108 S.Ct. 2460, 487 U.S. 412, 101 L.Ed.2d 370
In 1980 Congress enacted legislation requiring most Social Security disability determinations under Title II to be reviewed at least once every three years.1 The Secretary of Health and Human Services accelerated the start of the continuing disability review program to March 1981 even though the statute did not require the program to become effective before January 1 1982.2 Under the initial procedures state agencies performed the reviews and benefits were usually terminated after a finding of ineligibility with no payments available during administrative appeals.3 Between March 1981 and April 1984 approximately 200000 persons had their benefits terminated and later reinstated after appeal.4
Respondents James Chilicky Spencer Harris and Dora Adelerte had their Title II disability benefits terminated in 1981 and 1982.5 Harris and Adelerte pursued administrative appeals and received full retroactive benefits.6 Chilicky filed a new application about a year and a half after termination received one year of retroactive benefits and had a claim for the remaining six months still pending.7 All three respondents had been wholly dependent on their benefits and alleged they were unable to maintain themselves or their families in even a minimally adequate fashion after termination.8 Chilicky was in the hospital recovering from open-heart surgery when informed that his heart condition was no longer disabling.9
Congress responded to widespread problems with the program by enacting temporary emergency legislation in 1983 that allowed continuation of benefits pending administrative law judge review.10 In 1984 Congress passed the Social Security Disability Benefits Reform Act which extended the interim payment provision and made other changes to the continuing disability review process.11 Respondents along with several other individuals filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona against one Arizona official and two federal officials who had policymaking roles in the program.12 They alleged that the officials had adopted illegal policies including improper acceleration of the review program nonacquiescence in Ninth Circuit decisions failure to apply uniform standards use of an impermissible quota system and disregard of favorable evidence.13 The complaint sought injunctive and declaratory relief plus money damages for emotional distress and loss of food shelter and other necessities.14
The District Court dismissed the case on qualified immunity grounds.15 The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal of the acceleration and nonacquiescence claims but reversed on the remaining claims and remanded for further proceedings including a possible trial.16 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the question whether a Bivens remedy should be implied for alleged due process violations in the denial of social security disability benefits.17
Whether the improper denial of Social Security disability benefits allegedly resulting from due process violations by government officials who administered the federal program may give rise to a cause of action for money damages against those officials?18
When the design of a Government program suggests that Congress has provided what it considers adequate remedial mechanisms for constitutional violations that may occur in the course of its administration, we have not created additional Bivens remedies.19
No. The Social Security disability benefits program features an unusually protective multi-step process for the review and adjudication of disputed claims that includes initial state agency determinations, de novo reconsideration, ALJ hearings, Appeals Council review, and judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).20 Respondents received the restoration of their benefits through this process but obtained no compensation for emotional distress or other hardships suffered because of the delays in receiving benefits to which they were entitled.21 Congress addressed the problems that arose in the administration of the continuing disability review program with frequent and intense legislation in 1983 and 1984 without providing for damages against officials.22 This comprehensive scheme indicates that Congress has provided what it considers adequate remedial mechanisms, precluding an additional Bivens remedy as in Bush v. Lucas.23
A Bivens remedy for money damages is unavailable because Congress has provided meaningful safeguards and remedies in the Social Security disability benefits program.24
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stevens concurred in part and in the judgment. He maintained that the Court should not reach the issue of whether a Bivens remedy may be brought directly under the Due Process Clause without first deciding whether 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) expressly requires dismissal of the complaint.25 Stevens agreed with the explanation in Part III-A of Justice Brennan's opinion that 42 U.S.C. § 405(h) does not preclude a Bivens remedy in this case.26
He therefore joined all of the Court's opinion except for footnote 3, which addressed the Solicitor General's argument on the effect of § 405(h).27
Joined by Justices Marshall And Blackmun
Justice Brennan dissented, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun.28 He argued that the administrative review process does not provide adequate redress for constitutional violations because it offers only retroactive benefits without compensation for consequential harms like emotional distress or loss of necessities.29 Brennan emphasized that Congress never mentioned or debated the desirability of providing a statutory remedy for such constitutional wrongs.30
He concluded that the social welfare context does not present special factors like those in the military or civil service contexts that would counsel hesitation, as courts are competent to adjudicate due process claims in this area.31