537 U.S. 51 (2002)
On July 10, 1995, petitioner’s wife, Jeanne Sprietsma, died as a result of a boating accident on an inland lake that spans the Kentucky-Tennessee border.1 She was riding in an 18-foot ski boat equipped with a 115-horsepower outboard motor manufactured by respondent, Mercury Marine, which is a division of the Brunswick Corporation.2 Apparently when the boat turned, she fell overboard and was struck by the propeller, suffering fatal injuries.3
Petitioner filed a nine-count complaint in an Illinois court seeking damages from Brunswick on state-law theories.4 Each count alleged that Brunswick had manufactured an unreasonably dangerous product because, among other things, the motor was not protected by a propeller guard.5 The complaint alleges that the Sprietsmas and the owners of the boat were residents of Illinois and that the boat had been purchased in Illinois.6
The trial court granted respondent’s motion to dismiss, and the intermediate appellate court affirmed on the ground that the action was expressly pre-empted by the FBSA.7 Relying on the intervening decision in Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., the Illinois Supreme Court rejected the appellate court’s express pre-emption rationale, but affirmed on implied pre-emption grounds.8 The court’s decision added to a split of authority on this precise issue arising from lawsuits against, among a few others, this particular respondent and its corporate subsidiaries.9 The Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether the FBSA pre-empts state common-law claims of this character.10
The 1971 Act is the most recent and most comprehensive of the several statutes that Congress has enacted to improve the safe operation of recreational boats.11 A 1910 enactment required three classes of motorboats to carry certain lights, sound signals, life preservers, and fire extinguishers.12 In 1918, Congress passed a law that required the numbering of motorboats over 16 feet long, and in 1940, it reenacted the above requirements, provided a system of federal inspection, and authorized penalties for the reckless operation of motorboats.13 In 1958, Congress enacted additional numbering requirements to be administered by the States and directed the States to compile and transmit boating accident statistics to the Secretary of the Treasury.14
In May 1988, the Coast Guard decided that the number of recreational boating accidents in which persons in the water were struck by propellers merited a special study.15 Acting at the request of the Coast Guard, the National Boating Safety Advisory Council appointed a special Propeller Guard Subcommittee.16 The subcommittee was directed to review the available data on the prevention of propeller-strike accidents and to study the methods of shrouding propellers to prevent contact with a person in the water.17 After 18 months of study, the subcommittee recommended that the Coast Guard should take no regulatory action to require propeller guards.18 The Advisory Council endorsed the subcommittee’s recommendation, as did the Coast Guard.19 In a 1990 letter the Chief of the Coast Guard’s Office of Navigation Safety and Waterway Services agreed that the available accident data did not support the adoption of a regulation requiring propeller guards on motorboats.20 The Coast Guard has invited public comment on proposals to reduce the number of injuries involving propeller strikes.21 It has considered recommendations for regulations on nonplaning houseboats and planing vessels.22 It has not yet issued any regulation either requiring or prohibiting propeller guards on recreational planing vessels such as the boat involved in this case.23
Whether the Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971 expressly preempts state common-law tort claims against outboard motor manufacturers for failure to install propeller guards?24
The express pre-emption clause in section 4306 of the FBSA applies to a state or local law or regulation establishing a recreational vessel or associated equipment performance or other safety standard.25 This language is most naturally read as not encompassing common-law claims because the article a implies discreteness embodied in statutes and regulations that is not present in the common law.26 The terms law and regulation used together indicate that Congress pre-empted only positive enactments.27 The saving clause in section 4311(g) states that compliance with the chapter does not relieve a person from liability at common law or under State law, which assumes there are common-law liability cases to save.28
No. The claims in the nine-count complaint filed by petitioner in Illinois court are state-law theories alleging that the outboard motor manufactured by Mercury Marine was unreasonably dangerous because it lacked a propeller guard.29 These are common-law tort claims, not positive enactments of state law or regulation.30 The preemption clause therefore does not apply to them.31 The saving clause preserves such claims as confirmed by the history of federal regulation under the FBSA.32
The Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971 does not expressly preempt the state common-law tort claims.33
Whether the Coast Guard's 1990 decision not to promulgate a regulation requiring propeller guards preempts such state common-law claims?34
A federal decision not to regulate a particular aspect of boating safety is fully consistent with an intent to preserve state regulatory authority pending the adoption of specific federal standards.35 The decision not to adopt a regulation does not have preemptive effect unless it conveys an authoritative message of a federal policy against propeller guards.36 This requires more than a judgment that available data did not meet the stringent criteria for federal regulation.37
No. The Coast Guard's 1990 decision, after the Propeller Guard Subcommittee study, to take no regulatory action was based on the available accident data not supporting imposition of a regulation and questions about technical feasibility.38 This decision left the law applicable to propeller guards the same as before and did not prohibit state common-law claims.39 The Coast Guard has not taken the position that such litigation would conflict with federal purposes.40 The agency does not view it as having preemptive effect.41
The Coast Guard's 1990 decision does not preempt the state common-law claims.42
Whether the Federal Boat Safety Act impliedly preempts such claims through field preemption or conflict with the federal interest in uniform boat safety regulation?43
Implied preemption occurs when the scope of a statute indicates Congress intended federal law to occupy a field exclusively.44 State law is in actual conflict with federal law when it makes compliance impossible or stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of congressional purposes. The FBSA does not require the Coast Guard to promulgate comprehensive regulations covering every aspect of recreational boat safety, unlike the statute in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., and the saving clause expressly preserves common-law claims, so there is no clear and manifest intent to preempt all state common law.45
No. The FBSA's structure does not convey a clear and manifest intent to implicitly preempt all state common law relating to boat manufacture. The express preemption clause does not cover common-law claims and the saving clause preserves them.46 The interest in uniformity is not unyielding, as shown by the Coast Guard's grants of exemptions for state regulations.47 The more prominent objective is promoting boating safety through remedies that compensate accident victims such as the claims arising from Jeanne Sprietsma's death in the 1995 boating accident.48
The Federal Boat Safety Act does not impliedly preempt the state common-law claims.49