405 U.S. 645 (1972)
Joan Stanley and Peter Stanley lived together intermittently for 18 years, during which time they had three children.1 When Joan Stanley died, Peter Stanley lost not only her but also his children.2 Under Illinois law, the children of unwed fathers become wards of the State upon the death of the mother.3 Accordingly, upon Joan Stanley’s death, in a dependency proceeding instituted by the State of Illinois, Stanley’s children were declared wards of the State and placed with court-appointed guardians.4
Stanley appealed. He claimed that he had never been shown to be an unfit parent. Since married fathers and unwed mothers could not be deprived of their children without such a showing, he had been deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed him by the Fourteenth Amendment.5 The Illinois Supreme Court accepted the fact that Stanley’s own unfitness had not been established, but rejected the equal protection claim, holding that Stanley could properly be separated from his children upon proof of the single fact that he and the dead mother had not been married.6 Stanley’s actual fitness as a father was irrelevant.7 The decision is reported at In re Stanley, 45 Ill. 2d 132, 256 N. E. 2d 814 (1970).8
Stanley presses his equal protection claim in the United States Supreme Court.9 The State responds that unwed fathers are presumed unfit to raise their children.10 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 400 U. S. 1020 (1971), to determine whether this method of procedure by presumption could be allowed to stand in light of the fact that Illinois allows married fathers — whether divorced, widowed, or separated — and mothers — even if unwed — the benefit of the presumption that they are fit to raise their children.11
Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment entitles an unwed father to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before his children are declared wards of the state?12
The Due Process Clause protects a parent's substantial interest in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his children and therefore requires an individualized hearing on fitness before the state may sever that relationship, rather than permitting removal based solely on a presumption of unfitness derived from the parent's marital status.13
Yes. Peter Stanley lived with Joan Stanley intermittently for eighteen years. He fathered three children with her. Yet upon her death Illinois instituted a dependency proceeding that declared the children wards of the state and placed them with court-appointed guardians without any showing that Stanley was an unfit parent.14 Illinois law defined parents to exclude unwed fathers and therefore allowed the state to bypass the neglect proceeding that requires notice, hearing, and proof of unfitness for married fathers, divorced fathers, widowed fathers, and unwed mothers.15 The procedure by presumption foreclosed the determinative issues of competence and care, needlessly risking the important interests of both parent and child even though nothing in the record indicated that Stanley had been a neglectful father.16
The state's interest in administrative convenience cannot justify refusing a hearing when the stake is the dismemberment of the family unit.17
Stanley was entitled under the Due Process Clause to a hearing on his fitness as a parent before his children were removed from his custody.18
Related opinions on this issue
Joined by Justice Blackmun
Chief Justice Burger, joined by Justice Blackmun, dissented.19 He contended that no due process issue had been raised or decided in the Illinois courts.20 Therefore the Court lacked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1257 to reach the question.21
Burger argued that the majority improperly converted an equal-protection claim into a due-process holding by treating the Equal Protection Clause as a shorthand for every constitutional right.22 He further maintained that the record contained no indication the state had advanced the presumption-of-unfitness rationale the majority attributed to it.23 The juvenile court had in fact viewed Stanley's acknowledgment of paternity favorably rather than as a mark of unfitness.24
Whether the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is violated when Illinois grants hearings on parental fitness to married fathers, divorced fathers, widowed fathers, and unwed mothers but denies them to unwed fathers?25
The Equal Protection Clause forbids a state from extending a hearing on parental fitness to some classes of parents. It denies the same procedural protection to unwed fathers who are similarly situated with respect to their interest in the custody of their children.26
Yes. Under the established facts, Illinois permitted married fathers, divorced fathers, widowed fathers, and unwed mothers to retain custody unless the state first proved unfitness in a neglect proceeding. Yet it subjected unwed fathers such as Peter Stanley to dependency proceedings in which custody could be lost upon the single fact of non-marriage without any hearing or proof of unfitness.27 The Illinois Supreme Court expressly accepted that Stanley's fitness had never been established and nevertheless upheld separation on the ground that the lack of marriage alone justified removal.28
This classification treated similarly situated parents differently by extending the presumption of fitness and the accompanying procedural safeguards to every parent except the unwed father, thereby denying Stanley the equal protection of the laws.29
The Illinois procedure violated the Equal Protection Clause by denying Stanley a fitness hearing that the state afforded to other parents.30