486 U.S. 466 (1988)
In 1985, petitioner Shapero, a member of Kentucky’s integrated bar, applied to the Kentucky Attorneys Advertising Commission for approval of a letter he proposed to send to potential clients who had foreclosure suits filed against them.1 The proposed letter stated that it had come to the lawyer’s attention that the recipient’s home was being foreclosed on, suggested that federal law might allow the recipient to keep the home, and offered free information from the lawyer’s office during business hours, urging the recipient to call immediately.2
The Commission found the letter neither false nor misleading yet declined approval under Kentucky Supreme Court Rule 3.135(5)(b)(i), which barred written advertisements precipitated by a specific event involving the addressee.3 The Commission recommended amending the rules to conform with constitutional requirements as interpreted in Zauderer, prompting Shapero to seek an advisory opinion from the Committee on Legal Ethics of the Kentucky Bar Association.4
The Ethics Committee upheld the prohibition, finding it consistent with ABA Model Rule 7.3.5 On review, the Kentucky Supreme Court deleted Rule 3.135(5)(b)(i) and replaced it with ABA Model Rule 7.3, which likewise prohibits targeted direct-mail solicitation by lawyers for pecuniary gain absent any finding that a particular letter is false or misleading.6 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the First Amendment question.7
Whether a State may, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, categorically prohibit lawyers from soliciting legal business for pecuniary gain by sending truthful and nondeceptive letters to potential clients known to face particular legal problems?8
Lawyer advertising is constitutionally protected commercial speech. Commercial speech that is not false or deceptive and does not concern unlawful activities may be restricted only in the service of a substantial governmental interest, and only through means that directly advance that interest.9 Targeted direct-mail solicitation by lawyers, like other forms of written advertising, does not present the same risks of overreaching or undue influence as in-person solicitation and therefore may not be categorically banned.10
No. The Court applied the Central Hudson test, under which truthful commercial speech may be restricted only if the restriction directly advances a substantial state interest through means no broader than reasonably necessary.11 Shapero’s proposed letter was found by the Commission to be neither false nor misleading, and the letter constituted targeted written communication that recipients could ignore or discard at their convenience.12 Unlike in-person solicitation, the letter lacked the coercive force of personal presence and did not invade privacy beyond what a general mailing would entail.13 The State could address any isolated risks of deception through less restrictive means, such as requiring lawyers to file solicitation letters with a regulatory agency for review, rather than imposing a total ban under Rule 7.3.14
A State may not, consistent with the First and Fourteenth Amendments, categorically prohibit lawyers from soliciting legal business for pecuniary gain by sending truthful and nondeceptive letters to potential clients known to face particular legal problems.15
Related opinions on this issue
Justice White agreed with Parts I and II of the Court’s opinion but was of the view that the matters addressed in Part III should be left to the state courts in the first instance.16
Joined by The Chief Justice And Justice Scalia
Justice O’Connor dissented, joined by the Chief Justice and Justice Scalia.17 She argued that the commercial speech doctrine applied to attorney advertising rests on defective premises and should be reexamined because it unduly interferes with valid state policies.18 In her view, targeted direct-mail advertising presents even greater risks of abuse than general advertising because personalized letters may overpower the will of unsophisticated recipients, suggest undue familiarity with the recipient’s affairs, and escape effective professional oversight, thereby undermining the substantial state interest in maintaining high ethical standards in the legal profession.19