567 U.S. 343 (2012)
Southern Union Company is a natural gas distributor whose subsidiary stored liquid mercury at a facility in Pawtucket, Rhode Island.1
In September 2004 youths broke into the facility, played with the mercury, and spread it around the complex, leading to temporary displacement of residents and testing for mercury poisoning.2
In 2007 a grand jury indicted Southern Union on multiple counts of violating federal environmental statutes.3 The first count alleged that the company knowingly stored liquid mercury without a permit at the Pawtucket facility from on or about September 19, 2002 until on or about October 19, 2004, in violation of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976.4
A jury in the District Court for the District of Rhode Island convicted Southern Union on this count.5 The verdict form stated that Southern Union was guilty of unlawfully storing liquid mercury on or about September 19, 2002 to October 19, 2004.6
Violations of the RCRA are punishable by a fine of not more than $50,000 for each day of violation.7 At sentencing the probation office calculated a maximum fine of $38.1 million on the basis that Southern Union violated the RCRA for each of the 762 days from September 19, 2002 through October 19, 2004.8 Southern Union objected that this calculation violated Apprendi because the jury was not asked to determine the precise duration of the violation.9
The District Court held that Apprendi applies to criminal fines but concluded from the content and context of the verdict that the jury found a 762-day violation. The court therefore set a maximum potential fine of $38.1 million from which it imposed a fine of $6 million and a community service obligation of $12 million.10
On appeal the First Circuit rejected the District Court conclusion that the jury necessarily found a violation of 762 days but affirmed the sentence because it held that Apprendi does not apply to criminal fines.11 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve the conflict.12
Whether the rule of Apprendi v. New Jersey applies to the imposition of criminal fines?13
The Sixth Amendment reserves to juries the determination of any fact other than the fact of a prior conviction that increases a criminal defendant's maximum potential sentence.14 This principle established in Apprendi applies to sentences of imprisonment or death.15 There is no principled basis for treating criminal fines differently because Apprendi's core concern is to reserve to the jury the determination of facts that warrant punishment for a specific statutory offense.16 Criminal fines are penalties inflicted by the sovereign for the commission of offenses.17 The amount of a fine is often determined by reference to particular facts such as the duration of a violation.18
Yes. The Apprendi rule applies here because the duration of the violation is a fact that increases the maximum fine from $50,000 to $38.1 million.19
The jury verdict found a violation on or about September 19, 2002 to October 19, 2004 but did not specify the exact number of days.20 The District Court made the factual finding of 762 days to set the maximum fine which is precisely the type of judicial factfinding that Apprendi prohibits.
The First Circuit erred in holding that Apprendi does not apply to fines because the historical role of the jury at common law supports requiring jury determination of facts that set a fine's maximum amount.21
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Kennedy, J., And Alito, J.
Justice Breyer dissented on the ground that the Sixth Amendment permits a sentencing judge to determine sentencing facts relevant only to the amount of a fine.24 He maintained that historical practice in England before the founding and in the early American states showed judges ordinarily determined the amount of fines and related sentencing facts.25
Breyer argued that extending Apprendi to fines would interfere with legislative efforts to calibrate fines to a defendant's culpability through statutes that tie fines to gain or loss or duration of violation.26 He emphasized that the animating principle of Apprendi does not require jury determination of facts that merely quantify harm rather than define separate acts for punishment.27 Breyer warned that the rule would create practical difficulties in complex corporate cases involving environmental violations where loss calculations are intricate and evidence of harm might prejudice the defense.28