548 N.E.2d 1226, 1228-1229 (Mass. 1990)
The plaintiff landlord applied to the defendant rent control board of Brookline for a certificate of eviction seeking to evict the defendant tenant Barry Myers on the ground that Myers had violated an obligation of his tenancy.1 The lease states that the tenant shall not assign nor underlet any part or the whole of the premises, nor shall permit the premises to be occupied for a period longer than a temporary visit by anyone except the individuals specifically named in the first paragraph of this tenancy, their spouses, and any children born to them hereafter, without first obtaining on each occasion the assent in writing of Landlord.2
After a hearing, the board found that the tenant had allowed an unauthorized person to occupy his apartment without first obtaining the landlord’s written consent.3 Nonetheless, the board refused to issue the eviction certificate.4 The board based its refusal on its determination that the lease provision implied an agreement on the part of the landlord to at least consider prospective tenants and not withhold consent unreasonably or unequivocally.5 The board also found that the landlord had acted unreasonably because she had categorically refused to allow the tenant to bring in someone new after the original cotenant had moved out.6
The landlord obtained judicial review under G. L. c. 30A, § 14, and a judge in the Brookline Division of the District Court annulled the board’s decision and ruled that the certificate of eviction should be issued.7 The board appealed, and the Appellate Division of the District Court affirmed the decision of the trial judge annulling the board’s decision and ordering issuance of the certificate of eviction.8 The Appellate Division also awarded the landlord double costs and attorneys’ fees.9
The board filed a notice of appeal from the Appellate Division’s decision and the Supreme Judicial Court granted the board’s application for direct appellate review.10
Whether a provision in a residential lease requiring the landlord’s written consent before assignment, subletting, or permitting other occupants implies an obligation on the landlord’s part to act reasonably in withholding consent?11
Massachusetts law permits a landlord to withhold consent in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner unless the landlord has expressly contracted not to do so.12 A majority of jurisdictions subscribe to the rule that a lease provision requiring the landlord’s consent to an assignment or sublease permits the landlord to refuse arbitrarily or unreasonably.13
No. The established facts show that the lease required the tenant to obtain the landlord’s written consent before permitting other occupants but contained no express agreement limiting the landlord’s discretion. The board found that the tenant had allowed an unauthorized person to occupy the apartment without consent. Yet the board refused the certificate of eviction by implying a reasonableness duty that the landlord breached through categorical refusal after the original cotenant moved out. Because the governing rule recognizes no such implied obligation in this residential lease under rent control, the board’s refusal was error.14
The provision in the residential lease does not imply an obligation on the landlord’s part to act reasonably in withholding consent.15
Whether a rent control board has authority to interpret lease provisions and determine the legal obligations of the parties when deciding whether to issue a certificate of eviction?16
Under the Brookline rent control by-law, the board has authority to determine whether the facts are in compliance with the eviction grounds, which includes interpreting lease provisions to determine the obligations imposed on the parties, subject to judicial de novo review.17 The special rent control act for Brookline provides that the rent board shall have all powers necessary or convenient to perform its functions.18
Yes. The established facts show that the board was required under the by-law to decide whether the facts attested in the landlord’s petition were in compliance with the ground that the tenant had violated an obligation of tenancy.19 To make that determination the board necessarily interpreted the lease to identify the parties’ obligations, a mixed question of fact and law that the board is authorized to resolve.20
The rent control board has authority to interpret lease provisions and determine the legal obligations of the parties when deciding whether to issue a certificate of eviction.21
Whether the Appellate Division had authority to award double costs and attorneys’ fees?22
The Appellate Division's authority to award double costs is conditioned upon finding that the appeal was frivolous or intended for delay under G. L. c. 231, § 108 and Dist. Mun. Cts. R. Civ. P. 64 (i), and neither the rule nor the statute authorizes an award of attorneys’ fees.23
No. The established facts show that the board’s appeal presented an important question of first impression concerning the lease consent provision and correctly maintained that the board possessed authority to interpret the lease.24 Because the appeal therefore was not frivolous and the governing provisions confer no power to award attorneys’ fees, the Appellate Division lacked authority for the award.25
The Appellate Division did not have authority to award double costs and attorneys’ fees.26