374 U.S. 398 (1963)
Appellant joined the Seventh-day Adventist Church in 1957 while working at a textile mill in South Carolina that permitted a five-day work week.1 In 1959 the employer changed the schedule to a six-day week that included Saturday shifts for all employees.2 Appellant was discharged because she would not work on Saturday, the Sabbath day of her faith.3
After her discharge, appellant sought employment with three other mills in the Spartanburg area but found no suitable five-day work available.4 She filed a claim for unemployment compensation benefits under the South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act.5 The Employment Security Commission denied the claim, finding that her restriction on Saturday work made her ineligible for benefits.6
The Court of Common Pleas for Spartanburg County sustained the Commission's decision.7 The South Carolina Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas.8 The state supreme court rejected appellant's claim that the denial of benefits abridged her right to the free exercise of her religion under the First Amendment as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.9
The United States Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction of the appeal.10 The case was argued on April 24, 1963, and decided on June 17, 1963.11
Whether the South Carolina Unemployment Compensation Act's denial of benefits to a claimant who refuses Saturday work on religious grounds imposes a burden on the free exercise of religion?12
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids governmental action that burdens religious exercise by conditioning a public benefit on the abandonment of a religious practice, even when the burden is indirect rather than a direct criminal sanction.13
Yes. Appellant joined the Seventh-day Adventist Church in 1957 while employed at a textile mill that allowed a five-day work week.14 In 1959 the employer changed operations to a six-day schedule that included Saturday shifts for all employees.15 Appellant was discharged solely because her religious convictions prohibited Saturday labor.16
She then applied for work at three other mills in the Spartanburg area but found no suitable five-day positions available.17 When she sought unemployment compensation, the Employment Security Commission denied benefits on the ground that her religious restriction rendered her unavailable for suitable work.18 The Court of Common Pleas and the South Carolina Supreme Court both affirmed that denial.19 The resulting choice between observing her Sabbath and receiving benefits places the same coercive pressure on religious exercise as a direct fine for Saturday worship would impose.20
The denial of benefits imposes a burden on the free exercise of religion.21
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Justice Douglas agreed that the South Carolina statute runs afoul of the Free Exercise Clause.22 He observed that many faiths impose practices alien to the majority, such as Friday mosque attendance for Muslims or refusal to swear oaths for Quakers, and warned that these could be suppressed under the guise of neutral regulations.23 He stressed that the constitutional harm lies in governmental interference with individual conscience, an area the First Amendment protects regardless of measurable economic injury.24
Whether any burden on religious exercise is justified by a compelling state interest?25
Even when a law incidentally burdens religious exercise, the state must demonstrate a compelling interest of the highest order. The state must also show that no less restrictive alternative exists. A mere rational relationship to a colorable state interest is insufficient in this sensitive constitutional area.26
No. The state advanced only the possibility that fraudulent claims feigning religious objections might dilute the compensation fund or disrupt Saturday work scheduling.27 No evidence of such malingering was presented to the South Carolina Supreme Court, and the record contains no proof supporting fears of deceit.28 The Court therefore declined to assess an unasserted interest and noted that even if the risk existed, the state would still need to prove that no narrower regulation could address it without infringing religious liberty.29 In contrast to Braunfeld v. Brown, where a uniform day of rest supplied a strong secular justification that could not be achieved through exemptions, the present record offers no comparable countervailing interest.30
No compelling state interest justifies the burden on religious exercise.31
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Joined by Justice White
Justice Harlan dissented on the ground that the Constitution does not compel the state to carve out a religious exception to its neutral eligibility rules.32 He argued that the indirect financial burden here was less severe than the criminal penalty upheld in Braunfeld v. Brown and that the decision necessarily overruled that precedent.33 While he believed a legislature could permissibly accommodate religion, he concluded that the Free Exercise Clause does not require the state to single out religiously motivated unavailability for special financial assistance.34
Whether the denial of benefits violates the Establishment Clause by requiring accommodation of religious beliefs?35
The Establishment Clause prohibits governmental sponsorship or financial support of religion. Yet the Free Exercise Clause may require neutral accommodation of religious practices when the state administers public benefits. Extending unemployment compensation to a Sabbatarian on the same terms as other workers reflects governmental neutrality rather than impermissible establishment.36
No. Providing benefits to the appellant places her in the same position as any other worker who is available for suitable employment; the payment is made to her as an unemployed person, not as a Seventh-day Adventist.37 The decision does not involve direct subsidy of a religious organization or endorsement of a particular creed.38 South Carolina's existing statute already protects Sunday worshippers from mandatory work during emergencies, demonstrating that the scheme treats religious observers even-handedly rather than preferring one faith.39 The accommodation therefore fulfills the state's obligation of neutrality without constituting an establishment of religion.40
The denial of benefits does not violate the Establishment Clause; accommodation is constitutionally permissible and required under the Free Exercise Clause.41
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Justice Stewart concurred in the result but highlighted the tension between the Court's Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence.42 He argued that if the Establishment Clause forbids any public money from supporting religion, then South Carolina would be required to deny benefits even when unavailability stems from religious conviction.43 He viewed the majority's approach as inconsistent with prior Establishment Clause decisions and urged the Court to recognize that the Constitution demands positive governmental hospitality toward religious exercise rather than strict separation that disadvantages believers.44