550 U.S. 372 (2007)
In March 2001, a Georgia county deputy clocked respondent's vehicle traveling at 73 miles per hour on a road with a 55-mile-per-hour speed limit.1 The deputy activated his blue flashing lights indicating that respondent should pull over, but respondent sped away, initiating a chase down what is in most portions a two-lane road, at speeds exceeding 85 miles per hour.2
Deputy Timothy Scott heard the radio communication and joined the pursuit along with other officers.3 In the midst of the chase, respondent pulled into the parking lot of a shopping center and was nearly boxed in by police vehicles from the pursuing officers.4 Respondent evaded the trap by making a sharp turn, colliding with Scott's police car, exiting the parking lot, and speeding off once again down a two-lane highway.5
Following respondent's shopping center maneuvering, which resulted in slight damage to Scott's police car, Scott took over as the lead pursuit vehicle.6 Six minutes and nearly 10 miles after the chase had begun, Scott decided to attempt to terminate the episode by employing a Precision Intervention Technique maneuver.7 Having radioed his supervisor for permission, Scott was told to go ahead and take him out.8 Scott instead applied his push bumper to the rear of respondent's vehicle.9 As a result, respondent lost control of his vehicle, which left the roadway, ran down an embankment, overturned, and crashed, rendering respondent quadriplegic.10
Respondent filed suit against Deputy Scott and others under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging use of excessive force resulting in an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment.11 The district court denied Scott's motion for summary judgment based on qualified immunity.12 On interlocutory appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court's decision to allow respondent's Fourth Amendment claim to proceed to trial.13 The Supreme Court granted certiorari.14 The record includes a videotape capturing the events in question.15
Whether Deputy Scott's decision to terminate the high-speed pursuit by applying his push bumper to the rear of respondent's vehicle violated the Fourth Amendment?16
A claim of excessive force in the course of making a seizure of the person is properly analyzed under the Fourth Amendment's objective reasonableness standard.17 Reasonableness is determined by balancing the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against the importance of the governmental interests justifying the intrusion.18 Tennessee v. Garner applied this reasonableness test to a particular use of deadly force but did not establish a magical on/off switch triggering rigid preconditions whenever force creates a substantial likelihood of death or serious injury.19
No. The videotape shows respondent racing down narrow two-lane roads at shockingly fast speeds, swerving around more than a dozen other cars, crossing the double-yellow line, forcing cars to the shoulders, running multiple red lights, and traveling in the center left-turn-only lane.2021 This created an actual and imminent threat to pedestrians, other motorists, and pursuing officers.22 Scott's ramming maneuver posed a high likelihood of serious injury or death to respondent.23 Respondent was the culpable party who intentionally placed himself and the public in danger through reckless flight, while those potentially harmed were entirely innocent.24
Scott's ramming action would eliminate the risk to the public, whereas ceasing pursuit would not, given uncertainties about whether respondent would slow down.25 Balancing the high governmental interest in public safety against the intrusion, Scott's actions were objectively reasonable.26
Scott's actions did not violate the Fourth Amendment, and he is entitled to summary judgment on the excessive-force claim.27
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Ginsburg joined the Court's opinion but underscored that the decision does not articulate a mechanical per se rule.28 The inquiry described by the Court is situation specific rather than mechanical.29 Among relevant considerations are whether the lives and well-being of others such as motorists, pedestrians, and police officers were at risk and whether there was a safer way given the time, place, and circumstances to stop the fleeing vehicle.30
She observed that an admirable attempt to craft an easy-to-apply legal test in the Fourth Amendment context must still yield in the end to the factbound morass of reasonableness.31 She also noted that the constitutional question warranted an answer in this appeal rather than resolving the case solely on qualified immunity grounds.32
Justice Breyer joined the Court's opinion with one suggestion and two qualifications.33 He emphasized the highly fact-dependent nature of the constitutional determination and suggested that watching the video footage demonstrates the officer did not violate the Constitution.34 He argued that Saucier's rigid order-of-battle rule should be reconsidered because it sometimes wastes judicial resources by requiring courts to answer difficult constitutional questions unnecessarily, may immunize incorrect constitutional rulings from review, and produces confusion rather than clarity in fact-dependent areas.35
He noted that the order-of-battle rule violates the older judicial counsel not to pass on questions of constitutionality unless adjudication is unavoidable.36 Although reluctant to overturn precedents, he observed that stare decisis concerns are at their weakest for this novel procedural rule that primarily affects judges and has seen little reliance.37 He disagreed with the majority's articulation of a per se rule as too absolute.38
Justice Stevens dissented, arguing that the videotape confirms rather than contradicts the lower courts' appraisal of the facts and does not provide a principled basis for depriving respondent of his right to a jury trial.39 He maintained that the cars pulled over in response to sirens and flashing lights, that respondent retained full control of his vehicle without any close calls, and that the shopping center incident created no risk because the center was closed at night.40 He contended that the per se rule is inconsistent with the flexible case-by-case reasonableness approach applied in Garner and Graham.41
He argued that deadly force was unnecessary given alternatives such as stop sticks or a simple warning from a loudspeaker and that any uncertainty about abandoning the pursuit does not justify the Court's factual assumptions.42 In his view, jurors in Georgia should evaluate the reasonableness of the decision to ram respondent's vehicle.43
Whether a court must adopt the plaintiff's version of the facts at the summary judgment stage when that version is blatantly contradicted by a videotape in the record?44
At summary judgment, facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party only if there is a genuine dispute.45 When opposing parties tell different stories and one is blatantly contradicted by the record so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version for purposes of ruling on the motion.46
No. The Court of Appeals adopted respondent's assertions that there was little actual threat to pedestrians or motorists, that respondent remained in control, slowed for turns, used indicators, and did not run motorists off the road.4748 The videotape tells a different story, showing respondent's vehicle racing at shockingly fast speeds, swerving around cars, crossing the double-yellow line, forcing vehicles to shoulders, running red lights, and traveling in the turn lane while pursued by police engaging in the same maneuvers.49 Respondent's version is so utterly discredited by the record that no reasonable jury could have believed it.50 The Court of Appeals should not have relied on such visible fiction and instead should have viewed the facts in the light depicted by the videotape.51
A court should not adopt a plaintiff's version of the facts when it is blatantly contradicted by a videotape in the record.52