151 Ga. 27, 105 S.E. 601 (1921)
Hays v. State, 142 Ga. 592 (83 S. E. 236). The language of the other provision (§ 329) is different, as will readily appear from its verbiage: “If any person, informing or prosecuting under pretense of any penal law, shall compound with the offender, or direct the suit or information to be discontinued, unless it be by leave of the court where the same is pending, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.” It will be observed that this law provides that compounding in violation of its terms shall be a misdemeanor. The word “ crime ” is not mentioned; and it could not refer to the compounding of a felony that had been actually committed, because such a construction would cause the statute to be in conflict with § 328, which makes it a felony to compound felonies. The words, “informing or prosecuting under pretense of any penal law,” are employed. This language was employed in our first statute on the subject. Penal Code of 1833, § 32; Cobb’s Digest, 808. “Pretense” as here employed is used in its offensive sense, as “that which is advanced or displayed for the purpose of concealing the reality; . . a ruse or wile masking ulterior design.” Standard Dictionary. The use of this word denotes an intention to punish a person for informing or prosecuting another under “ pretense ” that such other has committed an offense for which he might be prosecuted, when in fact such person has not commited any offense; the thing thus condemned is in the nature of a fraud, and is punished as for a misdemeanor. The prosecution contemplated is a proseeution in a court which would have jurisdiction to try the pretended offender, and which would have authority to allow the parties to compound the pretended offense. This is manifest from the use of the language, “unless it be by leave of the court where the same is pending.” Thus construed, § 329 means that if any person informing or prosecuting under pretense of any penal law, after the commencement of a prosecution in a court having jurisdiction of the pretended offense, shall compound with the alleged offender or direct a suit or information to be discontinued, without leave of the court, he shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. As the offense consists of compounding, without consent of the court, with the person prosecuted for a pretended offense, it follows that in such cases it would not be necessary to charge and prove specifically the elements necessary to make the pretended offense. The indictment was not subject to the demurrer.
All the Justices concur.