300 U.S. 506 (1937)
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether section 2 of the National Firearms Act of June 26, 1934, which imposes a $200 annual license tax on dealers in firearms, is a constitutional exercise of Congress's legislative power.1 Petitioner was convicted by the District Court for Eastern Illinois on two counts of an indictment, the first charging him with violation of § 2 by dealing in firearms without payment of the tax.2 On appeal the Court of Appeals set aside the conviction on the second count and affirmed on the first.3 On petition of the accused the Supreme Court granted certiorari limited to the question of the constitutional validity of the statute in its application under the first count in the indictment.4
Section 2 of the National Firearms Act requires every dealer in firearms to register with the Collector of Internal Revenue in the district where he carries on business and to pay a special excise tax of $200 a year.5 Importers or manufacturers are taxed $500 a year.6 Section 3 imposes a tax of $200 on each transfer of a firearm, payable by the transferor.7 The term “firearm” is defined by § 1 as meaning a shotgun or a rifle having a barrel less than eighteen inches in length, or any other weapon, except a pistol or revolver, from which a shot is discharged by an explosive, if capable of being concealed on the person, or a machine gun, and includes a muffler or silencer for any firearm.8 The $200 tax was paid by 27 dealers in 1934, and by 22 dealers in 1935.9
Whether § 2 of the National Firearms Act of June 26, 1934, which imposes a $200 annual license tax on dealers in firearms, is a constitutional exercise of the legislative power of Congress?10
In the exercise of its constitutional power to lay taxes, Congress may select the subjects of taxation, choosing some and omitting others.11 Its power extends to the imposition of excise taxes upon the doing of business.12 Every tax is in some measure regulatory.13 To some extent it interposes an economic impediment to the activity taxed as compared with others not taxed.14 But a tax is not any the less a tax because it has a regulatory effect.15 It has long been established that an Act of Congress which on its face purports to be an exercise of the taxing power is not any the less so because the tax is burdensome or tends to restrict or suppress the thing taxed.16 Inquiry into the hidden motives which may move Congress to exercise a power constitutionally conferred upon it is beyond the competency of courts.17
Yes. The statute on its face is only a taxing measure that requires dealers to register and pay the annual tax.18 Although the tax may have a deterrent effect on the activities taxed, every tax is regulatory to some extent because it interposes an economic impediment.19 The $200 tax produced some revenue, as shown by the fact that it was paid by 27 dealers in 1934 and by 22 dealers in 1935.20
Since the tax is not attended by an offensive regulation, it is within the national taxing power.21
Section 2 of the National Firearms Act is a constitutional exercise of the legislative power of Congress.22