334 U.S. 1 (1948)
In February 1911, thirty out of thirty-nine owners of property fronting both sides of Labadie Avenue between Taylor Avenue and Cora Avenue in St. Louis signed a recorded agreement.1 The agreement restricted the use and occupancy of the properties for fifty years to persons of the Caucasian race.2 It excluded occupancy by people of the Negro or Mongolian race.3
The district included fifty-seven parcels of land.4 The signers held title to forty-seven parcels.5 At the time, five parcels were owned by Negroes, with one occupied by Negro families since 1882.6
On August 11, 1945, the Shelley petitioners, who are Negroes, purchased one parcel from Fitzgerald by warranty deed for valuable consideration without knowledge of the restriction.7 On October 9, 1945, respondents sued in the Circuit Court of St. Louis to restrain the Shelleys and divest title.8 The trial court denied relief, but the Supreme Court of Missouri reversed and directed enforcement.9
In June 1934, Ferguson and his wife executed a contract restricting their Detroit property to Caucasian occupancy.10 The restriction was effective only if at least eighty percent of the lots in the block were subjected to similar restrictions.11 The restrictions were to remain in effect until January 1, 1960.12 Similar agreements covered eighty percent of the lots.13
By deed dated November 30, 1944, the McGhee petitioners, who were Negroes, acquired and occupied the Detroit property.14 On January 30, 1945, respondents sued in Wayne County Circuit Court.15 The court ordered them to move within ninety days and enjoined future occupancy.16 The Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed.17
Petitioners claimed that judicial enforcement violated the Fourteenth Amendment.18
Whether the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment inhibits judicial enforcement by state courts of restrictive covenants based on race or color?19
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits state action denying any person equal protection of the laws.20 Such state action includes judicial enforcement of private agreements.21 Private restrictive covenants based on race standing alone do not violate the Amendment because they involve no state action.22 Their enforcement by state courts constitutes state action that denies equal protection when it prevents persons from acquiring or occupying property solely on grounds of race or color.23
Yes. The rule requires state action, which is present here because the state courts enforced the covenants by ordering divestiture of title and injunctions against occupancy in both the Missouri and Michigan cases.24 The covenants excluded Negroes from ownership and occupancy of property that the Shelleys and McGhee petitioners were willing and able to purchase from willing sellers.25 But for the judicial enforcement the petitioners would have been free to occupy the properties.26 This enforcement denied petitioners rights of property available to other citizens on equal terms.27 The personal rights guaranteed by the Amendment cannot be satisfied by reciprocal discrimination against white persons.28
The Court first established that judicial enforcement qualifies as state action under the Fourteenth Amendment because the Amendment reaches action by a state's legislative, executive, or judicial authorities.29 In the Shelley case the Supreme Court of Missouri directed enforcement after the trial court had found the agreement incomplete.30 In the McGhee case the Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed the trial court's decree ordering removal within ninety days.31 These orders applied the common-law policy of the states and invoked the full coercive power of government to prevent acquisition and occupancy on racial grounds.32
The resulting discrimination fell squarely within the prohibition.33 The covenants defined the excluded class wholly in terms of race and color and operated to bar petitioners from property rights that other citizens enjoyed as a matter of course.34 The Court rejected the argument that mutual enforceability against white persons satisfied equal protection, noting that the rights secured by the Amendment are personal and that equal protection is not achieved through indiscriminate imposition of inequalities.35