428 U.S. 364 (1976)
On December 10, 1973, a Vermillion, South Dakota police officer observed respondent Opperman's unoccupied vehicle illegally parked in a restricted downtown area between 2 a.m. and 6 a.m.1 The officer issued an overtime parking ticket and placed it on the windshield, warning that vehicles in violation could be towed.
Later that morning, another officer issued a second ticket for the continuing violation, and the circumstances were reported to police headquarters.2 After inspection, the vehicle was towed to the city impound lot.3 From outside the car, an officer observed a watch on the dashboard and other personal property on the back seat and floorboard.4 The car door was unlocked, and using a standard inventory form pursuant to standard police procedures, the officer inventoried the contents, including the unlocked glove compartment, where marijuana was found in a plastic bag.5 All items were removed to the police department for safekeeping.6
Respondent Opperman was arrested on charges of possession of marijuana.7 His motion to suppress the evidence from the inventory search was denied.8 He was convicted after a jury trial and sentenced to a fine of $100 and 14 days in jail.9
The Supreme Court of South Dakota reversed the conviction, holding that the evidence had been obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment.10 The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the judgment.11
Whether a routine inventory search of an impounded automobile, including its unlocked glove compartment, conducted pursuant to standard police procedures violates the Fourth Amendment?12
The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures but does not require a warrant for every search; it demands only that the search be reasonable under the circumstances.13 In the context of automobiles lawfully impounded by police for parking violations, a routine inventory search conducted pursuant to standard police procedures is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.14 Such searches serve three distinct needs: protection of the owner's property while in police custody, protection of the police against claims or disputes over lost or stolen property, and protection of the police from potential danger.15 The expectation of privacy in an automobile is significantly less than that relating to one's home or office because automobiles are subject to pervasive governmental regulation, are mobile, and travel on public thoroughfares where their contents are often in plain view.16 Precedent establishes that warrantless examinations of automobiles in police custody are permissible when aimed at securing or protecting the vehicle and its contents, as recognized in Cooper v. California, Harris v. United States, and Cady v. Dombrowski.17
No. The Vermillion police observed Opperman's unoccupied vehicle illegally parked in a restricted downtown area between 2 a.m. and 6 a.m. on December 10, 1973, issued two overtime parking tickets, and towed the vehicle to the city impound lot after the owner could not be located to move it.18 From outside the car at the impound lot, an officer observed a watch on the dashboard and other personal property on the back seat and floorboard in plain view.19 Following standard inventory procedures used throughout the country, the officer unlocked the door and inventoried the contents on a standard form, including the unlocked glove compartment, where marijuana was discovered in a plastic bag.20 All items were removed for safekeeping.21
This inventory was not a pretext for criminal investigation but a good-faith caretaking measure prompted by valuables in plain view and the owner's absence.22 The search was limited in scope to the standard procedure and served the recognized interests in protecting property and preventing disputes. The South Dakota Supreme Court erred in holding the search unreasonable because the facts align directly with the caretaking function upheld in prior decisions where no warrant or probable cause was required.23 The reduced privacy expectation in automobiles, combined with the noncriminal context and standardized nature of the procedure, renders the search reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.24
The routine inventory search of the impounded automobile did not violate the Fourth Amendment.25
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Powell concurred in the judgment and wrote separately to emphasize that routine inventory searches are valid because the governmental interests in protecting the owner's property, shielding police from false claims, and ensuring public safety outweigh the reduced privacy expectation in automobiles.26 He explained that the search here was strictly limited to established police regulations with no officer discretion involved and was not aimed at discovering evidence of crime, eliminating any need for a warrant or probable cause determination by a magistrate.27 Powell noted that the absence of a warrant poses no risk of hindsight justification in this standardized, noninvestigatory context and that upholding such limited inventories does not authorize general rummaging through vehicles or their contents.28
Joined by Justices Brennan And Stewart
Justice Marshall dissented, joined by Justices Brennan and Stewart, contending that the inventory search of the closed glove compartment constituted an unreasonable intrusion into constitutionally protected privacy interests without probable cause, a warrant, or owner consent.29 He argued that distinctions between automobiles and homes do not justify sacrificing the integrity of closed compartments in a locked vehicle, that the record belied any genuine safety or liability-protection rationale, and that the police made no effort to contact the owner or obtain consent despite readily ascertaining his identity.30 Marshall concluded that routine searches of this scope without specific justification or consent elevate property interests above the Fourth Amendment's core protections against arbitrary governmental invasions.31