351 U.S. 427 (1956)
In 1953, Mackey and another brought this action presenting multiple claims for relief in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.1
Mackey, a citizen of Illinois, and Time Saver Tools, Inc., an Illinois corporation owned by Mackey, sued Sears, Roebuck & Co., a New York corporation doing business in Illinois.2
The complaint contained six counts.3 The claims stated in Counts I and II were material and have been dismissed without leave to amend.4 The claim contained in Count III and that in amended Count IV are at issue on the answers filed by Sears, Roebuck & Co.5
The District Court expressly directed that judgment be entered for the defendant, Sears, Roebuck & Co., on two, but less than all, of the claims presented.6 It also expressly determined that there was no just reason for delay in making the entry.7 After Mackey’s notice of appeal from that judgment to the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, Sears, Roebuck & Co. moved to dismiss the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.8
The Court of Appeals upheld its jurisdiction and denied the motion.9 Because of the importance of the issue in determining appellate jurisdiction and because of a conflict of judicial views on the subject, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.10
Whether the judgment of the District Court dismissing Counts I and II is presently appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, when the District Court has made an express determination that there is no just reason for delay, and an express direction for the entry of judgment?11
Amended Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that, when more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, the court may direct the entry of a final judgment upon one or more but less than all of the claims.12 This direction is allowed only upon an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry of judgment.13 This rule does not relax the finality required of each decision. It provides a practical means of permitting an appeal from final decisions on individual claims in multiple claims actions without waiting for final decisions on all claims.14 The rule recognizes the statutory requirement of a final decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 as a basic requirement for an appeal.15
Yes. The District Court dismissed the claims stated in Counts I and II without disturbing Counts III and IV, constituting final decisions on individual claims that are sufficiently independent to be decided separately.16 The District Court made the required express determination that there was no just reason for delay and gave an express direction for the entry of judgment.17 These facts satisfy the conditions of amended Rule 54(b), allowing the Court of Appeals to exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 over the appeal from the judgment on Counts I and II.18
The claims in Counts I and II can be decided independently of those in Counts III and IV, confirming that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the appeal.19
The judgment of the District Court is presently appealable, and the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals is sustained.20
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Frankfurter concurred in the result but expressed concern that the Court's approach impairs the historic policy against piecemeal appeals embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 1291.21 He argued that the separate-and-independent test should continue to guide determinations of finality in multiple claims litigation.22 While Count II was appealable because its transactions did not overlap with Counts III and IV, Count I involved overlapping facts yet was appealable under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 as an interlocutory order denying an injunction.23
Frankfurter warned that committing the determination of finality to the individualized notions of district judges risks anarchy rather than flexibility.24 The requirement of a final decision cannot be left to the district court to confer jurisdiction on the court of appeals.25