55 Misc. 2d 286, 285 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1967)
The plaintiff brought suit against the defendant corporation, a supplier of fuel oil, for damages sustained to the lawn and shrubbery on his property by reason of defendant’s alleged unauthorized delivery of fuel oil to his home.1 The claimed damages were apparently sustained because of spillage.2 Plaintiff’s complaint in its first cause of action alleges a trespass and the unauthorized deposit of fuel oil upon the lawn and shrub beds surrounding plaintiff’s home, and in its second cause of action, alleges negligence on the part of the defendant in delivering the oil.3
It appears that the defendant corporation had a contract with the former owner of plaintiff’s premises to deliver fuel oil.4 The defendant claims that he had no notice of cancellation of the contract.5 The spillage was caused by the fact that defendant was not aware that plaintiff’s tank contained the amount that it did actually contain.6 The defendant assumed that the amount of oil he intended to deliver would not have caused an overflow.7 This assumption rested on the fact that an intervening delivery of oil had taken place between the time he had last delivered oil and the time the delivery complained of took place.8 Plaintiff has moved for summary judgment.9
Defendant’s papers set forth that he is being defended by one attorney on the first cause of action and by another on the second, and affidavits from both attorneys have been submitted in opposition to the motion.10
Whether the defendant corporation's delivery of fuel oil to the plaintiff's property without authorization from the current owner constituted a trespass?11
Yes. The defendant corporation admitted the delivery of oil to the plaintiff's premises in the affidavit of its secretary-treasurer.14 The defendant possessed no agreement with the plaintiff and relied solely on a contract with the former owner.15 This intentional act of entering the land and depositing oil on the lawn and shrub beds produced the unauthorized invasion, establishing liability for trespass regardless of the defendant's mistaken belief that the delivery was authorized.16
The unauthorized delivery constituted a trespass.17
Whether the defendant was entitled to notice of cancellation of its prior contract with the former owner in the absence of any agreement with the plaintiff?18
Lacking privity between the parties, a claimed right to notice of cancellation from the current owner is without substance when the contract existed only with the former owner.19
The defendant was not entitled to notice of cancellation from the plaintiff.22
Whether proof that the defendant intended to commit a trespass is required to establish liability for the unauthorized oil delivery?23
No. Although the plaintiff's papers do not allege facts tending to prove that the defendant intended to commit a trespass, no such proof is necessary.26 The defendant intended to deliver the oil, and its innocence or mistaken belief that the visit was authorized is of no moment in establishing liability.27
Proof of intent to commit a trespass is not required.28
Whether the plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on the first cause of action for trespass?29
Summary judgment is proper on a trespass claim when the defendant's conduct constitutes an actionable trespass and the delivery was unauthorized because the defendant lacked any agreement with the current owner.30
Yes. The facts alleged by the plaintiff demonstrate that the defendant's deposit of oil on the premises constituted a trespass.31 Summary judgment is therefore granted on the first cause of action, with the matter set down for a hearing to assess damages; the motion on the negligence cause of action is denied as moot.32
The plaintiff is entitled to summary judgment on the first cause of action for trespass.33
Whether a defendant may be represented by more than one attorney in a single action?34
No. The defendant's papers set forth that it is being defended by one attorney on the first cause of action and by another on the second, with affidavits from both attorneys submitted in opposition to the motion.37 This practice is unauthorized, and the defendant is directed to designate one attorney to represent it on both causes of action.38
The defendant may not be represented by more than one attorney in a single action.39