201 Cal. Rptr. 665, 670 (Ct. App. 1984)
On September 22, 1975, Sara Jane Moore attempted to assassinate President Gerald R. Ford while visiting San Francisco, California.1 Oliver W. Sipple, present in the crowd at Union Square, grabbed or struck Moore's arm as she prepared to fire.2 The attempt failed, and Sipple received widespread national publicity as a hero for his actions.3
A column by Herb Caen appeared in the San Francisco Chronicle on September 24, 1975, identifying Sipple as an ex-Marine hero and noting his associations with gay activists including Harvey Milk.4 The Los Angeles Times and other out-of-state newspapers then published articles referencing the Chronicle piece, highlighting Sipple's heroic act alongside his prominence in the San Francisco gay community and questioning the President's delayed response.5
Sipple had already made his homosexual orientation public in multiple cities before these articles.6 He had frequented gay bars and gatherings in San Francisco and elsewhere, marched in gay parades, supported gay community political campaigns, and appeared in gay magazines on several occasions.7
Sipple filed suit on September 30, 1975, against the Chronicle Publishing Company, publisher Charles de Young Thieriot, columnist Herb Caen, the Times Mirror Company, and publisher Otis Chandler.8 He alleged invasion of privacy arising from the unauthorized disclosure of his sexual orientation, claiming the publications caused family abandonment and emotional distress.9 The out-of-state defendants obtained dismissal for lack of personal jurisdiction, which was affirmed on appeal.10
California defendants moved for summary judgment in late 1975 and early 1976, but the trial court denied those motions.11 Following discovery that included depositions of Sipple and others, the defendants renewed the motion in February 1980.12 The trial court granted summary judgment on April 22, 1980, entered judgment dismissing the action on May 7, 1980, and Sipple appealed the ruling.13
Whether the facts disclosed by the articles were private facts within the meaning of the law?14
It is well settled that there are three elements of a cause of action predicated on tortious invasion of privacy. First, the disclosure of the private facts must be a public disclosure. Second, the facts disclosed must be private facts, and not public ones. Third, the matter made public must be one which would be offensive and objectionable to a reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities.15 There can be no privacy with respect to a matter which is already public or which has previously become part of the public domain. There is no liability when the defendant merely gives further publicity to information about the plaintiff which is already public or when the further publicity relates to matters which the plaintiff leaves open to the public eye.16
No. The undisputed facts reveal that prior to the publication of the newspaper articles in question Sipple's homosexual orientation and participation in gay community activities had been known by hundreds of people in a variety of cities, including New York, Dallas, Houston, San Diego, Los Angeles and San Francisco.17 Sipple spent a lot of time in the well-known gay sections of San Francisco, frequented gay bars and other homosexual gatherings in both San Francisco and other cities, marched in gay parades on several occasions, supported the campaign of Mike Caringi for the election of Emperor, participated in the coronation of the Emperor, and his friendship with Harvey Milk was well-known and publicized in gay newspapers.18 His homosexual association and name had been reported in gay magazines several times before the publications in question.19 Sipple conceded that he did not make a secret of his being a homosexual and that if anyone would ask, he would frankly admit that he was gay.20 Since Sipple's sexual orientation was already in the public domain, the articles did no more than to give further publicity to matters which Sipple left open to the eye of the public. A vital element of the tort was missing.21
The conclusion reached applies with equal force to all respondents, and the Los Angeles Times is exempt on the additional ground that it only republished the Chronicle article which implied that Sipple was gay.22 No right of privacy attaches to a matter of general interest that has already been publicly released in a periodical or in a newspaper of local or regional circulation.23
The facts disclosed by the articles were not private facts within the meaning of the law.24
Whether the publications in dispute were newsworthy?25
Our courts have recognized a broad privilege cloaking the truthful publication of all newsworthy matters. A truthful publication is protected if it is newsworthy and it does not reveal facts so offensive as to shock the community notions of decency.26 The general criteria for determining newsworthiness are the social value of the facts published, the depth of the article's intrusion into ostensibly private affairs, and the extent to which the individual voluntarily acceded to a position of public notoriety.27 The paramount test of newsworthiness is whether the matter is of legitimate public interest which in turn must be determined according to the community mores.28 The line is to be drawn when the publicity ceases to be the giving of information to which the public is entitled, and becomes a morbid and sensational prying into private lives for its own sake, with which a reasonable member of the public, with decent standards, would say that he had no concern.29
Yes. In the case at bench the publication of Sipple's homosexual orientation, which had already been widely known by many people in several communities, was not so offensive even at the time of the publication as to shock the community notions of decency.30 The record shows that the publications were not motivated by a morbid and sensational prying into Sipple's private life but rather were prompted by legitimate political considerations, i.e., to dispel the false public opinion that gays were timid, weak and unheroic figures and to raise the equally important political question whether the President of the United States entertained a discriminatory attitude or bias against a minority group such as homosexuals.31 Sipple's case squarely falls within the language emphasizing that when the legitimate public interest in the published information is substantial, a much greater intrusion into an individual's private life will be sanctioned, especially if the individual willingly entered into the public sphere.32
Sipple's contention that by saving the President's life he did not intend to enter into the limelight and become a public figure can be easily answered.33 There are other individuals who have not sought publicity or consented to it, but through their own conduct or otherwise have become a legitimate subject of public interest.34 They have, in other words, become news.35 These persons are regarded as properly subject to the public interest, and publishers are permitted to satisfy the curiosity of the public as to its heroes, leaders, villains and victims, and those who are closely associated with them.36 The authorized publicity is not limited to the event that itself arouses the public interest, and to some reasonable extent includes publicity given to facts about the individual that would otherwise be purely private.37
The publications in dispute were newsworthy.38
Whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment in the invasion of privacy action?39
A motion for summary judgment in First Amendment cases is an approved procedure. Unnecessarily protracted litigation would have a chilling effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights. Speedy resolution of cases involving free speech is desirable.40 While the crucial test as to whether to grant a motion for summary judgment remains the same in free speech cases, the courts impose more stringent burdens on one who opposes the motion. They require a showing of high probability that the plaintiff will ultimately prevail in the case.41 In the absence of such showing the courts are inclined to grant the motion and do not permit the case to proceed beyond the summary judgment stage.42
Yes. When viewed in light of the foregoing principles, the summary judgment in this case must be upheld on two grounds. First, the facts disclosed by the articles were not private facts within the meaning of the law. Second, the record likewise reveals on its face that the publications in dispute were newsworthy and thus constituted a protective shield from liability based upon invasion of privacy.43
Since the record fails to present any triable issue of fact, the trial court was justified in granting summary judgment and dismissing the case against respondents by way of summary procedure.44
The trial court properly granted summary judgment in the invasion of privacy action.45