on the conduct both before and after the TRO issued, the District Court was entitled to conclude that the only way to ensure access was to move demonstrations away from the entrances.23 The fifteen-foot distance is reasonable, and deference is given to the trial court's familiarity with the facts.24
The fixed buffer zones do not burden more speech than necessary.25
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Joined by Justice Kennedy And Justice Thomas
The District Court did not conclude that all demonstrators must be excluded from the fixed buffer zone.26 It permitted two sidewalk counselors subject to a cease-and-desist requirement.27 The Court cannot substitute its own conclusion that excluding all protesters was necessary when the trial court reached a different judgment on the record.28
Public safety cannot supply an independent justification for the injunction beyond the interests asserted in the pleaded claims.29 The District Court thought the supposed right to be left alone central to its order.30
Whether the floating 15-foot buffer zones around persons and vehicles seeking access to the clinics burden more speech than necessary to serve significant government interests?31
Content-neutral injunctions must burden no more speech than necessary to serve a significant government interest.
Yes. The floating buffer zones burden more speech than necessary because they make it difficult for protesters to know how to comply with the injunction.32 Protesters on narrow sidewalks are pushed into the street at clinics such as the GYN Womenservices clinic in Buffalo.33 The zones create a substantial risk that protected speech will be burdened when protesters attempt to maintain the required distance while communicating their message.34
The floating buffer zones are unconstitutional.35
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Breyer would affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals in its entirety rather than striking down the floating buffer zones.36 He concludes that the preliminary injunction's key language does not necessarily create a floating bubble zone of the sort that leads the Court to invalidate it.37 At the TRO hearing the District Court expressly clarified that the zone was fixed and referred only to free access from the entrance itself.38
Later filings and proceedings reflected no intent to create a moving zone until the issue surfaced for the first time at en banc argument.39 The Court of Appeals acted properly in leaving any interpretive questions to the District Court, which retains ongoing responsibility for administering the injunction and possesses superior familiarity with the underlying facts.40 No contempt proceedings have ever arisen from any supposed floating aspect, and nothing in the record suggests a realistic threat that protected speech will be chilled.41
Any constitutional question that might arise from a particular floating bubble would turn on specific clinic layouts and circumstances best evaluated first by the trial court.42
Whether the injunction leaves open ample alternative channels of communication?43
A content-neutral injunction must leave open ample alternative channels of communication.44
Yes. Petitioners may engage in expressive activities on the public sidewalks outside the fifteen-foot buffer zones.45 They may also use signs and leaflets to communicate their message.46 The only restriction is that they may not demonstrate within fifteen feet of the clinic entrances, exits, or driveways.47
The injunction leaves open ample alternative channels of communication.48