405 U.S. 727 (1972)
The Mineral King Valley is an area of great natural beauty nestled in the Sierra Nevada Mountains in Tulare County, California, adjacent to Sequoia National Park.1 It has been part of the Sequoia National Forest since 1926 and is designated as a national game refuge by special Act of Congress.2 Though once the site of extensive mining activity, Mineral King is now used almost exclusively for recreational purposes.3 Its relative inaccessibility and lack of development have limited the number of visitors each year while preserving the valley's quality as a quasiwilderness area.4
The United States Forest Service began in the late 1940's to give consideration to Mineral King as a potential site for recreational development.5 Prodded by a rapidly increasing demand for skiing facilities, the Forest Service published a prospectus in 1965 inviting bids from private developers for the construction and operation of a ski resort.6 The proposal of Walt Disney Enterprises, Inc., was chosen from those of six bidders, and Disney received a three-year permit to conduct surveys and explorations in the valley in connection with its preparation of a complete master plan for the resort.7
The final Disney plan, approved by the Forest Service in January 1969, outlines a $35 million complex of motels, restaurants, swimming pools, parking lots, and other structures designed to accommodate 14,000 visitors daily.8 This complex is to be constructed on 80 acres of the valley floor under a 30-year use permit from the Forest Service.9 Other facilities, including ski lifts, ski trails, a cog-assisted railway, and utility installations, are to be constructed on the mountain slopes and in other parts of the valley under a revocable special-use permit.10
Representatives of the Sierra Club followed the progress of recreational planning for the valley with close attention and increasing dismay.11 They unsuccessfully sought a public hearing on the proposed development in 1965.12 In subsequent correspondence with officials of the Forest Service and the Department of the Interior, they expressed the Club's objections to Disney's plan as a whole and to particular features included in it.13 In June 1969 the Sierra Club filed the present suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California.14 The suit sought a declaratory judgment that various aspects of the proposed development contravene federal laws and regulations governing the preservation of national parks, forests, and game refuges.15 It also sought preliminary and permanent injunctions restraining the federal officials involved from granting their approval or issuing permits in connection with the Mineral King project.16 The petitioner Sierra Club sued as a membership corporation with a special interest in the conservation and the sound maintenance of the national parks, game refuges and forests of the country.17 It invoked the judicial-review provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.
After two days of hearings, the District Court granted the requested preliminary injunction.18 It rejected the respondents' challenge to the Sierra Club's standing.19 The respondents appealed, and the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed.20 With respect to the petitioner's standing, the court noted that there was no allegation in the complaint that members of the Sierra Club would be affected by the actions of the respondents other than the fact that the actions are personally displeasing or distasteful to them.21 Alternatively, the Court of Appeals held that the Sierra Club had not made an adequate showing of irreparable injury and likelihood of success on the merits to justify issuance of a preliminary injunction.22 The Sierra Club filed a petition for a writ of certiorari which the Supreme Court granted to review the questions of federal law presented.23
Whether the Sierra Club has alleged facts that entitle it to obtain judicial review of the challenged action?24
Under section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, a plaintiff has standing to obtain judicial review where the challenged action has caused injury in fact to an interest arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute. The party seeking review must be himself among the injured rather than merely possessing a special interest in the problem.25
No. The Sierra Club alleged only that it was a membership corporation with a special interest in the conservation and sound maintenance of national parks, game refuges, and forests and that its interests would be vitally affected by the Mineral King development.26 The complaint and affidavits contained no allegation that the Club or its members used Mineral King for any purpose or that their activities or pastimes would be affected by the proposed highway and ski resort.27 The alleged injury to scenery, natural objects, and wildlife therefore was not shown to fall directly upon the Sierra Club or its members as required by the injury-in-fact test.28
The Sierra Club lacks standing to obtain judicial review of the challenged action because it failed to allege facts showing that it or its members would suffer injury in fact.29
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Douglas dissented and would have reversed the judgment below.30 He argued that the critical question of standing would be simplified if federal courts allowed environmental issues to be litigated in the name of the inanimate object about to be despoiled, such as valleys, rivers, or groves of trees.31 Douglas contended that contemporary public concern for protecting nature's ecological equilibrium should lead to conferral of standing upon environmental objects to sue for their own preservation.32
Those people who have a meaningful relation to the area must be able to speak for the values which the river or valley represents.33 This would ensure that the voice of existing beneficiaries is heard before priceless bits of Americana are lost.34
Justice Brennan dissented and agreed that the Sierra Club has standing for the reasons stated by Justice Blackmun in Alternative No. 2 of his dissent.35 He therefore would reach the merits of the case rather than affirm dismissal on standing grounds.36 Brennan noted his agreement with Blackmun that the merits are substantial.37
In Brennan's view the Court should resolve the important questions concerning the Mineral King development instead of avoiding decision through a narrow application of standing doctrine.38
Justice Blackmun dissented and would have reversed the Court of Appeals judgment.39 He proposed two alternatives.40 First, reverse and approve the District Court's judgment on condition that the Sierra Club amend its complaint to allege individualized injury meeting the Court's specifications.41
Second, permit an imaginative expansion of traditional standing concepts to enable an organization such as the Sierra Club with bona fide and well-recognized attributes in the environmental area to litigate such issues.42 Blackmun emphasized that the case was not ordinary litigation and that rigid procedural concepts should not render courts helpless when addressing the nation's deteriorating environment.43