636 P.2d 1121 (Cal. 1981)
Respondent South Winter Mesa Associates, a joint venture between the Adamson Companies and Century-Malibu Ventures, Inc., owned a 90-acre parcel of land bounded on the north by the Pacific Coast Highway and on the south by Malibu Road.1 Across Malibu Road from the parcel stood several beachfront homes, including the home of appellant Peter Sprecher.2
The respondents' parcel contained part of an active landslide extending seaward for approximately 1,700 feet along Malibu Road.3 The Sprecher property lay within the toe of this slide.4 The landslide had been evident since the area was first developed in the early 1900s and was classified as active due to its periodic cycles of activity and dormancy.5 The parties agreed that the slide constituted a natural condition unaffected by any activities of the respondents on the parcel.6
In March 1978, heavy spring rains triggered a major movement of the slide, causing Sprecher's home to rotate and press against the home of his neighbor Gwendolyn Sexton.7 Sexton filed an action against Sprecher seeking to enjoin the encroachment.8 Sprecher cross-complained against Sexton, the County of Los Angeles, and the respondents, seeking damages for harm to his home and alleging that the damage resulted from the respondents' negligent failure to correct or control the landslide condition.9
Respondents moved for summary judgment, contending that a possessor of land has no duty to remedy a natural condition to prevent harm to property outside the premises.10 The trial court granted the motion in favor of respondents, and Sprecher appealed the judgment to the Supreme Court of California.11
Whether a possessor of land should be immunized from liability for harm caused by a natural condition of his land to persons outside his premises?12
Civil Code section 1714 establishes that everyone is responsible for injury caused by want of ordinary care in the management of his property.13 In Rowland v. Christian this court held that departures from that principle require clear support in public policy and identified the major factors for determining duty as foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff, degree of certainty that the plaintiff suffered injury, closeness of connection between defendant's conduct and the injury, moral blame attached to defendant's conduct, policy of preventing future harm, extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the community of imposing a duty, and availability, cost, and prevalence of insurance for the risk involved.14 The common law distinction granting immunity for natural conditions fails these factors and is rejected in favor of ordinary negligence principles applied to all conditions of land.15
No. The established facts demonstrate that respondents possess and control the 90-acre parcel containing part of the active landslide.16 The landslide has exhibited periodic activity since the early 1900s and the parties agree it is a natural condition unaffected by respondents' activities.17 In March 1978 heavy rains triggered movement that rotated Sprecher's home and caused it to press against his neighbor's home.18 The facts further show that the Sprecher property lies within the toe of the slide across Malibu Road from the parcel.19
Respondents moved for summary judgment relying solely on the natural-condition immunity.20 Because that immunity is rejected, the case must proceed under ordinary negligence standards that consider the likelihood of injury, the probable seriousness of injury, the burden of reducing the risk, the location of the land, and the possessor's degree of control over the risk-creating condition.21
A possessor of land owes a duty of reasonable care with respect to natural conditions and may be liable for harm caused to persons or property outside the premises when that duty is breached.22
Related opinions on this issue
Justice Richardson concurs in the judgment reversing summary judgment because landowners should act reasonably to prevent damage to neighbors regardless of whether the threatening condition is artificial or natural.23 He nevertheless observes that the landslide here is very large, very deep, and very old, extending across multiple properties with instability caused by wave action on the ocean toe and triggered by heavy rains.24 Under these circumstances he finds it exceedingly difficult to identify any restraining engineering procedures that could reasonably be required of respondents whose land comprises only a small portion of the slide area.25
Whether the trial court properly granted summary judgment on the ground that respondents' failure to take affirmative steps to control the landslide was reasonable under the circumstances?26
Summary judgment is properly granted only where the evidence supporting the moving party is sufficient to establish a complete defense and there is no triable issue of fact.27 Negligence is ordinarily a question for the trier of fact if different conclusions can rationally be drawn from the evidence.28 Doubts as to the propriety of granting the motion must be resolved in favor of the party opposing the motion.29
No. Respondents' expert affidavit asserted that corrective measures would be expensive, could not totally control the slide, and would at best be only slightly effective.30 In opposition appellant's admissible evidence established that respondents knew or had reason to know of the landslide yet did nothing and that proper excavation, sloping, and dewatering might have been effective.31 Construing the evidence liberally in favor of appellant, a rational inference can be drawn that effective measures were within respondents' reach and that the cost of implementing them might or might not be justified by the benefit.32 Because conflicting inferences exist on the reasonableness of respondents' inaction, a triable issue of fact remains.33
The motion was heard early in the litigation and respondents first raised the reasonableness argument in a reply memorandum filed only two days before the hearing, leaving appellant little opportunity to marshal additional facts.34 These circumstances reinforce that summary judgment was inappropriate.35
The trial court erred in granting summary judgment because a triable issue of fact exists regarding the reasonableness of respondents' failure to take affirmative steps to control the landslide.36