325 U.S. 91 (1945)
Petitioner Screws was sheriff of Baker County, Georgia. He enlisted the assistance of petitioner Jones, a policeman, and petitioner Kelley, a special deputy, in arresting Robert Hall, a citizen of the United States and of Georgia.1 Hall, a young negro about thirty years of age, was handcuffed and taken by car to the court house.2
The arrest was made late at night at Hall's home on a warrant charging Hall with theft of a tire.3 As Hall alighted from the car at the court-house square, the three petitioners began beating him with their fists and with a solid-bar blackjack about eight inches long and weighing two pounds.4 After Hall, still handcuffed, had been knocked to the ground they continued to beat him from fifteen to thirty minutes until he was unconscious.5 Hall was then dragged feet first through the court-house yard into the jail and thrown upon the floor dying.6 An ambulance was called and Hall was removed to a hospital where he died within the hour and without regaining consciousness.7 There was evidence that Screws held a grudge against Hall and had threatened to "get" him.8
An indictment was returned against petitioners, one count charging a violation of section 20 of the Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C. § 52, and another charging a conspiracy to violate section 20 contrary to section 37 of the Criminal Code, 18 U.S.C. § 88.9 The indictment charged that petitioners, acting under color of the laws of Georgia, willfully caused Hall to be deprived of rights, privileges, or immunities secured or protected to him by the Fourteenth Amendment, the right not to be deprived of life without due process of law.10 Petitioners unlawfully and wrongfully did assault, strike and beat the said Robert Hall about the head with human fists and a blackjack causing injuries to Hall which were the proximate and immediate cause of his death.11
The case was tried to a jury.12 The jury returned a verdict of guilty and a fine and imprisonment on each count was imposed.13 The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction, one judge dissenting.14 140 F.2d 662. The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the importance in the administration of the criminal laws of the questions presented.15
Whether section 20 of the Criminal Code requires proof that defendants acted with a specific intent to deprive the victim of a constitutional right?16
The specific intent required by the Act is to deprive a person of a right made specific either by the express terms of the Constitution or laws of the United States or by decisions interpreting them.17
Yes. The established facts show that petitioners Screws, Jones, and Kelley arrested Robert Hall on a theft warrant, handcuffed him, and beat him with fists and a blackjack for fifteen to thirty minutes until he was unconscious, then dragged him into jail where he died without regaining consciousness.18 The jury instructions permitted conviction on a showing of generally bad purpose or excessive force during the arrest.19 They did not require the jury to find that the petitioners acted with the specific purpose to deprive Hall of a constitutional right such as the right to due process through trial by a court rather than by ordeal.20
The conviction cannot stand because the jury was not instructed on the essential element of specific intent to deprive the victim of a defined constitutional right.21
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Justice Rutledge concurred in the result of reversal.22 He stated that for the compelling reason of the jury instruction defect he concurred in reversing the judgment and remanding the cause for further proceedings.23 He noted that the acts of the defendants were shocking.24
They deprived the victim of rights guaranteed by the Constitution.25 The statute was intended to reach such conduct.26 He agreed that the judgment should be reversed for the reasons stated by Mr. Justice Douglas.27
Whether the petitioners acted under color of law when they arrested, assaulted, and killed Robert Hall?28
Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken under color of state law.29
Yes. The established facts demonstrate that Screws as sheriff, Jones as policeman, and Kelley as special deputy were officers of the law who made the arrest of Hall pursuant to a warrant charging theft of a tire.30 By their own admissions they assaulted Hall to protect themselves and to keep their prisoner from escaping.31 It was their duty under Georgia law to make the arrest effective.32 Their conduct therefore came within the statute even though they used excessive force.33
The petitioners acted under color of law in making the arrest and assaulting Hall.34
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Joined by Justice Frankfurter And Justice Jackson
Justice Roberts dissented on the ground that the phrase under color of any law means the officer must be acting in pursuance of some statute or ordinance.35 The acts here were not done under color of law.36 They were acts of lawlessness.37
The statute does not cover them.38 The judgment should be reversed on the ground that the indictment does not state an offense under the statute.39 Roberts emphasized that the statute was never intended to reach every act of a state officer that deprives a person of due process.40
Instead the phrase requires that the officer be acting in pursuance of some statute or ordinance.41 Because the petitioners' conduct constituted pure lawlessness rather than action under color of law, the federal statute simply does not apply.42
Whether the trial court's jury instructions adequately explained the elements of the offense under section 20?43
To convict under section 20 the jury must be instructed that it is necessary to find the defendants had the purpose to deprive the prisoner of a constitutional right such as the right to be tried by a court rather than by ordeal.44
No. The trial court charged the jury that the defendants acted illegally if they applied more force than was necessary to make the arrest effectual or to protect themselves.45 The court did not further instruct that it was not sufficient that petitioners had a generally bad purpose.46 Conviction required a finding they had the specific purpose to deprive Hall of a constitutional right.47 The established facts of the prolonged beating of the handcuffed Hall therefore were not properly submitted to the jury under the correct legal standard.48
The jury instructions were inadequate and the judgment must be reversed for a new trial.
Whether section 20 is unconstitutionally vague when applied to deprivations of rights secured by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment?49
A requirement of specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right made definite by decision or other rule of law saves the Act from any charge of unconstitutionality on the grounds of vagueness.50
No. When section 20 is confined to willful acts done with the specific intent to deprive a person of a right made specific by the Constitution or decisions interpreting it, the statute provides fair warning.51 One who acts with such intent knows that what he does is precisely what the statute forbids.52 The established facts of the petitioners' conduct as officers beating Hall to death while he was in custody can be measured against the defined right to due process through trial rather than ordeal.53
Section 20 is not unconstitutionally vague when construed to require specific intent.54
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Justice Murphy dissented and would have affirmed the conviction.55 He argued that the reference in section 20 to rights protected by the Constitution is manifest and simple.56 The right not to be deprived of life without due process of law is distinctly and lucidly protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.57
He concluded that common sense gives an affirmative answer to whether the statute gives fair warning to state officials that they are criminally liable for violating the right to life.58 The evidence overwhelmingly showed the officials willfully deprived Hall of that right.59
Whether the indictment sufficiently specified the constitutional rights of which the victim was allegedly deprived?60
The indictment must charge a deprivation of rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment with sufficient specificity to identify the particular constitutional right at issue.61
No. The indictment charged that the defendants deprived Hall of the rights secured to him by the Fourteenth Amendment to be secure in his person while in the custody of the defendants, to be tried by due process of law, and to be immune from illegal assault and battery and from illegal whipping and torture.62 This formulation did not specify the particular constitutional right with the precision required once the statute is construed to demand specific intent to deprive the victim of a defined right.63
The indictment was insufficient under the proper construction of the statute.64