467 U.S. 20, 32–33, 36 (1984)
Respondent Rhinehart serves as the spiritual leader of the Aquarian Foundation, a religious group with fewer than 1,000 members mostly residing in Washington whose beliefs include life after death and communication with the dead through a medium.1 Between 1973 and 1979 the Seattle Times and the Walla Walla Union-Bulletin published eleven articles describing Rhinehart's operation of the Foundation, seances in which participants paid to contact deceased relatives, sales of magical stones expelled from his body, a vacated sodomy conviction, an extravaganza at the Walla Walla State Penitentiary that included cash prizes and a chorus line, and an alleged connection to actor Lou Ferrigno.2
Rhinehart, the Foundation, and five female members who participated in the penitentiary presentation filed suit in Washington Superior Court against the newspapers, the article authors, and the authors' spouses.3 The complaint alleged that the articles contained fictional and untrue statements that petitioners knew or should have known were false, that the articles held Rhinehart up to public scorn and impeached his honesty, integrity, virtue, religious philosophy, and professional reputation, and that the articles discouraged contributions and diminished the Foundation's financial ability to pursue its purposes; it sought $14,100,000 in damages for defamation and invasions of privacy.4
Petitioners answered and promptly pursued extensive discovery by deposing Rhinehart, requesting production of documents concerning the financial affairs of Rhinehart and the Foundation, and serving extensive interrogatories.5 Respondents produced several financial documents including income tax returns but refused to disclose additional financial information, the identities of all donors during the preceding ten years, and a list of members during that period.6
Petitioners moved under Civil Rule 37 for an order compelling discovery.7 Respondents opposed the motion on First Amendment grounds and separately moved for a protective order, noting petitioners' stated intention to continue publishing articles and to use discovered information in future articles.8 The trial court initially granted the motion to compel and denied the protective order without prejudice, but after respondents submitted affidavits detailing threatening letters, telephone calls, attacks, and assaults, the court issued a protective order covering all discovered information pertaining to the financial affairs of the plaintiffs, the names and addresses of Aquarian Foundation members, contributors, or clients, and the names and addresses of those who had been contributors, clients, or donors, prohibiting any use or dissemination except as necessary to prepare for and try the case.9
Respondents appealed the production order and petitioners appealed the protective order.10 The Supreme Court of Washington affirmed both orders.11 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a conflict with decisions of the District of Columbia Circuit and the First Circuit.12
Whether parties to civil litigation have a First Amendment right to disseminate, in advance of trial, information gained through the pretrial discovery process?13
Protective orders entered on a showing of good cause as required by Rule 26(c), limited to the context of pretrial civil discovery, and not restricting the dissemination of the information if gained from other sources, do not offend the First Amendment.14
No. Petitioners gained access to the donor and member identities solely through the trial court's discovery processes under Washington Superior Court Civil Rule 26(b)(1), which exist as a matter of legislative grace rather than constitutional right.15 The protective order was issued only after respondents submitted affidavits detailing threats, assaults, and harassment that established good cause to shield the privacy and associational interests of Foundation members and donors.16 The order applies exclusively to information obtained via discovery and leaves petitioners free to publish the same facts if acquired through independent means.17 These limitations advance the substantial governmental interest in preventing abuse of compelled discovery without imposing restrictions greater than necessary to protect that interest.18
Parties to civil litigation do not possess an unrestrained First Amendment right to disseminate information obtained through pretrial discovery when a protective order has been properly entered on a showing of good cause.19
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Marshall
Justice Brennan, with whom Justice Marshall joins, concurs in the judgment.20 The Court today recognizes that pretrial protective orders, designed to limit the dissemination of information gained through the civil discovery process, are subject to scrutiny under the First Amendment.21 Before approving such protective orders, it is necessary to consider whether the practice in question furthers an important or substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of expression and whether the limitation of First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is necessary or essential to the protection of the particular governmental interest involved.22
In this case, the respondents opposed discovery, and in the alternative sought a protective order for discovered materials, because the compelled production of the identities of the Foundation's donors and members would violate the First Amendment rights of members and donors to privacy, freedom of religion, and freedom of association.23 The Supreme Court of Washington found that these interests constituted the requisite good cause under the State's Rule 26(c).24 Given this finding, the court approved a protective order limited to information regarding the financial affairs of the various respondents, the names and addresses of Aquarian Foundation members, contributors, or clients, and the names and addresses of those who have been contributors, clients, or donors to any of the various respondents.25
Brennan agrees that the respondents' interests in privacy and religious freedom are sufficient to justify this protective order and to overcome the protections afforded free expression by the First Amendment.26