517 U.S. 44, 106 (1996)
In 1988 Congress enacted the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act to provide a statutory basis for the operation of gaming by Indian tribes.1 The Act divides gaming on Indian lands into three classes.2 Class III gaming includes slot machines, casino games, banking card games, dog racing, and lotteries.3 Such gaming is lawful only when conducted in conformance with a Tribal-State compact entered into by the Indian tribe and the State.4
The Act imposes upon the States a duty to negotiate in good faith with an Indian tribe toward the formation of such a compact.5 It authorizes a tribe to bring suit in federal court against a State in order to compel performance of that duty.6 The Seminole Tribe of Florida requested that the State of Florida enter into negotiations for a compact governing class III gaming on the Tribe's lands.7
When the State refused to negotiate, the Tribe filed suit in September 1991 in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida against the State and its Governor, Lawton Chiles.8 The Tribe invoked jurisdiction under 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(7)(A), as well as 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1362.9 It alleged that respondents had refused to enter into any negotiation for inclusion of certain gaming activities in a tribal-state compact, thereby violating the requirement of good faith negotiation contained in § 2710(d)(3).10
The State moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the suit violated the State's sovereign immunity from suit in federal court.11 The District Court denied the motion.12 On interlocutory appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit reversed.13 It held that the Eleventh Amendment barred the Tribe's suit against the State and that the doctrine of Ex parte Young did not permit a suit against the Governor to enforce the statutory duty.14 The Eleventh Circuit remanded with directions to dismiss the suit.15
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in 1995 to consider whether the Eleventh Amendment prevents Congress from authorizing suits by Indian tribes against States for prospective injunctive relief to enforce legislation enacted pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause and whether the Ex parte Young doctrine permits suits against a State's Governor for such relief.16
Whether the Eleventh Amendment prevents Congress from authorizing suits by Indian tribes against States for alleged violations of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act?17
The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing suits brought by private parties against a State without the State’s consent.18 Congress may abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity only pursuant to a valid exercise of constitutional power.19 The power to abrogate is not among the powers delegated to Congress under Article I.20
Yes. The Seminole Tribe of Florida sued the State of Florida and its Governor under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act after the State refused to negotiate a compact for class III gaming. The Act was enacted pursuant to the Indian Commerce Clause. The Court overruled Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. and held that Article I cannot be used to circumvent the limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction by the Eleventh Amendment.
The Eleventh Amendment bars the Tribe's suit against the State of Florida.21
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stevens dissented on the ground that the Indian Commerce Clause is a broad grant of authority to Congress to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes.22 That authority includes the power to abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity when necessary to effectuate the purposes of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act.23 He argued that the majority's reliance on the Eleventh Amendment is misplaced because the Amendment was not intended to bar suits against the States by Indian tribes.24
The history of the Amendment and the structure of the Constitution support congressional power to authorize such suits.25 Justice Stevens further contended that the Framers assumed Congress possessed the power to subject States to suit and that the Eleventh Amendment addressed only diversity jurisdiction.26
Joined by Justices Ginsburg And Breyer
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, dissented and emphasized that the decision undermines the purposes of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act and the federal government’s trust responsibility to the Indian tribes.27 He argued that the Court’s narrow view of congressional power under the Indian Commerce Clause is inconsistent with the broad authority granted to Congress in matters involving Indian affairs as recognized in Morton v. Mancari.28 Justice Souter stressed that the decision will have unfortunate consequences for the ability of Indian tribes to negotiate compacts with the States and will hinder the development of gaming on Indian lands as authorized by Congress.29
Whether the Indian Commerce Clause grants Congress the power to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity from suit?30
The Indian Commerce Clause provides Congress with the power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes, but this power is not coextensive with the power to regulate interstate commerce and does not include the authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity.31 The Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent those constitutional limitations.32
No. Although the Indian Commerce Clause provides Congress with power to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes, the Court held that this power does not grant Congress the authority to abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity.33 The Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent those constitutional limitations.
The Indian Commerce Clause does not grant Congress the power to abrogate the States' sovereign immunity from suit.34
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stevens dissented on the ground that the Indian Commerce Clause is a broad grant of authority to Congress to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes. That authority includes the power to abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity when necessary to effectuate the purposes of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. He argued that the majority's reliance on the Eleventh Amendment is misplaced because the Amendment was not intended to bar suits against the States by Indian tribes.
The history of the Amendment and the structure of the Constitution support congressional power to authorize such suits. Justice Stevens further contended that the Framers assumed Congress possessed the power to subject States to suit and that the Eleventh Amendment addressed only diversity jurisdiction.
Joined by Justices Ginsburg And Breyer
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, dissented and emphasized that the decision undermines the purposes of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act and the federal government’s trust responsibility to the Indian tribes. He argued that the Court’s narrow view of congressional power under the Indian Commerce Clause is inconsistent with the broad authority granted to Congress in matters involving Indian affairs as recognized in Morton v. Mancari. Justice Souter stressed that the decision will have unfortunate consequences for the ability of Indian tribes to negotiate compacts with the States and will hinder the development of gaming on Indian lands as authorized by Congress.
Whether the doctrine of Ex parte Young permits an Indian tribe to sue a state governor to enforce the good-faith negotiation requirement of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act?35
Although the doctrine of Ex parte Young permits suits against state officials for prospective injunctive relief to end a continuing violation of federal law, where Congress has created a detailed remedial scheme for enforcement of a statutory right a court should not permit an action against a state officer that would circumvent the limitations of that scheme.36
No. The Indian Gaming Regulatory Act creates an elaborate remedial scheme that limits the remedies available when a State fails to negotiate in good faith.37 Allowing an Ex parte Young action against the Governor would expose the official to the full remedial powers of a federal court and render the statutory scheme superfluous.38
The doctrine of Ex parte Young does not permit the Tribe to sue the Governor to enforce the good-faith negotiation requirement.39
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Stevens dissented on the ground that the Indian Commerce Clause is a broad grant of authority to Congress to regulate commerce with the Indian tribes. That authority includes the power to abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity when necessary to effectuate the purposes of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. He argued that the majority's reliance on the Eleventh Amendment is misplaced because the Amendment was not intended to bar suits against the States by Indian tribes.
The history of the Amendment and the structure of the Constitution support congressional power to authorize such suits. Justice Stevens further contended that the Framers assumed Congress possessed the power to subject States to suit and that the Eleventh Amendment addressed only diversity jurisdiction.
Joined by Justices Ginsburg And Breyer
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, dissented and emphasized that the decision undermines the purposes of the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act and the federal government’s trust responsibility to the Indian tribes. He argued that the Court’s narrow view of congressional power under the Indian Commerce Clause is inconsistent with the broad authority granted to Congress in matters involving Indian affairs as recognized in Morton v. Mancari. Justice Souter stressed that the decision will have unfortunate consequences for the ability of Indian tribes to negotiate compacts with the States and will hinder the development of gaming on Indian lands as authorized by Congress.