392 U.S. 40 (1968)
In March 1965, New York City police officer Anthony Martin observed appellant Sibron over an eight-hour period in the vicinity of 742 Broadway in Brooklyn.1 During this time, Martin saw Sibron speaking with six to eight known narcotics addicts but did not overhear the conversations or see any objects pass between them.2 Later in the evening, after Sibron entered a restaurant and spoke with three more addicts, Martin approached him, directed him outside, and reached into Sibron's pocket to seize several glassine envelopes containing heroin.3
On July 10, 1964, Mount Vernon police officer Samuel Lasky, while at home in his apartment building where he had lived for twelve years, heard noises at his door and observed two men he did not recognize tiptoeing in the hallway.4 After the men fled down the stairs upon Lasky emerging from his apartment armed, Lasky pursued and apprehended appellant Peters between the fourth and fifth floors.5 Lasky then frisked Peters and removed a plastic envelope containing burglar's tools from his pocket.6
Both Sibron and Peters were charged with crimes based on the seized evidence.7 They moved to suppress the items prior to trial on Fourth Amendment grounds.8 After the trial courts denied the motions, both pleaded guilty while preserving their right to appeal the suppression rulings.9
The Appellate Division and the New York Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, upholding the searches under New York's stop-and-frisk statute.10 The Supreme Court granted certiorari in both cases to address the constitutional questions presented by the application of the statute.11
Sibron received a six-month sentence and was released after serving his term before his appeal could be fully processed through the state courts.12 He was arrested on March 9, 1965, remained in jail due to indigency until his sentence expired on July 10, 1965, and could not obtain bail pending appeal under state law.13 Delays in the New York court system meant his case reached the Court of Appeals only after release.14
Whether Sibron's case is moot after he completed service of his six-month sentence?15
A criminal case is moot only if it is shown that there is no possibility that any collateral legal consequences will be imposed on the basis of the challenged conviction.16
No. The established facts show that Sibron received a six-month sentence for unlawful possession of heroin and was released after serving his term before his appeal could be fully processed through the state courts.17 New York statutes provide that the conviction may be used to impeach his character at any future criminal trial and must be submitted to a sentencing judge if he is convicted again.18 These specific collateral legal consequences, including potential use in impeachment and recidivist sentencing, preserve a live controversy.19 The procedural history further supports this conclusion.20
Sibron was arrested on March 9, 1965, remained in jail due to indigency until his sentence expired on July 10, 1965, and could not obtain bail pending appeal under state law.21 Delays in the New York court system meant his case reached the Court of Appeals only after release, yet the possibility of ongoing disabilities keeps the matter justiciable.22
Sibron's case is not moot.23
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Justice Fortas would construe St. Pierre v. United States to mean that a criminal case is moot if it appears that no collateral legal consequences will be imposed on the basis of the challenged conviction.24 This approach differs from the majority by requiring an affirmative showing that no consequences exist rather than presuming their possibility.25
Fortas joined the judgment that the case is not moot but emphasized a stricter threshold for finding mootness in criminal appeals.26 He stressed that the mere possibility of consequences is not enough under his view and that courts should require concrete evidence of potential disabilities before proceeding to the merits.27
Whether the heroin seized from Sibron's pocket was obtained through an unconstitutional search under the Fourth Amendment?28
A police officer may conduct a limited frisk for weapons only when he has reasonable grounds to believe the individual is armed and dangerous.29 Any search must be strictly limited in scope to that justification.30 Evidence obtained without probable cause or reasonable suspicion of danger must be excluded.31
No. The established facts establish that Officer Martin observed Sibron speaking with known narcotics addicts over eight hours but overheard nothing and saw no objects exchanged.32 Martin directed Sibron outside the restaurant and immediately thrust his hand into Sibron's pocket, seizing heroin envelopes, without any testimony that he feared for his safety or that Sibron made furtive movements suggesting a weapon.33 The search exceeded any permissible self-protective scope and was not incident to a lawful arrest because no probable cause existed before the seizure.34 The officer's conduct violated the Fourth Amendment because the mere association with addicts over an extended period supplies no reasonable inference of criminal activity or danger sufficient to justify the intrusion.35
The heroin must therefore be excluded from evidence.36
The heroin was obtained through an unconstitutional search.37
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Justice Douglas concluded that talking with addicts without more rises no higher than suspicion.38 That is all we have here; and if it is sufficient for a seizure and search, then there is no such thing as privacy for this vast group of sick people.39
Douglas emphasized that the eight-hour observation produced no evidence of criminal activity beyond mere conversation, rendering the intrusion unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.40 He noted that consorting with criminals may in a particular factual setting be a basis for believing that a criminal project is underway. Yet talking with addicts without more rises no higher than suspicion.41
Justice Black dissented and would have affirmed the conviction because the officer had probable cause to believe Sibron had a dangerous weapon when he reached into his pocket after eight hours of associating with addicts.42 The limited search was justified in self-defense.43
Black stressed that police officers must act instantly in dangerous situations and that the lower courts' factual findings on reasonableness should not be overturned by this Court absent egregious error.44 He argued that when a man associating intimately and continuously with addicts shifts his hand immediately to a pocket where weapons are constantly carried, an officer is entitled to act at once to protect himself.45
Justice Harlan concurred in the result but would have rested the judgment on Terry principles.46 Association with known criminals by itself does not create adequate suspicion.47
There was no need for immediate action justifying the forcible intrusion.48 Harlan would have required additional circumstances showing an incipient crime before permitting the stop and frisk.49 He observed that the eight-hour surveillance pointed away from suspicion and that the officer had no reason to think an incipient crime or flight would occur if he stayed his hand.50
Whether the burglar's tools seized from Peters were obtained through a search incident to a lawful arrest under the Fourth Amendment?51
A search incident to a lawful arrest is valid when the officer has probable cause to arrest before the search begins. The search is limited to weapons and evidence that might be destroyed.52
Yes. The established facts show that Officer Lasky heard noises at his apartment door, observed two unrecognized men tiptoeing in the hallway of the building where he had lived for twelve years, and saw them flee down the stairs when he emerged armed.53 Lasky pursued and seized Peters by the collar between the fourth and fifth floors, at which point probable cause for attempted burglary existed.54 The subsequent pat-down that revealed the plastic envelope of burglar's tools was therefore incident to a lawful arrest and limited in scope to the justifications of officer safety and evidence preservation.55
The burglar's tools were obtained through a search incident to a lawful arrest.56
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Justice White joined the affirmance not because there was probable cause to arrest but because there was probable cause to stop Peters for questioning and thus to frisk him for dangerous weapons.57 The tools were properly admitted.58 White would have rested the decision on the stop-and-frisk authority rather than full probable cause for arrest.59
He emphasized that the pat-down occurred during a lawful stop supported by reasonable suspicion and that the discovery of the tools during that limited frisk justified their admission into evidence.60
Justice Harlan concurred in the result but would have upheld the seizure on Terry grounds of reasonable suspicion for a forced stop rather than probable cause for arrest.61 The officer's trained judgment and the need for immediate action justified the limited intrusion that produced the tools.62
Harlan cautioned against expanding probable cause doctrine in on-the-street encounters.63 He noted that the articulable circumstances were somewhat less suspicious than in Terry yet still sufficient for a forcible stop given the officer's experience and the apparent need for quick action.64
Whether the New York stop-and-frisk statute authorized searches that violated the Fourth Amendment as applied in these cases?65
The constitutional validity of a warrantless search or seizure must be judged under the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness standard in the concrete factual context of each case rather than by abstract comparison of statutory language to constitutional categories.66
No. The established facts demonstrate that the searches in both cases were evaluated under the Fourth Amendment directly.67 In Sibron the search lacked any reasonable suspicion of danger or probable cause, while in Peters the seizure was justified as incident to arrest.68 The Court therefore declined to address the facial validity of the statute and confined review to the reasonableness of the specific police conduct shown by the facts.69
The statute did not authorize unconstitutional searches as applied here because the Court judged the conduct under the Fourth Amendment.70
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Justice Harlan agreed that the Court should not pass on the facial constitutionality of the statute but noted that the core permission to stop on reasonable suspicion is constitutional under Terry.71 Any particular stop must still meet constitutional standards of reasonableness.72
Harlan would have provided more guidance on how the statute intersects with Fourth Amendment limits in future applications.73 He stressed that the New York formulation is constitutional to the extent it premises a stop on reasonable suspicion but that each application must independently satisfy Fourth Amendment requirements.74
Justice Fortas would explicitly reserve the possibility that a statute purporting to authorize a warrantless search might be so extreme as to be unconstitutional on its face regardless of the facts of the particular case.75 This reservation distinguishes his view from the majority's case-by-case approach.76
Fortas cautioned that some statutory schemes could be facially invalid even if particular applications might survive review.77 He made clear that while he joined the judgment here, extreme statutory authorizations could justify facial invalidation without regard to specific facts.78